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 This dissertation is composed of 3 chapters on the topics of investor sentiment and 
institutional trading momentum. In the first chapter, I investigate whether the returns to 
cross-sectional anomalies reported in the finance literature are due to investor sentiment. I 
present evidence of a weak relation between cross-sectional anomalies and investor 
sentiment. Using a larger collection of cross-sectional anomalies, I find that only a small 
subsample of these anomalies exhibits a relation with investor sentiment. This result does 
not appear to be due to certain anomalies being more sensitive to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. Further I show that the predictive power of sentiment 
diminishes significantly after controlling for the Fama and French factors. These results 
suggest that the returns to active trading strategies are generally not due to sentiment-driven 
mispricing. In the second chapter, I investigate whether the relation between investor 
sentiment and cross-sectional anomalies is due to short sale constraints. I find that the 
average security in these strategies is not hard-to-short. Furthermore, the short leg does not 
appear to be harder to short or more overvalued than the long leg. However, I find that 
these strategies are more illiquid and have higher institutional ownership following low 
sentiment. These results imply that the relation between investor sentiment and profitable 
trading strategies could be due to illiquidity and institutional trading, rather than short sale 
constraints. Finally, in the third chapter I investigate whether the collective trades of 
financial institutions create mispricing in the stock market. Previous studies have generally 
found a positive relation between institutional demand and short-term returns, consistent 
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with the interpretation that institutional trading pushes prices towards fundamental values. 
However, these studies do not control for the general and firm-specific trends in 
institutional ownership. After removing the trend in institutional ownership using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, I find strong evidence that financial institutions create substantial 
mispricing in the market. There is a large reversal in both returns and ownership following 
periods when ownership is abnormally high or low.   
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SAMPLE SELECTION AND THE RELATION BETWEEN 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND PROFITABLE 
TRADING STRATEGIES 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that there are profitable trading opportunities 
in the stock market. A number of studies document trading strategies that have historically 
earned a positive return.1 These studies suggest that an investor could earn a positive return 
by sorting firms on an observable variable and then investing in one extreme portfolio and 
selling the other extreme portfolio. (See Ang et al. (2006, 2009), Ball and Brown (1968), 
Banz (1981), Cooper, Gulen, Schill (2008), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Sloan (1996), 
etc.)  
Some researchers provide evidence supporting the view that these strategies are 
compensation for risk (Ball, Sadka, and Sadka (2009), Fama and French (1992, 1993), 
Liew and Vassalou (2000), etc.) while other researchers present evidence implying that 
these strategies are due to mispricing (Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), etc.).  However, there is not yet 
a consensus on whether the returns to these strategies are due to risk or mispricing. 
A recent body of literature suggests that these trading strategies earn positive 
                                                 
1 I define a trading strategy as the long-short portfolio which goes long on one portfolio of securities 
and sells short another portfolio of securities.  Henceforth, I will refer to the return of the long-short portfolio 
as a trading strategy or more simply as a strategy. 
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returns because investors are unable or unwilling to make trades to eliminate the 
mispricing.  Investors are not able to correct the mispricing when the costs of doing so are 
greater than the potential payoffs. Thus, there are limits of arbitrage (Lam and Wei (2011), 
Lewellen (2011), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). In particular, a security could become 
overpriced if investors are not able to sell the security short, i.e., the security is hard-to-
short.  In a recent paper, Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) examine whether certain trading 
strategies are profitable because these strategies invest in securities that are hard-to-short.  
They investigate returns to the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios for 16 different 
trading strategies following high and low investor sentiment periods and find results 
consistent with short sale limits to arbitrage. While they present convincing evidence 
regarding the 16 strategies they examine, it is not clear whether their results can be 
extended to all profitable trading strategies or are specific to the strategies that they tested. 
Using the same tests employed in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) and a larger 
collection of trading strategies, I re-examine whether these strategies are profitable because 
these strategies take short positions in hard-to-short securities.  I find much weaker 
evidence in support of the hard-to-short hypothesis.  Based on the arguments presented in 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), the long leg of each investment strategy should not have 
large return differences following high and low investor sentiment, while the short leg 
should have lower returns following high investor sentiment than following low investor 
sentiment.  Additionally, each strategy should be more profitable following periods of high 
sentiment.2 
                                                 
2 Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) rely on Miller’s (1977) reasoning that if a security is hard-to-
short, it might become overvalued in the sense that it does not reflect the average market valuation because 
investors cannot make trades that would lead the security to a price that reflects this average valuation.  
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I test if the results reported in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) can be extended to 
34 additional trading strategies.  Consistent with their results, I find that the returns of the 
long leg portfolios are weakly affected by investor sentiment.  Therefore, the long leg 
portfolio results presented in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) can be generalized to a 
larger collection of trading strategies.  This implies that the returns to the long leg portfolios 
are not due to short sale constraints. 
Next I test if the short leg of each strategy has a higher return following high 
investor sentiment than following low investor sentiment. However, unlike in Stambaugh, 
Yu, and Yuan (2012), I find that for a large number of trading strategies there is essentially 
no difference in returns for the short leg across periods of high versus low investor 
sentiment.  Using the same tests used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), I also find 
evidence that a large number of trading strategies are not more profitable following high 
investor sentiment. Typically, I find evidence consistent with the hard-to-short hypothesis 
for less than 40% of the trading strategies considered.  This result is robust across 6 
measures of investor sentiment.  
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) find that the returns to a set of 16 trading 
strategies can be predicted using lagged investor sentiment.  However, when I re-run the 
same tests using a larger collection of trading strategies I find that the majority of the 
                                                 
Combining this argument with investor sentiment, they propose that firms are more likely to be overvalued 
following high investor sentiment when expectations are also high, than following low investor sentiment 
when expectations are lower. Using the preceding argument, Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) reason that if 
a strategy is profitable primarily due to overpricing, the returns to this strategy should be larger following 
high investor sentiment than following low investor sentiment.  Additionally, supposing that the securities in 
the long leg face the least amount of short sales constraints, these securities should not be greatly affected by 
investor sentiment, because if a security becomes over- or under-valued then this mispricing can be corrected 
by the market.  On the other hand, supposing that the securities in the short leg face short sale constraints, 
then these securities are more likely to become overvalued when sentiment is high, leading these securities 
to have lower returns following high investor sentiment. 
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returns to these strategies cannot be predicted using lagged investor sentiment.  I check the 
robustness of these results using 5 additional measures of investor sentiment and find 
similar results.   
In a recent paper, Sibley et al. (2013) present evidence that investor sentiment is 
related to economic conditions.  If this is the case, then the results presented in this paper 
could be due to the 34 additional trading strategies being less sensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions than the original 16 trading strategies.  Yet, even after controlling for the portion 
of investor sentiment that is related to 13 macroeconomic variables, I still find a relation 
between investor sentiment and some of the original 16 trading strategies.  Therefore, it 
appears that the results presented in this paper are not due to 1 group of strategies being 
more sensitive to economic conditions. 
Recently, Huang et al. (2015) suggest that there is noise in the Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) investor sentiment measure.  They propose a new investor sentiment measure that 
is supposed to contain less noise.  I assess whether the prior results change using this new 
measure of investor sentiment.  Prior to controlling for risk, I find that there is a strong 
relation between both the long leg and short leg portfolios, but this relation becomes weak 
after controlling for risk.  Further, the use of this measure does not produce a strong relation 
between the long-short portfolios and investor sentiment.  Therefore, it does not appear 
that my results are due to using a noisy measure of investor sentiment. 
As a final robustness check, I simulate 10,000 long, short, and long-short portfolios.  
I find that only 10% of the long-short portfolios have a statistical relation with investor 
sentiment.  Moreover, after removing the component of investor sentiment that is related 
to the economy, I find that there is little change in the percentage of strategies with a 
5 
 
relation with investor sentiment.  Thus, these results confirm the general finding of this 
paper: that there is a weak relation between profitable trading strategies and investor 
sentiment. 
A common research question in finance is to ask why certain trading strategies earn 
a positive return.  For example, Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) and Korajczyk and 
Sadka (2004) propose that trading on past price performance appears to be profitable 
because this strategy invests in securities with high transaction costs; likewise, Ng, 
Rusticus, and Verdi (2008) find that trading on earnings appears to be profitable because 
this strategy invests in securities with high transaction costs.  On the other hand, some 
scholars propose an explanation that could be true for all profitable trading strategies, not 
just a subsample of profitable trading strategies (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012)). 
If a proposed explanation could be true for any profitable trading strategy, then it 
is desirable for studies evaluating the proposed explanation to include a broad cross section 
of strategies.  Focusing on a small set of strategies is associated with reduced statistical 
power and potentially results in bias.  In some research areas the researcher’s population is 
well-defined and so the researcher can construct a sample that is representative of the 
population. Unfortunately, in finance the population of profitable trading strategies is not 
clearly defined.  Financial scholars know the trading strategies reported in the literature 
that have historically yielded a positive return, but the literature may not have documented 
the entire population of profitable trading strategies in the market yet.  
One solution to this problem is to lower the chance that the researcher will reject 
the null hypothesis when it is in fact true by increasing the sample size. For example, 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) test the hard-to-short hypothesis using a sample of 16 
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profitable trading strategies.  However, they do not consider a number of prominent trading 
strategies in the literature, including strategies that trade on firm idiosyncratic risk, analyst 
forecast dispersion, and positive or negative earnings announcements.  Each of these 
strategies has historically yielded a positive return (see for example Ang et al. (2006, 2009), 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Ball and Brown (1968), and Bernard and Thomas 
(1989, 1990)).  Therefore, it is unclear whether the results reported in Stambaugh, Yu, and 
Yuan (2012) can be generalized to all trading strategies or if their results are sample 
specific.  I address this potential deficiency. 
In this paper, I contribute to the literature by presenting strong evidence that the 
returns to profitable trading strategies are not the result of those firms being hard-to-short.  
Generally, I find support for the hard-to-short hypothesis for less than 40% of the strategies 
considered, inclusive of those used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012).  This result 
obtains both when I assess differences in returns between high and low investor sentiment 
states and when I assess the predictability of long-short portfolio returns using investor 
sentiment.  In addition, I provide evidence that research on trading strategies is affected by 
the size and representativeness of the strategy sample.  This finding could be important in 
other areas of finance, such as when studying initial public offerings or mergers and 
acquisitions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 presents a brief literature 
review, Section 1.2 describes the data and methodology, Section 1.3 presents some results 





1.1 Literature Review 
A growing body of literature that investigates investor sentiment and asset pricing. 
Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2011) investigate investor sentiment and price 
momentum.  They find that momentum profits only occur in optimistic periods and are 
strongest in poorly performing stocks.  Similarly, Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) 
find that momentum is stronger following positive market returns than following negative 
market returns. Lee, Jiang, and Indro (2002) investigate whether sentiment is a priced risk 
factor using the Investors’ Intelligence sentiment index as their measure of investor 
sentiment and find evidence that sentiment is a priced risk factor.  In a related study, Beer, 
Watfa, and Zouaoui (2011) find that a portfolio of stocks with high exposure to sentiment 
outperforms a portfolio of stocks with low exposure to sentiment.  Chang, Fuh, and Hsu 
(2008) and Bergman and Jenter (2005) investigate employee sentiment and employee stock 
options. Joseph, Wintoki, and Zhang (2011) measure investor sentiment as online search 
intensity defined as the number of times investors search for a particular firm ticker.  They 
find that online search intensity predicts abnormal stock returns and trading volumes.  
Some scholars use mutual funds flows as a proxy for investor sentiment.   Brown et al. 
(2005) use daily mutual fund flows as a proxy for investor sentiment in the United States 
and in Japan and find that investor sentiment is priced in both markets. Ben-Rephael, 
Kandel, and Wohl (2012) use aggregate net exchanges of equity funds as a measure of 
investor sentiment and find that this measure is positively related to aggregate stock market 
excess returns. Kim and Ha (2010) find that investor sentiment affects small cap, low price, 
and low book-to-market firms listed on the Korean stock exchange. 
 Another body of literature looks at accounting anomalies and investor sentiment.  
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Livnat and Petrovits (2009) investigate investor sentiment, post-earnings announcement 
drift, and accruals.  They find that holding extreme good news firms or firms with low 
accruals following pessimistic sentiment periods outperforms holding similar firms 
following high sentiment periods.  They conclude that investor sentiment influences 
earnings-based trading strategies.  Kaplanski and Levy (2011) find that investor sentiment 
affects some analysts’ recommendations.  Hribar and McInnis (2012) find that investor 
sentiment affects analysts’ earnings forecasts of hard-to-value firms. Seybert and Yang 
(2012) conclude that management earnings guidance helps the market to assess their 
earnings expectations and to adjust for sentiment-driven overvaluation. 
 Other researchers have investigated investor sentiment and stock market returns 
outside of the United States. Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012) find that their global 
sentiment index and local stock market sentiment indices are negatively related to stock 
market returns; when sentiment is high, future returns are low on relatively difficult-to-
arbitrage and difficult-to-value stocks.  Hwang (2011) finds that a country’s popularity 
among American investors influences their demand for those securities and this can lead 
the firms’ share prices to move away from their fundamental values. Other papers construct 
sentiment-related models (Baker and Stein (2004) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998)). Additional sentiment-related papers include Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007), 
Kaplanski and Levy (2010), Karakatsani and Salmon (2007, 2008), Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006), and Tetlock (2007).  Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007) investigate 
stock market returns following international soccer matches and whether a win or a loss 
affects market returns following a match.  Kaplanski and Levy (2010) investigate how the 
market responds to aviation disasters.  Karakatsani and Salmon (2007) investigate non-
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linearities in the formation of institutional and individual sentiment while Karakatsani and 
Salmon (2008) investigate stock market returns and different sentiment states.  Lemmon 
and Portniaguina (2006) find that investor sentiment predicts the returns of small stocks 
and stocks with low institutional ownership, but sentiment does not predict the value or 
momentum premiums. Tetlock (2007) investigates investor sentiment as proxied by the 
“Abreast of the Market” column in the Wall Street Journal, and finds that high media 
pessimism predicts downward pressure on market prices followed by a reversion to 
fundamentals, and unusually high or low pessimism predicts high market trading volume. 
 My research is most closely related to 4 papers: Baker and Wurgler (2006), Chung 
et al. (2012), Miller (1977), and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012).  Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) construct a new measure of investor sentiment and find evidence suggesting that 
hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage securities are affected by investor sentiment.  Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) also test whether investor sentiment predicts the returns of securities 
that they believe are hard-to-value.  They find mixed results, but overall their results 
indicate that sentiment has an effect on hard-to-value and hard-to-arbitrage firms.  Chung 
et al. (2012) build on the work by Baker and Wurgler (2006) by investigating whether 
investor sentiment has varying effects across different economic states.  They run 
predictive regressions using the variables from Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Stambaugh, 
Yu, and Yuan (2012) and find that investor sentiment has higher predictive power during 
expansionary periods than during recessions. 
Miller (1977) argues that if a stock is hard-to-short and there is heterogeneity in 
firm valuations, the share price will reflect the most optimistic valuation; however, if a 
stock is hard-to-short, investors will be able to sell short the stock so it reflects the average 
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valuation in the market.  Combining the work of Miller (1997) and Baker and Wurgler 
(2006), Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) argue that if the securities in the short legs of 
each trading strategy are hard-to-short, then these stocks should follow the patterns implied 
by Miller (1977).  Miller’s (1977) argument implies that during high investor sentiment the 
securities that are hard-to-short will be overvalued; however, when investor sentiment is 
low valuations for hard-to-short securities will also be low and they will not be overvalued.  
On the other hand, securities that are easy-to-short should not be overvalued relative to the 
average valuation because investors can simply sell or short sell the stock if it becomes 
overvalued.  Therefore, Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) present 3 hypotheses based on 
Miller’s (1977) argument.  First, they hypothesize that each trading strategy should be 
stronger following high sentiment.  Next, they hypothesize that the returns on the short-leg 
portfolio of each strategy should be lower when sentiment is high because these firms 
already reflect a high valuation.  Finally, they hypothesize that investor sentiment should 
not significantly affect the returns of the long-leg portfolios. Their results are consistent 
with these hypotheses.  
1.2 Data Description and Methodology 
1.2.1 Data Description 
 Daily and monthly stock market data are taken from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database.  Accounting data at the quarterly and annual frequency 
are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database.  Quarterly analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
street-level actual earnings values are taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimates 
System (I/B/E/S) unadjusted actual and detail files. The CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and 
I/B/E/S datasets are all accessed via the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) website.  
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The Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized and raw investor sentiment indices and the 
6 proxies for investor sentiment are kindly provided by Jeffrey Wurgler on his personal 
website.  The University of Michigan Consumer sentiment index and the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website.  The Fama 
and French (1993) 3 factors and the risk-free rate are generously provided by Kenneth 
French on his personal website.3 Following Fama and French (1993) I define the risk-free 
rate as the 1-month Treasury bill rate. 
1.2.2 Overview of 86 Different Trading Strategies 
I consider a total of 86 different trading strategies covering 43 different financial 
variables. Of the 86 strategies, 84 are based on portfolios formed using single-variable 
sorts, while 2 of the strategies are combinations of a selection from these 84 strategies. 
Sometimes I have 2 or more strategies that trade on the same financial variable.  This occurs 
if a variable has been defined in more than one way in the literature, if the definition given 
in the literature is ambiguous, if it is possible to construct the variable using different 
horizons (i.e., 3-year return versus 4-year return), or if it is possible to update the variable 
to reflect current market information.  
For example, Fama and French (1993) calculate book-to-market ratios once a year 
in June of year t and use those values of book-to-market ratios until May of year t+1; 
however, a firm’s market value of equity can change between June of years t and t+1.  So, 
                                                 
3 Jeffrey Wurgler’s website is http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/. The St. Louis Federal Reserve’s 





in this case I could calculate book-to-market ratios once a year or more frequently. The 
first 16 financial variables that I consider come from Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012). 
These variables are: Campbell et al. (2008) distress risk, Ohlson (1980) O-score, Daniel 
and Titman (2006) composite equity issuances, net stock issues, accruals, net operating 
assets, momentum, gross profitability, asset growth, return on assets, investment-to-assets, 
a combination strategy that invests equally in the prior 11 strategies, market beta, firm size, 
book-to-market, and liquidity beta.   
Baker and Wurgler (2006) investigate investor sentiment and firm characteristics 
that they view as proxies for whether a security is hard-to-value.  They believe that hard-
to-arbitrage stocks are also hard-to-value. I use 8 financial variables from Baker and 
Wurgler (2006): firm age; dividends-to-book equity; earnings-to-book equity; external 
finance; property, plant and equipment-to-assets; research and development-to-assets; 
return variance; and sales growth.  Unlike Baker and Wurgler (2006), who calculate return 
variance using monthly returns, I calculate return variance using daily returns, following 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). 
The remaining financial variables I consider are analyst coverage, cash flow-to-
market equity, credit rating, dividends-to-price, earnings-to-market equity, forecast 
dispersion, idiosyncratic risk, illiquidity, intermediate momentum, long-term reversal, 
profit margin, profitability-to-book, return on equity, sales-to-market equity, share 
turnover, short-run momentum, short-term reversal, standardized unexpected earnings, and 
unexpected earnings calculated using analysts’ forecasts. None of these variables were 
used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) or Baker and Wurgler (2006).   
These variables were chosen because they seem to have an effect on stock market 
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returns.4  A more detailed description of each financial variable and trading strategy is 
given in Appendix A. 
1.2.3 Baker and Wurgler (2006) Investor Sentiment Index 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct their investor sentiment index using 6 proxies 
for investor sentiment: closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, number and 
average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the dividend 
premium.  They write: 
The closed-end fund discount, CEFD, is the average difference between the net 
asset values (NAV) of closed-end stock fund shares and their market prices. NYSE 
share turnover is based on the ratio of reported share volume to average shares listed 
from the NYSE Fact Book.... We take the number of IPOs, NIPO, and the average 
first-day returns, RIPO, from Jay Ritter's website, which updates the sample in 
Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994)…. The share of equity issues in total equity 
and debt issues is another measure of financing activity that may capture sentiment. 
Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that high values of the equity share predict low 
market returns. The equity share is defined as gross equity issuance divided by 
gross equity plus gross long-term debt issuance using data from the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin.  Our sixth and last sentiment proxy is the dividend premium, PD-ND, the 
log difference of the average market-to-book ratios of payers and nonpayers. (1655-
1656)     
 
Baker and Wurgler then construct their investor sentiment measure in the following 
manner: 
We form a composite index that captures the common component in the 6 proxies 
and incorporates the fact that some variables take longer to reveal the same 
sentiment.9 We start by estimating the first principal component of the 6 proxies 
and their lags. This gives us a first-stage index with 12 loadings, 1 for each of the 
current and lagged proxies. We then compute the correlation between the first-stage 
index and the current and lagged values of each of the proxies. Finally, we define 
SENTIMENT as the first principal component of the correlation matrix of 6 
                                                 
4 Papers that discuss one or more of these financial variables include Amihud (2002), Ang et al. 
(2006, 2009), Avramov et al. (2012), Ball and Brown (1968), Basu (1977, 1983), Bernard and Thomas (1989, 
1990), Chen et al. (2011), Chordia et al. (2001), Chung, Hung, and Yeh (2012), DeBondt and Thaler (1984), 
Diether et al. (2002), Fama and French (2008), Haugen and Baker (1996, 2008), Jegadeesh (1990), 
Lakonishok et al. (1994), Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), Novy-Marx (2012a), and Yu (2008). 
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variables-each respective proxy's lead or lag, whichever has higher correlation with 
the first-stage index-rescaling the coefficients so that the index has unit variance. 
This procedure leads to a parsimonious index  
 
SENTIMENTt = -0.241CEFDt+0.242TURNt-1 + 0.253NIPOt + 0.257RIPOt-1  
                                         + 0.112St - 0.283PD-NDt-1                                                                                           (1) 
 
where each of the index components has first been standardized. (1657) For 
SENTIMENT, CEFD is the closed end fund discount, TURN is share turnover, 
NIPO is the number of IPOs, RIPO is the average first-day IPO returns, S is the 
share of equity issues measure, and PD-ND is the dividend premium.   
I also use the orthogonalized investor sentiment index, SENTIMENT⊥, constructed 
by Baker and Wurgler.  This index is constructed by first regressing each of the 6 proxies 
of investor sentiment on growth in industrial production, growth in consumer durables, 
nondurables and services, and a dummy variable for National Bureau of Economic 
Research recessions.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) define SENTIMENT⊥  as the first principal 
component of these orthogonalized 6 proxies of investor sentiment, and find the following 
equation: 
SENTIMENTt ⊥= -0.198CEFDt ⊥ + 0.225TURNt-1⊥ + 0.234NIPOt ⊥  
+ 0.263RIPOt-1 ⊥ + 0.211St ⊥ - 0.243PD-ND,⊥t-1                              (2) 
The Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment data are on a monthly frequency from 
July 1965-December 2010. 
1.2.4 University of Michigan Consumer Confidence Index 
 Each period, either quarterly or monthly, the University of Michigan surveys a 
representative sample of American households about their current financial situation and 
how they feel about the economy in the near and long-term.  Consumers are asked around 
50 questions that cover 3 areas of consumer sentiment: personal finances, business 
conditions, and buying conditions. The University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers has 
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been shown to be an accurate measure of the future prospects of the United States economy. 
(University of Michigan (2013a, 2013b)) The University of Michigan consumer 
confidence index is available on a quarterly basis from 1952 through 1977 and monthly 
from January 1978 onwards.  I restrict the dates of this index to be from June 1965 through 
December 2010. 
 Following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) I construct a University of Michigan 
residual consumer confidence index.  I estimate the following regression equation: 
UMICHt = α + β1Growth_Indprot + β2Growth_Consdurt + β3Growth_Consnont 
+ β4Growth_Consservt + β5Growth_employt +β6Recesst +εt ,                (3) 
where UMICH is the value of the University of Michigan consumer confidence survey, 
Growth_Indpro is the growth of industrial production, Growth_Consdur is the growth of 
durable consumption, Growth_Consnon is the growth of nondurable consumption, 
Growth_Consserv is the growth of service consumption, Growth_employ is the growth of 
employment, and Recess is a dummy variable for National Bureau of Economic Research 
recessions.5   
The University of Michigan residual consumer confidence index is the residual 
from equation (3).  There are 2 other measures of investor sentiment that I use in this paper 
as robustness checks.  The first measure of investor sentiment is the residual from the 
following regression equation:  
UMICHt = α + β1Level_Indprot + β2Level_Consdurt + β3Level_Consnont 
                                                 
5 The monthly levels of industrial production, durable consumption, nondurable consumption, 
service consumption, employment, and the recession dummy variable are available on Jeffrey Wurgler’s 
website. I calculate the five growth variables using these data. I find fairly similar results if I use levels instead 
of growth rates on the right hand side of regression equation (3).  The adjusted R2 from regression equation 
(3) using growth rates is approximately 0.35, and if I use levels the adjusted R2 is approximately 0.60. 
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+β4Level_Consservt + β5Level_employt +β6Recesst +εt                    (4) 
where Level_Indpro is the level of industrial production, Level_Consdur is the level of 
durable consumption, Level_Consnon is the level of nondurable consumption, 
Level_Consserv is the level of service consumption, Level_employ is the level of 
employment, and Recess is a dummy variable for National Bureau of Economic Research 
recessions.   
The final measure of investor sentiment is the residual from the following 
regression equation: 
UMICHt = α + β1CEFDt+ β2TURNt+ β3NIPOt + β4RIPOt + β5S+β6PD-NDt +εt       (5) 
where CEFD is the closed-end fund discount, TURN is share turnover, NIPO is the number 
of IPOs, RIPO is the average first-day IPO returns, S is the share of equity issues measure, 
and PD-ND is the dividend premium.  I will refer to the residual from equation (4) as 
University of Michigan residual consumer confidence using economic level variables and 
the residual from equation (5) as University of Michigan residual consumer confidence 
using sentiment variables. 
1.2.5 Delisting Returns 
 Prior literature has shown that delisting returns can affect the magnitude of trading 
strategy returns (Beaver, McNichols, Price (2007), Shumway (1997), and Shumway and 
Warther (1999)).  I handle delisting returns in the following manner.  If a firm delists in 
the month following a valid nondelisting return month then I use both the nondelisting 
return and the delisting return as given.  If a firm has a nondelisting return and a delisting 
return in the same month then I combine these 2 returns into 1 return observation using 
simple compounding.  If a firm delists in a month and has a nondelisting return, but is 
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missing the delisting return, I assume that the overall return for this month was -100%.  In 
some instances, a firm delists but doesn’t make a delisting payment until a few months 
following the last valid nondelisting return.  In these cases, I assume that the firm makes 
the delisting payment in the month immediately following the last valid nondelisting return 
month.  I adopt this policy in order to have a continuous series of monthly firm returns.  In 
the rare instances that this delisting payment is missing I assume that the firm experienced 
a delisting return of -100%. 
1.2.6 Portfolio Formation 
 I form 10 decile portfolios by sorting firms on 1 of the 84 single-variable trading 
strategies using NYSE breakpoints in June of each year.  I use only common equity with 
share codes 10 or 11 with share prices between $5 and $1000 and exclude financials (SIC 
Codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). Each portfolio is held from July of 
year t until June of year t+1. Value-weighted portfolio returns are calculated for each 
portfolio.6  
Following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), portfolio returns for the Campbell et 
al. (2008) financial distress portfolios start at the end of December 1974 and portfolio 
returns for the O-score or Investment-to-asset portfolios starts at the end of January 1972.  
I/B/E/S data were not available prior to June 1984 so portfolio returns for trading strategies 
that use I/B/E/S data start in July 1984.  All other strategies have portfolio returns starting 
in July 1965.  
                                                 
6  My results are robust to the inclusion of utilities and financials and firms with extreme share prices 
(less than $5 or greater than $1000), for holding periods of 1 month, using quarterly COMPUSTAT data, and 
for equally-weighted portfolios. 
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After calculating portfolio returns for each of the 84 single-variable trading 
strategies, I calculate portfolio returns for the 2 combination trading strategies.  The first 
combination strategy, from Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), invests equally in the 
portfolios for Campbell et al. (2008) distress risk, Ohlson’s O-score as defined in Chen 
Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011), net stock issuances, composite equity issues, accruals, net 
operating assets, momentum, gross profitability, asset growth, return on assets, and 
investment-to-assets.   
The second combination strategy invests equally in each of the 84 trading strategies. 
I classify the 2 extreme portfolios into long and short leg portfolios as documented in the 
literature and form a hedge portfolio as the difference between the long leg and short leg 
portfolio returns.  In the few rare cases where the average return of the hedge leg is negative 
I switch the long leg and the short leg so that the strategy generates a positive return on 
average. 
1.2.7 Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan Sentiment Variables 
 Following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) I construct a few sentiment-related 
variables.  For the 6 measures of sentiment I classify a month as having high sentiment if 
it is greater than the median level of investor sentiment over the entire sample; otherwise, 
the month is classified as having low sentiment.   Using this definition of high and low 
investor sentiment I construct 2 dummy variables for each sentiment measure.  The first 
dummy variable indicates if the prior month had high investor sentiment and the second 





1.2.8 Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan Regressions 
 After calculating value-weighted returns for each strategy I perform a series of 
regressions of portfolio returns in excess of the Fama and French (1993) risk-free rate on 
other financial variables.  These regressions follow the methodology used in Stambaugh, 
Yu, and Yuan (2012) and are designed to test whether portfolio returns are different 
following high and low sentiment periods and whether portfolio returns can be predicted 
based on prior sentiment levels.  I estimate the following regressions for the long, short, 
and hedge legs of each strategy and for each sentiment measure: 
Ri,t = aHdH,t + aLdL,t + εi,t                                                                      (6) 
Ri,t = a + aHdH,t + εi,t                                                  (7) 
Ri,t = aHdH,t + aLdL,t + bMKTt + cSMBt + dHMLt + εi,t                                    (8) 
Ri,t = a + aHdH,t + bMKTt + cSMBt + dHMLt + εi,t                                          (9) 
Ri,t = a +bSt-1 + εi,                                                   (10) 
Ri,t = a +bSt-1  + cMKTt + dSMBt + eHMLt + εi,t,                          (11) 
where dH,t is a dummy variable indicating if the prior period had high investor sentiment; 
dL,t is a dummy variable indicating if the prior period had low investor sentiment; MKT, 
SMB, and HML are the Fama and French (1993) market, size, and book-to-market factors 
respectively; and St-1 is the lagged value of 1 of the sentiment measures: either 1 of the 2 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment indices or 1 of the 4 sentiment measures constructed 
using the University of Michigan consumer confidence index. 
The first 4 regressions are used to measure the average excess return following high 
or low investor sentiment and to measure the difference in excess returns between high and 
low investor sentiment.  The first 2 regressions present the average excess returns following 
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each sentiment state while the second 2 regressions adjust these returns for the returns on 
the 3 Fama and French (1993) factors.  The last 2 regressions are used to test whether the 
long leg, short leg, or hedge portfolio excess returns can be predicted using the lagged 
value of investor sentiment.  All regressions are estimated using White (1980) standard 
errors. 
1.3 Results 
1.3.1 Removal of Highly Correlated Strategies 
After calculating long, short, and long-short portfolio returns for each of the 86 
strategies I remove those strategies that are highly correlated with another strategy already 
included as test assets.  The removal of highly correlated strategies is completed using 2 
steps.  Starting with a correlation threshold of 0.75, I first remove strategies that have a 
correlation of 0.75 or above with the original 16 strategies from Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 
(2012).  From the remaining new strategies not previously tested in Stambaugh, Yu, and 
Yuan (2012), I remove those strategies that have a correlation of 0.75 or above with the 
other new strategies. When a strategy has a high correlation I remove the strategy that has 
the highest mean absolute correlation with all the other strategies (inclusive of the 16 
strategies from Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012)).  I complete the removal of highly 
correlated strategies in 2 steps with the idea that this methodology will prevent us from 
removing more strategies than necessary.  However, the results are similar if I remove all 
highly correlated strategies in 1 step.  After completing these 2 steps I am left with a total 
of 43 different trading strategies.  This composes the initial list of strategies.  Next I repeat 
these 2 steps for correlation thresholds of 0.76, 0.77, 0.78, 0.79, and 0.80.  If a strategy is 
kept for 1 of these thresholds that was not previously included as a test asset, I add it to the 
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initial list of strategies and use it as a test asset for all correlation thresholds greater than or 
equal to the current threshold.  In this way I am never adding and subtracting the same 
strategy.  With a correlation threshold of 0.80 I am left with a total of 50 strategies.  Table 
1.1 lists the 50 trading strategies that remain after removing highly correlated trading 
strategies and Table 1.2 shows the correlation between the long-short portfolio returns for 
the 50 different trading strategies.  Henceforth I will refer to the 16 trading strategies used 
in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) as the original trading strategies or as the original 
strategies and all other trading strategies as the new trading strategies or as the new 
strategies.  
1.3.2 Results Using Baker and Wurgler (2006) Orthogonalized  
Investor Sentiment 
 First, I estimate regression equations (4) and (5) using each of the 6 measures of 
investor sentiment for each of the 50 long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  Equation 
(4) estimates the average excess return following high or low investor sentiment and 
equation (5) estimates the average difference in excess returns following high and low 
investor sentiment.  Following the reasoning in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), if the 
securities in the long leg are easy-to-short while the securities in the short leg are hard-to-
short then the long leg high-low coefficients from regression equation (5) should not be 
statistically different from 0, the short leg high-low coefficients should be negative and 
statistically significant, and the long-short (hedge) portfolio high-low sentiment 
coefficients should be positive and statistically significant.  Table 1.3 reports the number 
and percentage of high-low sentiment coefficients that are statistically significant for each 
of the 6 different measures of investor sentiment.  
In Table 1.3, Panel A reports the results for long leg portfolios, Panel B for short 
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leg portfolios, and Panel C for long-short portfolios. I use two-tailed t-tests for long leg 
portfolio coefficients and one-tailed t-tests for short leg and long-short portfolios.  One-
tailed t-tests are used to test if there is a positive or negative relation between investor 
sentiment and portfolio returns while two-tailed t-tests are used to test if there is a 
difference in returns between high and low investor sentiment. I first turn to the results 
using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment index (BW OIS).  
Consistent with the theoretical predictions I find only 4 out of 50 long leg high-low 
sentiment coefficients that pass a one-tailed t-test before controlling for the Fama and 
French (1993) factors. Only 8 out of 50 are statistically significant after controlling for the 
Fama and French (1993) factors.  However, for the short leg and the long-short portfolios 
I find evidence that is inconsistent with these predictions.  First, I find that 12 of the 16 
(75.00%) short leg portfolios used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) pass a one-tailed t-
test (statistically less than 0).  On the other hand, for the 34 short leg portfolios not used in 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) a much lower number of these portfolios pass a one-
tailed t-test.  I find that 19 (55.88%) out of 34 short leg portfolios pass a one-tailed t-test. 
Overall, using a one-tailed t-test, 62% of the short leg portfolio coefficients are statistically 
less than 0 before controlling for the Fama and French factors, and 64% of the coefficients 
are statistically less than 0 after controlling for the Fama and French factors.  
 Panel C in Table 1.3 reports the number of long-short, high-low sentiment 
coefficients that are statistically significant using a one-tailed t-test.  Here I find that within 
the 34 new strategies not used by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), a much smaller 
percentage of the coefficients pass either a one-tailed or two-tailed t-test. Looking at the 
results prior to controlling for the Fama and French factors we see that for the 16 original 
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strategies 50% pass a one-tailed t-test, but for the 34 new strategies only 8.82% pass a one-
tailed t-test. Overall, only 11 out of 50 (22%) coefficients pass a one-tailed t-test.  This 
result is slightly stronger once I control for the Fama and French (1993) factors.  Thus, 
there are a number of profitable strategies where I cannot accept the alternative hypothesis 
that these strategies are profitable because they are hard-to-short.   
 I also test whether investor sentiment can predict the returns to the 50 long leg, 
short leg, and long-short portfolios.  If the hard-to-short hypothesis is true, I should not be 
able to predict the returns to the long leg portfolios, but I should be able to predict the short 
leg and long-short portfolio returns.  For each of the 50 strategies, I estimate equation (8), 
which regresses portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate on lagged investor 
sentiment, and equation (9), which regresses portfolio excess returns on lagged investor 
sentiment and the contemporaneous Fama and French (1993) factors.  I summarize the 
number and percentage of statistically significant sentiment coefficients for equations (8) 
and (9) in Table 1.4.  In Table 1.4, the results for the long leg, short leg, and long-short 
portfolios are presented in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. 
From Table 1.4 we can see that most of the long leg coefficients do not pass a one-
tailed t-test, indicating that there is not a positive predictive relation between investor 
sentiment and portfolio returns.  Before controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, 
I find that 20 out of 50 long leg strategies are statistically significant. I find only 10 out of 
50 long leg strategies are still statistically significant after controlling for the Fama and 
French (1993) factors.  This evidence indicates that the long leg portfolios do not invest in 
hard-to-short securities. 
For the 16 short leg portfolios used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), 13 out of 
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16 of the investor sentiment coefficients are statistically significant.  Additionally, for the 
34 new short leg portfolios, 24 out of 34 pass a one–tailed t-test testing for a predictive 
relation between investor sentiment and lagged returns.  However, after controlling for the 
returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors, a smaller number of short leg investor 
sentiment coefficients are statistically significant; 18 out of 34 new short leg portfolios pass 
a one-tailed t-test testing for a negative relation between investor sentiment and short leg 
portfolio returns.  Overall, investor sentiment exhibits a predictive relation with the returns 
of 30 out of 50 short leg portfolios.  This indicates that there a number of short leg portfolios 
whose returns are not due to short sale constraints.     
I find a much smaller fraction of long-short portfolio returns that can be predicted 
by investor sentiment.  After regressing excess long-short portfolio returns on lagged 
investor sentiment, only 56.25% of the 16 original strategies are statistically positive and 
only 23.53% of the 34 new strategies are statistically positive.  Overall, of the 50 trading 
strategies, only 34% of returns to the 50 trading strategies can be predicted using lagged 
investor sentiment. There is even less evidence that long-short portfolio returns can be 
predicted by investor sentiment after controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors.  
Overall, I find 12 (24%) of the 50 long-short portfolios have a statistically positive relation 
with investor sentiment. 
The evidence found using Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor 
sentiment indicates that the relation between investor sentiment and profitable trading 
strategies is much weaker than was previously documented in the literature.  Likewise, this 
evidence seems to indicate that these strategies might be profitable for reasons other than 
being hard-to-short.  
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1.3.3 Results Using University of Michigan Residual  
Consumer Confidence 
Next I test whether the results found using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
orthogonalized investor sentiment index (orthogonalized investor sentiment) can also be 
found using University of Michigan residual consumer confidence constructed using 
economic growth variables (henceforth, I will call this measure “residual consumer 
confidence”).  I repeat regressions (4)–(9) using residual consumer confidence instead of 
the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment.  The results of these 
regressions are summarized in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.  
When using residual consumer confidence instead of orthogonalized investor 
sentiment, far fewer of the short leg high-low coefficients are statistically significant and 
have the predicted sign.  As shown in Panel B of Table 1.3, before controlling for the Fama 
and French (1993) factors, only 10% are statistically significant and have the predicted 
sign, compared to 62% of orthogonalized investor sentiment.  After controlling for these 
factors, the percentage of statistically significant short leg high-low coefficients is again 
lower using residual consumer confidence than using orthogonalized investor sentiment, 
34.00% compared to 64.00%.  For long-short portfolio returns, I still find a low percentage 
that are statistically significant: 24.00% of the 50 trading strategies are statistically positive 
without controlling for the Fama and French factors and 16.00% are statistically significant 
afterwards. 
Turning to the predictive regression results found using residual consumer 
confidence (Table 1.4), Panel A shows slightly lower percentages of statistically significant 
long leg coefficients, 30.00% before and 10.00% after controlling for the Fama and French 
factors, compared to 40.00% and 20.00% found using orthogonalized investor sentiment.  
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Panel B of Table 1.4 shows that controlling for the Fama and French factors impacts the 
number of statistically significant short leg coefficients as well, with 82.35% of new trading 
strategies being statistically significant prior to controlling for the Fama and French factors 
and just, 32.35% being statistically significant after.  Additionally, the overall percentage 
of statistically significant coefficients drops from 84.00% to 48.00% after controlling for 
the 3 Fama and French factors.  The drop for the original trading strategies is much smaller, 
from 87.50% to 81.25%. 
Moving to the long-short portfolios in Table 1.4, Panel C, I once again find the 
pattern of a much lower percentage of statistically significant coefficients for the new 
trading strategies than for the original 16 trading strategies. Without controlling for the 
Fama and French factors, 68.75% of the original long-short strategies are statistically 
significant but only 23.53% of the new long-short strategies are statistically significant.  A 
similar magnitude result is found after controlling for the Fama and French factors. 
Overall, the results found using residual consumer confidence provide supporting 
evidence that the results reported in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) are specific to those 
particular trading strategies and they do not seem to hold for very many of the new 
strategies considered in this paper. 
1.3.4 Results Using Other Sentiment Measures 
As additional robustness checks, I re-run the prior tests using the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) raw investor sentiment index, University of Michigan raw consumer 
confidence index, and the 2 other residual consumer confidence indices constructed using 
economic level variables and sentiment variables.  The results from these tests are reported 
in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.  I once again find that the percentage of statistically significant 
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coefficients drops when I move from the 16 original trading strategies to the 34 new trading 
strategies.  Sometimes the percentage of statistically significant coefficients is high for a 
particular sentiment measure without controlling for the Fama and French factors; 
however, this percentage drops once I control for the Fama and French factors.  Again, I 
find that the percentage of statistically significant short leg and long-short coefficients with 
the predicted sign is lower using all 50 trading strategies than when using the 16 original 
trading strategies. 
1.3.5 Results for Different Correlation Thresholds 
To address a concern that the results may be specific to the correlation threshold of 
0.80, I repeat the prior tests for correlation thresholds between 0.75 and 1.00 using 0.01 
increments. At a correlation threshold of 1.00, I am not excluding any of the 86 trading 
strategies, even if 1 of those strategies is perfectly correlated with another strategy already 
included as a test asset.  In Table 1.5, I document when a particular variable is added to the 
list of test assets after increasing the correlation cutoff threshold from 0.75 to 0.99 in 
increments of 0.01.  Seven strategies are perfectly correlated with another strategy already 
under consideration.  These strategies are listed in Table 1.6. 
I previously used 4 different tests to investigate whether the hard-to-short 
hypothesis explains the returns to profitable trading strategies.  First, I looked at average 
excess return differences following high and low investor sentiment periods with and 
without controlling for the returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors.  Then, I 
investigated whether the returns to long, short, and long-short portfolios can be predicted 
using lagged investor sentiment with and without controlling for the Fama and French 
(1993) factors.  I conducted these 4 tests using 6 different measures of investor sentiment: 
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Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment; Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
raw investor sentiment; University of Michigan residual consumer confidence constructed 
using economic growth, economic level, and sentiment input variables; and University of 
Michigan raw consumer confidence.  I repeat these 4 tests for the long-short portfolios and 
for all correlation thresholds between 0.75 and 1.00, increasing the correlation threshold 
by 0.01 after each series of tests, and plot the acceptance rate from each test in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2.  For brevity, I only report the results using Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
orthogonalized investor sentiment and University of Michigan residual consumer 
confidence.  Similar results are obtained using the 4 other measures of investor sentiment.  
I define the acceptance rate as the number of coefficients that are statistically significant 
using a 1 tailed t-test, H0: μ≤0, divided by the total number of coefficients.     
In each figure, Panels A and B, respectively, plot the acceptance rates for the 
coefficients, testing whether the difference in average excess returns following high and 
low investor sentiment is statistically significant with and without controlling for the Fama 
and French (1993) factors, respectively.  Panels C and D plot the acceptance rate for the 
coefficients, testing whether the lagged investor sentiment coefficient is statistically 
significant in a predictive regression of long-short excess returns with and without 
controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, respectively.  Figure 1.1 reports the 
results using Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment and Figure 1.2 
reports the results using University of Michigan residual consumer confidence.  Each panel 
plots the acceptance rates for the original 16 trading strategies, the new strategies that are 
less than the correlation threshold, and all strategies that are less than the correlation 
threshold.  The acceptance rate for the 16 original strategies does not change for different 
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correlation thresholds because these strategies are always included in the 4 tests. 
These plots show that the acceptance rates for the new strategies is always below 
the acceptance rate for the 16 original strategies, and most of the time there is a fairly large 
difference between the acceptance rate for the 16 original strategies and the new strategies 
considered in this paper. Sometimes the acceptance rates increase or decrease as the 
correlation threshold increases to 1.00.  Generally, this occurs because, as the correlation 
threshold increases, I am adding strategies that are highly correlated with strategies that 
previously rejected or failed to reject the null hypothesis.  Ideally, if the hard-to-short 
hypothesis holds, we would see an acceptance rate of 1.00 for all strategies. However, these 
plots show an overall acceptance rate that is usually below 0.40.  Therefore, there is only 
weak support for the hard-to-short hypothesis.  Furthermore, the main result, that these 
strategies are profitable for reasons other than short sale limits to arbitrage, is not extremely 
sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of highly correlated strategies. 
1.3.6 Investor Sentiment and Economic Conditions Results 
 So far, the evidence indicates that there is a strong relation between investor 
sentiment and the 16 original trading strategies but a weak relation between investor 
sentiment and the 34 additional trading strategies.  Recent work by Sibley et al. (2014) 
suggests that the Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index is related to 
macroeconomic conditions.  Thus, it could be the case that the original trading strategies 
invest in securities that are sensitive to macroeconomic conditions while the 34 additional 
strategies invest in securities that are not sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.  To test 
this explanation, I estimate the conditional CAPM model that was used in Petkova and 




Rt+1 = a + aHdH,t + (b0 +b1Divt+b2DEFt + b3TERMt + b4TBt)rm,t+1 + εt+1              (12) 
and   
Rt+1 = a + b St + (c0 +c1Divt+c2DEFt + c3TERMt + c4TBt)rm,t+1 + εt+1 ,           (13) 
where dH,t is a dummy variable indicating if the prior period had high investor sentiment, 
Div is the 12-month dividend yield on the value-weighted market portfolio, DEF is the 
default spread, TERM is the term spread, TB is 3-month Treasury bill rate, and rm is the 
excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio.  The dividend yield is calculated 
following Fama and French (1988).  I estimate regressions 1 and 2 for each of the 50 trading 
strategies and report the percentage of statistically significant coefficients in Table 1.7.  If 
the returns to the original strategies are driven by macroeconomic conditions while the new 
strategies are not, then there should be a large decrease in the percentage of significant 
coefficients using the conditional CAPM model.  However, the results presented in Table 
1.7 do not support this explanation.  Compared to the percentage of significant coefficients 
without controlling for the macroeconomic factors, there is very little change in the 
percentage of significant coefficients using the conditional CAPM model.  Additionally, 
similar results are obtained whether I estimate the difference in returns between high and 
low sentiment states or I regress returns on lagged investor sentiment.  These results 
suggest that the reason I find a strong relation between investor sentiment and 1 group of 
strategies and a weak relation using another group of strategies is not due to 1 group taking 
positions in securities sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.   
 To further assess whether the results between investor sentiment and profitable 
trading is due to macroeconomic conditions, I construct the predicted and residual investor 
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sentiment measures used in Sibley et al. (2013).  For each of the 6 sentiment measures, I 
construct predicted and residual investor sentiment by regressing each measure on 13 
financial variables.  The 13 financial variables are the U.S. unemployment rate, growth rate 
in inflation, growth rate in consumption, growth rate in disposable personal income, growth 
rate in industrial production, NBER recession indicator variable, 3-month Treasury bill 
rate, default spread, term spread, dividend yield, value-weighted market return, stock 
market volatility, and a liquidity risk factor.  The fitted value from these regressions is 
defined as predicted investor sentiment while the residual is defined as residual investor 
sentiment.   
 Based on the arguments presented in Sibley et al. (2013), if the relation between 
investor sentiment and profitable trading strategies is due to investor sentiment acting as a 
proxy for the state of the economy then there should be a strong relation between predicted 
investor sentiment and the returns to the trading strategies, but a weak relation between 
residual investor sentiment and the returns to the trading strategies. Table 1.8 shows the 
percentage of statistically significant investor sentiment coefficients using predicted and 
residual investor sentiment in place of the 6 raw sentiment measures, with Panel A showing 
the results for high-low investor sentiment coefficients and Panel B showing the results for 
predictive regression coefficients.  
Turning to the high-low investor sentiment results, without controlling for the Fama 
and French (1993) factors, we can see that there is strong relation between predicted 
investor sentiment and the short leg portfolios.  This result is obtained for 4 of the 6 investor 
sentiment measures and is consistently found for both the original and the new strategies.  
On the other hand, now I am also finding a statistically significant relation between investor 
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sentiment and a nontrivial portion of the long leg portfolios.  This result is inconsistent 
with the prediction of no relation between investor sentiment and long leg portfolio returns.   
While the portion of investor sentiment that is related to the macro economy 
explains the short leg portfolios, it does not seem to do a better job of explaining the hedge 
portfolio returns than the raw investor sentiment measures.  Furthermore, I again find a 
stronger relation between investor sentiment and the original long-short portfolios than 
between investor sentiment and the new long-short portfolios.  However, the 
macroeconomic component of investor sentiment does not seem to produce a stronger 
relation than when using the raw investor sentiment measures.  Fairly similar results are 
found after controlling for the Fama and French (1933) factors, except now the percentage 
of significant coefficients has a larger drop between the original and new strategy groups. 
If the Sibley et al. (2013) hypothesis that investor sentiment proxies for 
macroeconomic conditions is correct, there should be a weak relation between the residual 
investor sentiment measures and profitable trading strategies.  Looking at the results for 
the long leg and short leg portfolios, for the most part, I find evidence consistent with this 
explanation.  However, even when I use the component of investor sentiment that is 
unrelated to the macro economy, I still find a relation between investor sentiment and a 
portion of the long-short portfolios.  This suggests that unlike in Sibley et al. (2013), there 
is a relation between investor sentiment and some trading strategies, although the majority 
of the strategies do not have a relation with investor sentiment.   Additionally, once I control 
for the Fama and French (1993) factors, there is a portion of the short leg portfolios that 
have a relation with residual investor sentiment.  Thus, macroeconomic conditions are not 




Moving to the predictive regression coefficients presented in Panel B, prior to 
controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, I again find a strong relation between 
predicted investor sentiment and the short leg portfolios.  However, there is a relation 
between predicted investor sentiment and some of the long leg portfolios.  The relation 
between predicted investor sentiment and long-short portfolios is much stronger for the 
original strategies than for the additional strategies.  This result is obtained with or without 
controlling for the Fama and French (1933) factors.   
Once more, prior to controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, there is a 
weak relation between residual investor sentiment and the long leg and short leg portfolios.  
However, even when I use residual investor sentiment, I still find a relation between the 
original long-short strategies and investor sentiment.  This implies that the relation between 
investor sentiment and the original trading strategies is not due to those strategies investing 
in securities sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.  Further, once I control for the Fama 
and French (1993) factors, the relation between investor sentiment and short leg portfolios 
reappears in some instances. 
 Overall, these results suggest that while macroeconomic conditions may explain 
the relation between investor sentiment and short leg portfolio returns, but macroeconomic 
conditions are not able to explain the relation between investor sentiment and the long-
short trading strategies. 
1.3.7 Huang et al. (2015) Aligned Investor Sentiment Results 
 Up to this point, it does not seem that differences in sensitivity to macroeconomic 
conditions can explain why there is a strong relation between investor sentiment and the 
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original strategies but a weak relation between investor sentiment and the additional 
strategies.  In a recent paper Huang et al. (2015) propose that the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
sentiment measures contain noise.  They suggest a new measure of investor sentiment that 
uses partial least squares (PLS) to remove noise from the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
investor sentiment measure.  They find that their measure of investor sentiment has greater 
predictive power than the Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment measure.   
I assess whether the results reported so far are robust to the use of the Huang et al. 
(2015) aligned investor sentiment measure.  Goufu Zhou kindly provides the Huang et al. 
(2015) aligned investor sentiment measure on his personal website.  I also construct 2 other 
measures of investor sentiment: predicted and residual Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor 
sentiment.  These 2 measures are the fitted values and residual values from regressing the 
raw Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor sentiment measure on the 13 Sibley et al. (2013) 
financial variables.  In Table 1.9, I present the percentage of statistically significant 
investor sentiment coefficients for these 3 investor sentiment measures.  First, looking at 
the percentage of statistically significant high-low coefficients, there is now a new result.  
Before, an extremely small percentage of the long leg portfolios had a relation with investor 
sentiment, but now a large percentage of the long leg portfolios has a relation with investor 
sentiment.  This result is found using either the raw or predicted Huang et al. (2015) aligned 
investor sentiment measures, but disappears using the residual measure.  Interestingly, this 
result is found both for the original strategies as well as for the new strategies.  
  Turning to the short leg coefficients, almost all of the 50 short leg portfolios have 
a relation with investor sentiment.  This relation diminishes using the residual sentiment 
measure, but still at least 50% of the short leg portfolios has a relation with investor 
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sentiment.  These results suggest that investor sentiment has an effect on both the long leg 
and the short leg portfolios.   
Consistent with the results found using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) and 
University sentiment measures, I find a strong relation between investor sentiment and the 
original long-short portfolios, but a much weaker relation between investor sentiment and 
the new long-short portfolios.  This result is strongest using the raw or the predicted Huang 
et al. (2015) aligned investor sentiment measures.  A weaker relation is obtained using the 
residual Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor sentiment measure, although 38% of the 50 
trading strategies still has a relation with investor sentiment. 
While the prior results suggest that there is a strong relation between investor 
sentiment and the long leg and short leg portfolios, a different result is obtained after 
controlling for risk.  After controlling for the returns on the Fama and French (1993) 
factors, a tiny portion of the 50 trading strategies still have a relation with investor 
sentiment.  Overall, 6% of the 50 long leg portfolios have a relation with the raw and 
residual investor sentiment measures and 12% have a relation with the predicted investor 
sentiment measure.  Further, the relation between investor sentiment and short leg portfolio 
returns is much weaker after controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors.  The 
percentage of significant coefficients is 46%, 52%, and 0% using the raw, predicted, and 
residual sentiment measures, respectively.  Additionally, the long-short portfolios exhibit 
a weaker relation with the Huang et al. (2015) investor sentiment measures.  Typically, less 
than 20% of the 50 strategies have a statistically significant relation with investor 
sentiment.   
The percentage of statistically significant predictive regression coefficients are 
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presented in Panel B. of Table 1.9.  Similar to the results for the high-low investor 
sentiment coefficients, prior to controlling for risk, there is a strong predictive relation 
between the long leg and short leg portfolios, but a much weaker relation after controlling 
for risk.  Further, the relation between investor sentiment and the long-short portfolios is 
strong for the 16 original strategies, but much weaker for the 34 additional strategies.   
In totality, the prior results confirm the results found using the Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) and the University of Michigan sentiment measures.  There is a strong relation 
between the 16 original strategies but a much weaker relation between the 34 additional 
strategies and investor sentiment.  The question that still needs to be answered is which 
group of strategies is representative of the population.  Is it the case that there is strong 
relation between investor sentiment and cross-sectional anomalies and the additional 
strategies are not representative of the population or is it the case that there is a weak 
relation between investor sentiment and the 16 original strategies are not representative of 
the population?  In the next section, I try to answer this question using simulated long, 
short, and long-short portfolios. 
1.3.8 Simulation Results 
To further assess whether investor sentiment affects the returns to cross-sectional 
anomalies, I construct simulated long, short, and long-short portfolios. Each June, I 
randomly assigned each stock to 1 of 10 decile portfolios.  Value-weighted returns are then 
calculated for each portfolio from July of year t until June of year t+1.  I then define the 
long leg as the decile with the highest average return and the short leg as the decile with 
the lowest average return.  The long-short portfolio is then constructed using the long leg 
and short leg portfolios.  Then, I estimate the high-low investor sentiment and the 
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predictive regression coefficients for the long, short, and long-short portfolios using each 
of the raw, predicted, and residual sentiment measures.  This procedure is repeated 10,000 
times.  The percentage of statistically significant coefficients across all 10,000 trading 
strategies is presented in Table 1.9, with Panel A presenting the results for high-low 
investor sentiment coefficients and Panel B presenting the results for predictive regression 
coefficients.   
The results using the raw Baker and Wurgler (2006) and University of Michigan 
sentiment measures are consistent with the results presented for the new trading strategies, 
that there is a weak relation between profitable trading strategies and investor sentiment.  
Based on the evidence presented in Panel A.1 of Table 1.9, there is a weak relation between 
the long leg and investor sentiment. For the most part there is a weak relation between short 
leg portfolios and investor sentiment and a weak relation between investor sentiment and 
long-short portfolios.  Typically, less than 10% of the long-short portfolios exhibit a 
relation with investor sentiment.   
A different result is obtained using the raw Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor 
sentiment measure (AIS).  Using this measure there is strong relation between investor 
sentiment and the long leg and short leg portfolios but a very weak relation between 
investor sentiment and the long-short portfolios.  Out of the 10,000 portfolios, over 80% 
of the long leg portfolios and over 99% of the short leg portfolios have a relation with 
investor sentiment, but less than 11% of the long-short portfolios have a relation with 
investor sentiment. 
Prior to controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, there is a weak relation 
between 5 of the 6 predicted sentiment measures and the long leg portfolios and a stronger 
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relation between investor sentiment and the short leg portfolios.  Using the University of 
Michigan residual sentiment constructed using GDP growth variables, more than 97% of 
the short leg portfolios have a relation with investor sentiment.  While the short leg has a 
relation with investor sentiment, overall each long-short trading strategy has a weak 
relation with investor sentiment; less than 10% of the strategies have a statistical relation 
with investor sentiment.   
After controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, there is a weak relation 
between predicted investor sentiment and the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  
Further, although the overall relation is weak, there are still around 10% of the strategies 
with a relation between the component of sentiment related to the economy and trading 
strategy returns.  This result is found even when using the Huang et al. (2015) aligned 
investor sentiment measure. 
The results change using residual sentiment.  There is now a weak relation between 
the short leg portfolios and investor sentiment.  The long leg portfolios exhibit a relation 
with investor sentiment using 2 of the sentiment measures, but this result diminishes 
significantly after controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors.  Interestingly, there 
is still a relation between investor sentiment and a subsample of the long-short portfolios.  
This evidence is inconsistent with the macroeconomic hypothesis since the percentage of 
significant coefficients does not drop to 0 after removing the component of sentiment 
related to the economy. 
Finally, Panel B of Table 1.9 shows the simulation results from the predictive 
regressions.  By and large, the results are fairly similar to the results from the high-low 
sentiment regressions.  Before controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, the long 
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leg has a weak relation with 5 of the 7 sentiment measures.  The long leg portfolios have a 
strong relation with University of Michigan residual investor sentiment constructed using 
the 6 Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment variables and a strong relation with the Huang 
et al. (2015) aligned investor sentiment.  The short leg has a stronger relation with investor 
sentiment, especially with University of Michigan residual investor sentiment constructed 
using the 6 Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment variables and with the Huang et al. (2015) 
aligned investor sentiment.  Using the Huang et al. (2015) measure, 100% of the short leg 
coefficients are statistically significant.  The overall relation between the long-short trading 
strategies is weak.  Across all 7 measures, I consistently find around 10% of the strategies 
that have a relation with investor sentiment.  
Once I control for risk, the relation between investor sentiment and cross-sectional 
anomalies changes drastically.  After controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, 
typically around 3% of the long leg portfolios have a predictive relation with investor 
sentiment, around 20% of the short leg portfolios exhibit a predictive relation, and around 
10% of the long-short portfolios exhibit a predictive relation.  Thus, once I control for risk, 
there is a weak predictive relation between the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios. 
Similar results are obtained using the component of the sentiment measures that is related 
to the economy.  However, the relation between the short leg portfolios is often 
strengthened using the predicted investor sentiment measures.  Still, once again after 
controlling for risk, there is a weak relation between investor sentiment and cross-sectional 
anomalies.   
The percentage of significant high-low and predictive regression coefficients is 
presented in Panels A.3 and B.3 of Table 1.10.  The results indicate that there is a weak 
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relation between investor sentiment and the long, short, and long-short portfolios.  
Interestingly, 98.99% of the long leg high-low coefficients have a statistically significant 
relation with the portion of Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment that is unrelated 
to the 13 Sibley et al. (2013) variables.  However, this result changes once I control for 
risk.  After controlling for risk, the percentage of significant long leg portfolios drops from 
98.99% to 7.15%.  Additionally, I do not find a predictive relation between this measure 
and the long leg portfolios.  Another interesting finding is that residual Huang et al. (2015) 
aligned investor sentiment still has predictive power before controlling for risk, but after 
controlling for risk this measure has very little predictive power.  Additionally, the 
component of sentiment that is unrelated to the economy still has predictive power.  
Therefore, macroeconomic risk is not able to fully explain why certain cross-sectional 
anomalies have a relation with investor sentiment. 
Overall, these results confirm that there is a weak relation between trading strategy 
returns and investor sentiment and that macroeconomic conditions are not able to fully 
explain the relation between a small subsample of profitable trading strategies and investor 
sentiment.  Thus, while the 16 original strategies have a relation with investor sentiment, 
the overwhelming majority of strategies have a weak relation with investor sentiment.  
Thus, it appears that the 34 additional strategies are more representative of the population 
of profitable long-short strategies.  From these results, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
there is a weak relation between investor sentiment and cross-sectional anomalies. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Using a large sample of profitable trading strategies, I test the hypothesis that these 
strategies are profitable because they invest in hard-to-short securities. Prior literature, such 
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as Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), has argued that the firms in the long leg of each 
trading strategy should not be hard-to-short, and therefore, there should be no difference in 
returns following high or low investor sentiment and there should be no predictive relation 
between lagged investor sentiment and long leg returns. I find evidence consistent with this 
portion of the hard-to-short hypothesis. In addition, the short leg returns of each trading 
strategy should exhibit a negative relation with lagged investor sentiment and the returns 
following high investor sentiment should be lower than those returns following low 
investor sentiment. These hypotheses follow from the premise that the securities in the 
short leg are hard-to-short. Compared to the prior literature, I find weaker support for the 
hypothesis that the securities in the short leg portfolio of each strategy are hard-to-short.  
Finally, for the long-short portfolio, the returns following high sentiment should be larger 
than the returns following low sentiment, and there should be a positive relation between 
lagged investor sentiment and future returns. I test these 2 claims but find less evidence in 
favor of these claims than was previously reported in the literature. These results indicate 
that the returns to a large number of trading strategies are not due to short sale constraints.  
Thus, the higher returns earned to certain trading strategies could be due to risk rather than 
mispricing.  Overall, these results indicate that it is important to use a representative sample 
when testing financial theory. If the sample is not representative of the population then the 








Trading strategies remaining that have correlations less than 0.80.  This table lists the 50 
trading strategies that remain after removing strategies that are highly correlated with other 
trading strategies.  Initially I have a total of 86 different trading strategies.  I then remove 
strategies that have a correlation of 0.75 or above with the 16 trading strategies previously 
tested in the literature (i.e., Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012)).  Henceforth, I will refer to 
these 16 strategies as the original strategies and all other strategies as new strategies.  Next, 
of the remaining new strategies, I remove those strategies that have a correlation of 0.75 
with another member of the new strategies.  When a strategy has a correlation of 0.75 or 
above with another strategy I remove the strategy with the highest mean absolute 
correlation with the new strategies.  This composes the initial list of 42 test strategies.  Next 
I increase the correlation cutoff threshold from 0.75 to 0.80 in increments of 0.01 and repeat 
the removal of highly correlated strategies.  As I do this, if a strategy that was previously 
removed is no longer removed then I add this strategy to the initial 42 strategies list.  Thus, 
the strategies used in each test are updated each iteration and I never add and remove the  
same strategy.  
  
Variable Name Variable Name
(1) Campbell Distress (35) Forecast Dispersion
(2) O-Score (1) (42) Intermediate Momentum
(3) Net Stock Issues (43) Investments to Assets (2)
(4) Daniel Titman Composite (44) Investments to Assets (3)
(5) Accruals (1) (45) Investments to Assets (4)
(6) Net Operating Assets (46) Investments to Assets (5)
(7) Momentum (1) (47) Liquidity Beta (2)
(8) Gross Profitability (48) Liquidity Beta (3)
(9) Asset Growth (1) (49) Long-term Reversal (1)
(10) Return on Assets  (1) (50) Long-term Reversal (2)
(11) Investments to Assets (1) (51) Long-term Reversal (3)
(12) Combination Strategy (1) (52) Market Beta (2)
(13) Market Beta (1) (54) Momentum (2)
(14) Firm Size (59) Profit Margin
(15) Book-to-market (1) (60) PPE-to-Assets
(16) Liquidity Beta (1) (61) R&D-to-Assets
(17) Accruals (2) (73) Return Variance (8)
(18) Age (74) Sales Growth (1)
(19) Analyst Coverage (75) Sales Growth (2)
(24) Cash flow-to-market equity (2) (77) Sales-to-market equity (1)
(27) Dividends-to-price (1) (80) Short-run momentum (1)
(31) Earnings-to-market equity (2) (81) Short-run momentum (2)
(32) Earnings-to-market equity (3) (82) Short-term Reversal
(33) External Finance (1) (83) SUE
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number and percentage of high-low investor sentiment coefficients for 50 trading strategies. This 
table presents the number and percentage of coefficients that pass either a one-tailed or two-tailed 
t-test after regressing excess portfolio returns on a dummy variable indicating whether the prior 
period had high investor sentiment.  For each of the 50 trading strategies and for each sentiment 
variable I regress the long leg, short leg, and long-short (hedge) portfolio returns in excess of the 
1-month Treasury rate on a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the prior value of the investor 
sentiment index was greater than the median value of this sentiment index over the entire sample 
period.  The regression equation is Ri,t = a + aHdH,t + εi,t , where Ri,t is the excess portfolio return, 
a is a constant, and dH,t is the high investor sentiment indicator variable.  This regression measures 
the average excess return difference between high and low investor sentiment for each portfolio 
and was originally used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012).  All regressions are estimated using 
White (1980) standard errors.  The original strategies are the 16 trading strategies that appear in 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012).  These variables are Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi’s (2008) 
distress risk; Ohlson’s (1980) O-score; net stock issues; Daniel and Titman’s Composite equity 
issues; Sloan (1996) accruals; net operating assets; momentum; gross profitability; asset growth; 
return on assets; investment-to-assets; a combination strategy that invests equally in the prior 
variables; market beta; firm size; book-to-market; and Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity 
beta. New strategies are all of the strategies that were not previously tested in Stambaugh, Yu, and 
Yuan (2012). A description of these strategies is given in Section 2. The 6 sentiment measures are 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment, Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor 
sentiment, University of Michigan Consumer Confidence, University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence constructed using the 6 Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment input 
variables, University of Michigan residual consumer confidence constructed using the 6 Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) economic growth variables, and University of Michigan residual consumer 
confidence constructed using economic levels instead of economic growth variables. A detailed 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number and percentage of predictive regression coefficients for 50 trading strategies.  This 
table presents the number and percentage of coefficients that pass either a one-tailed or 
two-tailed t-test after regressing excess portfolio returns on lagged investor sentiment.  For 
each of the 50 trading strategies I regress the long leg, short leg, and long-short (hedge) 
portfolio returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury rate on the lagged level of 1 of the 6 
sentiment measures.  The regression equation is Ri,t = a +bSt-1 + εi,t, where Ri,t is the excess 
portfolio return, a is a constant, and St-1 is the lagged level of the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
orthogonalized investor sentiment index, the Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment 
index, the University of Michigan Consumer Confidence, or University of Michigan 
residual consumer confidence constructed using either the 6 Baker and Wurgler input 
sentiment variables or the growth or level of the 6 economic variables used in Baker and 
Wurgler (2006).  This regression is used to test whether portfolio returns can be predicted 
using lagged investor sentiment and was originally used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 
(2012).  All regressions are estimated using White (1980) standard errors.  The 16 original 
trading strategies are Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi’s (2008) distress risk; Ohlson’s 
(1980) O-score; net stock issues; Daniel and Titman’s composite equity issues; Sloan 
(1996) accruals; net operating assets; momentum; gross profitability; asset growth; return 
on assets; investment-to-assets; a combination strategy that invests equally in the prior 
strategies; market beta; firm size; book-to-market; and Pástor and Stambaugh’s (2003) 
liquidity beta. I refer to any other trading strategy as a new trading strategy. A description 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variables added for correlation thresholds between 0.76 and 0.99.  This table lists the 
variables that are added to the initial list of 42 trading strategies as I vary the correlation 
threshold between 0.76 and 0.99, inclusive, in increments of 0.01.  Starting with 86 
different trading strategies, I remove those strategies that have a correlation of 0.75 or 
above with the 16 original trading strategies.  Next, of the remaining new strategies, I 
remove those that have a correlation of 0.75 or above with the new strategies.  For strategies 
that have a correlation above a given threshold, I remove the strategy that has the highest 
mean absolute correlation with all of the other strategies.  After completing these 2 steps I 
am left with 42 strategies.  I repeat this procedure for correlation thresholds 0.76 through 
0.99.  If a strategy that was previously removed is no longer removed for a given threshold, 
then I add this strategy to the list of 42 strategies and use this list of test strategies as the 
initial strategy list for all correlation thresholds greater than the current threshold.  Thus, I 






Correlation when added Strategy Number Variable Name
76 44 Investments to Assets (3)
76 48 Liquidity Beta (3)
76 49 Long-term Reversal (1)
76 54 Momentum (2)
77 33 External Finance (1)
77 77 Sales-to-market equity (1)
79 18 Age
79 31 Earnings-to-market equity (2)
82 25 Credit Rating
82 66 Return Variance (1)
83 20 Asset Growth (2)
83 62 Return on Assets  (2)
83 79 Share Turnover
84 26 Dividends-to-book equity
85 29 Earnings-to-book equity
85 76 Sales Growth (3)
87 36 Idiosyncratic Risk (1)
88 65 Return on Equity (2)
88 67 Return Variance (2)
88 86 Combination Strategy (2)
90 22 Book-to-market (3)
90 58 Profitability-to-book
91 21 Book-to-market (2)
91 57 O-Score (4)
91 63 Return on Assets  (3)
91 64 Return on Equity (1)
94 40 Illiquidity (3)
94 85 Unexpected Earnings (2)
96 68 Return Variance (3)
97 53 Market Beta (3)
98 41 Illiquidity (4)
98 69 Return Variance (4)
98 78 Sales-to-market equity (2)
99 23 Cash flow-to-market equity (1)
99 37 Idiosyncratic Risk (2)




Highly correlated strategies.  This table lists 
variables that have a correlation above (0.99) with 





Strategy Number Variable Name
28 Dividends-to-price (2)





71 Return Variance (6)









Percentage of significant coefficients using Conditional CAPM.  This table shows the 
percentage of statistically significant investor sentiment coefficients before and after 
controlling for the conditional CAPM model.  Specifically, I estimate the average return 
difference between high and low sentiment and the predictive sentiment regressions using 
the following 2 conditional CAPM models: 
 
Rt+1 = a + aHdH,t + (b0 +b1Divt+b2DEFt + b3TERMt + b4TBt)rm,t+1 + εt+1                       (14) 
and  
Rt+1 = a + b St + (c0 +c1Divt+c2DEFt + c3TERMt + c4TBt)rm,t+1 + εt+1 ,                (15) 
where dH,t is a dummy variable indicating if the prior period had high investor sentiment, 
Div is the 12-month dividend yield, DEF is the default spread, TERM is the term spread, 
TB is 3-month Treasury bill rate, and rm is the excess return on the value-weighted market 
portfolio.  This model was previously used in Cooper et al. (2008).  The dividend yield is 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Percentage of significant coefficients using Sibley et al. (2013) investor sentiment.  This 
table presents the percentage of statistically significant coefficients using predicted and 
residual investor sentiment.  Following Sibley et al. (2013), I regress each of the 6 
sentiment measures on the 13 macroeconomic, financial, and risk factor variables used in 
Sibley et al. (2013). The 13 variables are the U.S. unemployment rate, growth rate in 
inflation, growth rate in consumption, growth rate in disposable personal income, growth 
rate in industrial production, NBER recession indicator variable, 3-month Treasury bill 
rate, default spread, term spread, dividend yield, value-weighted market return, stock 
market volatility, and a liquidity risk factor.  The fitted value from these regressions is 





Original 31.25% 81.25% 56.25% 18.75% 75.00% 62.50%
New 52.94% 85.29% 14.71% 20.59% 47.06% 11.76%
Overall 46.00% 84.00% 28.00% 20.00% 56.00% 28.00%
Original 56.25% 100.00% 56.25% 25.00% 25.00% 31.25%
New 55.88% 97.06% 17.65% 8.82% 8.82% 8.82%
Overall 56.00% 98.00% 30.00% 14.00% 14.00% 16.00%
Original 31.25% 81.25% 56.25% 31.25% 75.00% 62.50%
New 50.00% 82.35% 20.59% 26.47% 64.71% 11.76%
Overall 44.00% 82.00% 32.00% 28.00% 68.00% 28.00%
Original 12.50% 81.25% 50.00% 12.50% 31.25% 43.75%
New 26.47% 73.53% 23.53% 17.65% 32.35% 14.71%
Overall 22.00% 76.00% 32.00% 16.00% 32.00% 24.00%
Original 0.00% 6.25% 56.25% 18.75% 68.75% 37.50%
New 0.00% 0.00% 17.65% 23.53% 23.53% 17.65%
Overall 0.00% 2.00% 30.00% 22.00% 38.00% 24.00%
Original 6.25% 37.50% 50.00% 6.25% 31.25% 43.75%
New 5.88% 47.06% 29.41% 14.71% 26.47% 20.59%
Overall 6.00% 44.00% 36.00% 12.00% 28.00% 28.00%
(2)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using economic 
growth variables
Panel A.1 Sibley et al. (2013) predicted investor sentiment results
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Sentiment measure Strategy 
group
Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
(1)




Baker and Wurgler investor 
sentiment
(4)
University of Michigan consumer 
confidence
(5)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using economic level 
variables
(6)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using sentiment 
variables
Panel A. Percentage of statistically significant high-low sentiment coefficients
61 
 
Table 1.8 continued 
 
  
Original 31.25% 0.00% 25.00% 12.50% 25.00% 25.00%
New 35.29% 0.00% 29.41% 14.71% 23.53% 26.47%
Overall 34.00% 0.00% 28.00% 14.00% 24.00% 26.00%
Original 0.00% 25.00% 43.75% 0.00% 43.75% 18.75%
New 0.00% 8.82% 26.47% 5.88% 17.65% 14.71%
Overall 0.00% 14.00% 32.00% 4.00% 26.00% 16.00%
Original 75.00% 0.00% 6.25% 6.25% 18.75% 18.75%
New 67.65% 0.00% 17.65% 5.88% 17.65% 29.41%
Overall 70.00% 0.00% 14.00% 6.00% 18.00% 26.00%
Original 0.00% 0.00% 43.75% 0.00% 43.75% 18.75%
New 0.00% 0.00% 20.59% 0.00% 17.65% 8.82%
Overall 0.00% 0.00% 28.00% 0.00% 26.00% 12.00%
Original 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 31.25% 6.25%
New 0.00% 5.88% 23.53% 0.00% 14.71% 11.76%
Overall 0.00% 4.00% 24.00% 0.00% 20.00% 10.00%
Original 0.00% 43.75% 50.00% 0.00% 81.25% 50.00%
New 0.00% 14.71% 26.47% 8.82% 55.88% 17.65%
Overall 0.00% 24.00% 34.00% 6.00% 64.00% 28.00%
(5)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using economic level 
variables
(6)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using sentiment 
variables




Baker and Wurgler investor 
sentiment
(4)
University of Michigan consumer 
confidence
(2)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using economic 
growth variables
Panel A.2 Sibley et al. (2013) residual investor sentiment results
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Sentiment measure Strategy 
group




Table 1.8 continued 
 
  
Original 56.25% 93.75% 62.50% 25.00% 75.00% 50.00%
New 76.47% 91.18% 23.53% 32.35% 50.00% 17.65%
Overall 70.00% 92.00% 36.00% 30.00% 58.00% 28.00%
Original 31.25% 87.50% 62.50% 18.75% 75.00% 56.25%
New 58.82% 85.29% 17.65% 20.59% 35.29% 14.71%
Overall 50.00% 86.00% 32.00% 20.00% 48.00% 28.00%
Original 50.00% 87.50% 62.50% 25.00% 75.00% 62.50%
New 79.41% 91.18% 17.65% 41.18% 67.65% 17.65%
Overall 70.00% 90.00% 32.00% 36.00% 70.00% 32.00%
Original 0.00% 18.75% 50.00% 12.50% 56.25% 50.00%
New 0.00% 14.71% 17.65% 23.53% 32.35% 11.76%
Overall 0.00% 16.00% 28.00% 20.00% 40.00% 24.00%
Original 0.00% 62.50% 62.50% 31.25% 81.25% 62.50%
New 0.00% 23.53% 17.65% 44.12% 70.59% 17.65%
Overall 0.00% 36.00% 32.00% 40.00% 74.00% 32.00%
Original 18.75% 68.75% 43.75% 6.25% 25.00% 12.50%
New 32.35% 55.88% 26.47% 14.71% 29.41% 17.65%
Overall 28.00% 60.00% 32.00% 12.00% 28.00% 16.00%
Long leg
Panel B.1 Sibley et al. (2013) predicted investor sentiment results
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Sentiment measure Strategy 
group
Long leg Short leg Long-Short
(6)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using sentiment 
variables
Panel B. Percentage of statistically significant predictive regression coefficients
(3)
Baker and Wurgler investor 
sentiment
(4)
University of Michigan consumer 
confidence
(5)
University of Michigan residual 








University of Michigan residual 




Table 1.8 continued 
 
  
Original 0.00% 0.00% 43.75% 12.50% 50.00% 62.50%
New 0.00% 5.88% 23.53% 11.76% 32.35% 29.41%
Overall 0.00% 4.00% 30.00% 12.00% 38.00% 40.00%
Original 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 0.00% 18.75% 12.50%
New 0.00% 0.00% 5.88% 2.94% 8.82% 5.88%
Overall 0.00% 0.00% 8.00% 2.00% 12.00% 8.00%
Original 0.00% 0.00% 43.75% 6.25% 43.75% 50.00%
New 0.00% 0.00% 17.65% 8.82% 29.41% 23.53%
Overall 0.00% 0.00% 26.00% 8.00% 34.00% 32.00%
Original 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 12.50% 25.00%
New 0.00% 0.00% 8.82% 0.00% 11.76% 8.82%
Overall 0.00% 0.00% 14.00% 0.00% 12.00% 14.00%
Original 12.50% 62.50% 31.25% 6.25% 12.50% 12.50%
New 5.88% 47.06% 17.65% 0.00% 8.82% 5.88%
Overall 8.00% 52.00% 22.00% 2.00% 10.00% 8.00%
Original 6.25% 81.25% 68.75% 0.00% 68.75% 56.25%
New 8.82% 58.82% 23.53% 5.88% 47.06% 17.65%
Overall 8.00% 66.00% 38.00% 4.00% 54.00% 30.00%
(6)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using sentiment 
variables
(3)
Baker and Wurgler investor 
sentiment
(4)
University of Michigan consumer 
confidence
(5)
University of Michigan residual 
confidence using economic level 
variables
(1)




University of Michigan residual 
confidence using economic 
growth variables
Sentiment measure
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Short leg Long-ShortStrategy 
group
Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg




Percentage of significant coefficients using Huang et al. (2015) sentiment measures.  This 
table presents the percentage of statistically significant coefficients using raw Huang et al. 
(2015) aligned investor sentiment, predicted Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor 
sentiment, and residual Huang (2015) aligned investor sentiment.  Raw Huang (2015) 
aligned investor sentiment is constructed by applying partial least squares to the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment variables.  I obtain this measure directly from Goufu 
Zhou’s website.  Predicted and residual Huang (2015) aligned investor sentiment are 
constructed following the methodology used in Sibley et al. (2013).  Specifically, predicted 
Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor sentiment is the fitted value from regressing the raw 
Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor sentiment index on the 13 financial variables used in 
Sibley et al. (2013).  Residual Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor sentiment is the residual 
from regressing the raw Huang et al. (2015) aligned investor sentiment index on the 13 











Original 75.00% 100.00% 62.50% 6.25% 68.75% 25.00%
New 79.41% 94.12% 29.41% 5.88% 35.29% 17.65%
Overall 78.00% 96.00% 40.00% 6.00% 46.00% 20.00%
Original 62.50% 100.00% 56.25% 12.50% 68.75% 37.50%
New 91.18% 91.18% 17.65% 11.76% 44.12% 8.82%
Overall 82.00% 94.00% 30.00% 12.00% 52.00% 18.00%
Original 6.25% 50.00% 31.25% 12.50% 0.00% 6.25%
New 11.76% 52.94% 41.18% 2.94% 0.00% 11.76%
Overall 10.00% 52.00% 38.00% 6.00% 0.00% 10.00%
Panel  A. Percentage of statistically significant high-low sentiment coefficients
Predicted Huang et al. (2015) 
aligned investor sentiment
Residual Huang et al. (2015) 
aligned investor sentiment
Long leg Short leg Long-
Short
Huang et al. (2015) aligned 
investor sentiment
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Sentiment measure Strategy 
group




Table 1.9 continued 
 
Original 93.75% 100.00% 68.75% 6.25% 37.50% 50.00%
New 91.18% 88.24% 32.35% 14.71% 35.29% 14.71%
Overall 92.00% 92.00% 44.00% 12.00% 36.00% 26.00%
Original 56.25% 93.75% 56.25% 25.00% 56.25% 31.25%
New 76.47% 91.18% 14.71% 29.41% 47.06% 14.71%
Overall 70.00% 92.00% 28.00% 28.00% 50.00% 20.00%
Original 50.00% 81.25% 62.50% 6.25% 12.50% 31.25%
New 64.71% 76.47% 35.29% 8.82% 5.88% 17.65%




Predicted Huang et al. (2015) 
aligned investor sentiment
Residual Huang et al. (2015) 
aligned investor sentiment
Panel B. Percentage of statistically significant predictive regression coefficients
Short leg Long-
Short
Huang et al. (2015) aligned 
investor sentiment
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors






Simulation Results.  This table presents the percentage of statistically significant 
investor sentiment coefficients from simulated long, short, and long-short portfolios.  
Each June, stocks are randomly assigned to 1 of 10 decile portfolios.  Value-
weighted returns are then calculated from July of year t until June of year t+1.  The 
decile with the highest average return is defined as the long leg, the decile with the 
lowest average return is defined as the short leg, and the long-short portfolio is 
calculated as the difference between the long leg and short leg returns.  I then 
estimate the difference in returns between high and low sentiment and the predictive 
regression coefficients for the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolio using each 









Sentiment Measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
(1) Baker Wurgler OIS 0.01% 1.23% 7.74% 2.95% 10.58% 8.05%
(2) UMICH RES GDP GROWTH 0.00% 0.08% 10.31% 2.71% 12.48% 10.70%
(3) Baker Wurgler IS 0.00% 0.00% 8.78% 3.08% 10.55% 8.82%
(4) UMICH 0.01% 1.20% 9.32% 6.20% 23.83% 10.05%
(5) UMICH RES GDP LEVELS 6.78% 33.59% 4.97% 3.59% 7.65% 4.71%
(6) UMICH RES Sent Variables 12.73% 72.77% 11.98% 9.81% 40.97% 11.98%
(7) Huang et al. AIS 80.24% 99.31% 10.66% 2.50% 9.43% 10.30%
Panel A. Percentage of signficant high-low coefficients
Panel A.1. Original Sentiment measures
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Sentiment Measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
(1) Baker Wurgler OIS 6.53% 47.65% 8.77% 4.13% 15.50% 8.79%
(2) UMICH RES GDP GROWTH 71.07% 97.71% 10.91% 3.24% 9.74% 10.20%
(3) Baker Wurgler IS 4.61% 39.40% 8.94% 8.04% 25.22% 9.58%
(4) UMICH 7.19% 47.34% 8.55% 6.88% 20.51% 8.40%
(5) UMICH RES GDP LEVELS 0.00% 0.00% 7.78% 4.67% 13.51% 8.25%
(6) UMICH RES Sent Variables 0.04% 2.43% 8.82% 3.87% 15.86% 9.74%
(7) Huang et al. AIS 56.61% 94.13% 9.45% 3.76% 15.15% 9.84%
Panel A.2. Predicted Sentiment Measures
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors












Sentiment Measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
(1) Baker Wurgler OIS 39.29% 0.00% 7.05% 5.67% 1.19% 6.72%
(2) UMICH RES GDP GROWTH 0.01% 0.77% 10.27% 7.60% 18.52% 9.96%
(3) Baker Wurgler IS 98.99% 0.00% 6.32% 7.15% 0.89% 6.02%
(4) UMICH 0.00% 0.00% 8.36% 6.18% 16.79% 8.04%
(5) UMICH RES GDP LEVELS 0.01% 0.20% 3.95% 3.47% 3.97% 4.06%
(6) UMICH RES Sent Variables 0.01% 2.42% 8.40% 7.72% 20.49% 8.19%
(7) Huang et al. AIS 3.62% 41.93% 8.37% 6.29% 1.16% 7.35%
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Panel A.3. Residual Sentiment Measures
Sentiment measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
(1) Baker Wurgler OIS 3.20% 40.34% 9.67% 2.51% 12.58% 9.83%
(2) UMICH RES GDP GROWTH 5.33% 50.78% 12.99% 3.03% 21.39% 13.47%
(3) Baker Wurgler IS 0.33% 13.29% 8.46% 2.82% 11.96% 8.83%
(4) UMICH 0.00% 0.22% 10.20% 6.68% 30.63% 11.27%
(5) UMICH RES GDP LEVELS 19.14% 56.40% 6.52% 8.37% 17.89% 6.24%
(6) UMICH RES Sent Variables 69.16% 97.33% 10.66% 8.98% 35.27% 11.08%
(7) Huang et al. AIS 99.86% 100.00% 11.45% 1.38% 6.69% 11.15%
Panel B. Percentage of signficant predictive regression coefficients
Panel B.1. Original sentiment measures
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Sentiment measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
(1) Baker Wurgler OIS 24.37% 77.66% 8.16% 5.94% 18.81% 7.82%
(2) UMICH RES GDP GROWTH 33.80% 85.31% 8.41% 7.31% 23.19% 8.58%
(3) Baker Wurgler IS 0.00% 0.18% 9.89% 6.13% 28.95% 10.74%
(4) UMICH 2.66% 34.61% 9.10% 4.89% 23.10% 10.54%
(5) UMICH RES GDP LEVELS 32.48% 90.12% 14.73% 2.43% 18.33% 14.83%
(6) UMICH RES Sent Variables 0.00% 0.61% 7.76% 7.63% 18.13% 7.91%
(7) Huang et al. AIS 33.72% 83.07% 6.62% 4.16% 15.13% 6.82%
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors
With Fama and French (1993) 
factors
Panel B.2. Predicted sentiment measures
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Table 1.10 continued 
 
  
Sentiment measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
(1) Baker Wurgler OIS 0.00% 0.00% 8.53% 2.66% 4.05% 8.86%
(2) UMICH RES GDP GROWTH 0.00% 0.00% 6.67% 6.48% 11.72% 6.99%
(3) Baker Wurgler IS 0.00% 0.00% 6.65% 2.69% 2.50% 6.91%
(4) UMICH 0.00% 0.00% 6.83% 4.38% 9.57% 7.21%
(5) UMICH RES GDP LEVELS 0.95% 10.97% 3.94% 3.38% 7.01% 3.91%
(6) UMICH RES Sent Variables 8.27% 51.11% 9.55% 9.58% 24.44% 9.08%
(7) Huang et al. AIS 90.35% 99.79% 11.77% 3.54% 2.32% 11.12%
Panel B.3. Residual sentiment measures
Without Fama and French 
(1993) factors





















Acceptance rates using Baker Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment. This 
figure reports the acceptance rates for 4 different tests as the correlation cutoff threshold is 
varied from 0.75 to 1.00 in increments of 0.01.  The acceptance rate is defined as the 
number of coefficients that are statistically significant using a 1 tailed t-test, H0: µ≤0, 
divided by the total number of coefficients. As I vary the correlation cutoff threshold from 
0.75 to 1.00, the number of strategies tested increases from 43 to 86. In Panels A and B, I 
present the acceptance rates for the coefficients testing whether the difference following 
high and low investor sentiment for the long-short strategies is statistically positive with 
and without the Fama and French (1993) factors.  In Panels C and D, I present the 
acceptance rates for predictive regression of long-short portfolio returns on lagged investor 
sentiment with and without controlling for the returns on the Fama and French (1993) 
factors. Original Strategies are the 16 strategies used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), 
New Strategies are any strategy not used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), and All 
Strategies are all of the strategies tested. I conduct these tests using the Baker and Wurgler 














Figure 1.2  
Acceptance rates using University of Michigan residual consumer confidence.  This table 
reports the acceptance rates for 4 different tests as the correlation cutoff threshold is varied 
from 0.75 to 1.00 in increments of 0.01.  The acceptance rate is defined as the number of 
coefficients that are statistically significant using a 1 tailed t-test, H0: µ≤0, divided by the 
total number of coefficients. As we vary the correlation cutoff threshold from 0.75 to 1.00, 
the number of strategies tested increases from 43 to 86. Panels A and B present the 
acceptance rates for the coefficients testing whether the difference following high and low 
investor sentiment for the long-short strategies is statistically positive with and without the 
Fama and French (1993) factors.  Panels C and D present the acceptance rates for predictive 
regression of long-short portfolio returns on lagged investor sentiment with and without 
controlling for the returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors. Original Strategies are 
the 16 strategies used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), New Strategies are any strategy 
not used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), and All Strategies are all of the strategies 
tested.  I conduct these tests using University of Michigan residual consumer confidence. 
Residual consumer confidence is the residual from the following regression: UMICHt = α 
+ β1Growth_Indprot + β2Growth_Consdurt + β3Growth_Consnont + β4Growth_Consservt 
+ β5Growth_employt  + β6Recesst +εt , where UMICH is the value of the University of 
Michigan consumer confidence survey, Growth_Indpro is the growth of industrial 
production, Growth_Consdur is the growth of durable consumption, Growth_Consnon is 
the growth of nondurable consumption, Growth_Consserv is the growth of service 
consumption, Growth_employ is the growth of employment, and Recess is a dummy 








INVESTOR SENTIMENT, PROFITABLE TRADING STRATEGIES, 
AND SHORT SALE CONSTRAINTS 
There is a growing debate of whether the returns to profitable trading strategies are 
due to short sale constraints.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct an investor sentiment 
index and find that hard-to-value firms are affected by investor sentiment.  Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) state that hard-to-value firms typically have hard-to-short securities. 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012b) present evidence that the short leg of profitable trading 
strategies has a higher return following low sentiment and each long-short trading strategy 
is more profitable following high sentiment.  These results imply that the returns to 
profitable trading strategies are due to short sale constraints.  However, recently Bulsiewicz 
(2013) showed that there is a weak relation between investor sentiment and a large 
collection of cross-sectional anomalies suggesting that the returns to profitable trading 
strategies are not due to short sale constraints.   
 In this paper I directly test whether profitable trading strategies conform to Miller’s 
(1977) hypothesis.  Miller (1977) hypothesizes that if there are heterogeneous beliefs in 
the market, a security that is hard-to-short can become overvalued when investors are 
optimistic.  I assess whether the average firm in these strategies is hard-to-short, if the 
securities in the short leg are harder-to-short than the securities in the long leg, if there is 
wider dispersion in beliefs following high sentiment, and if the average security in the long 
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leg and short leg portfolios becomes overvalued following high sentiment.  
 First, I assess whether or not the short leg is harder-to-short than the long leg and if 
the average security in the 50 trading strategies considered here is hard-to-short.  I find that 
each strategy invests a small amount in hard-to-short securities and the short leg only 
invests slightly more than the long leg in hard-to-short securities.  Specifically, using 
equally-weighted portfolios, the long leg invests around 17% in hard-to-short securities, 
while the short leg invests around 21% in hard-to-short securities.  Even less is invested in 
hard-to-short securities using value-weighted portfolios.  On average only 10% of the long 
leg and 15% of the short leg of each strategy is invested in hard-to-short securities.  Further, 
the difference in weight in hard-to-short securities between high and low sentiment states 
is less than 2%. 
  Next, I investigate whether the average security in these strategies is hard-to-short. 
First, using Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, I find that both the long leg and short leg 
are more liquid following high sentiment than following low sentiment.  However, the 
short leg is not more illiquid than the long leg.  I further investigate these results using daily 
trading volume, dollar trading volume, and share turnover.  I find that each trading strategy 
is more heavily traded following high sentiment than following low sentiment. Using 
equally-weighted portfolios, the short leg has around $3 million more trading volume 
following high sentiment and the long leg has around $4 million more trading volume 
following high sentiment; using value-weighted portfolios, the short leg has around $45 
million more trading volume per day following high sentiment while the long leg has 
around $53 million more trading volume per day following high sentiment.  
Additional tests indicate that the short leg has slightly higher trading costs than the 
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long leg, but there is not a large difference in trading costs across sentiment states. 
Furthermore, there is not a large difference in the number of zero trading days between the 
long and short leg portfolios.  Using equally-weighted portfolios, the average security in 
the long leg has a Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta that is not statistically 
different from 0 while the average security in the short leg has a negative Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta.  However, using value-weighted portfolios, the long leg 
has a Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta that is negative following high sentiment 
and statistically 0 following low sentiment, while the short leg has a Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity beta that is statistically 0.  Thus, the relation between investor sentiment 
and profitable trading strategies does not appear to be due to differences in liquidity betas. 
I also assess whether the short leg is harder to short than the long leg using 
idiosyncratic risk, institutional ownership, and short interest.  However, I find that the 
average security in the short leg has similar idiosyncratic risk, institutional ownership, and 
short interest as the average security in the long leg.  Furthermore, I find that there is a 
large difference in institutional ownership between high and low sentiment states. 
Institutional ownership is around 9 to 10 percentage points higher following low sentiment 
using equally-weighted portfolios and around 6 to 7 percentage points higher following 
low sentiment using value-weighted portfolios.  This effect remains even after controlling 
for market wide ownership and controlling for ownership of firms in similar size deciles.  
Further tests reveal that this result is driven by mutual funds, hedge funds, and other 
institutions, while banks and insurance companies maintain their ownership levels across 
sentiment states.   
 Miller’s (1977) hypothesis requires for there to be wide dispersion in beliefs.  Using 
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the average daily return variance and analysts’ forecast dispersion, I find that the short leg 
has higher dispersion in beliefs especially following high sentiment.  Thus the short leg 
conforms to this portion of Miller’s hypothesis. 
 In order to conform to Miller’s (19770 hypothesis, the short leg has to become 
overvalued relative to the average valuation in the market following high sentiment.  I find 
weak evidence in favor of this hypothesis.  First, analysts do not view the average security 
in the short leg as being more overvalued than the average security in the long leg.  I 
construct analysts’ expected returns using analysts’ median price target and find that they 
expect the average security in the short leg to earn a higher return than the average security 
in the long leg.  Furthermore, there is not a statistical difference in their average 
recommendation for the average security in the long leg and short leg portfolios.  I also 
measure overvaluation using book-to-market ratios, but I do not find a material difference 
between the long leg and the short leg. 
 As a final test of the Miller’s (1977) overvaluation hypothesis, I measure 
overvaluation using intrinsic value-to-market equity ratios.  Intrinsic value is calculated 
using Ohlson’s (1995) residual income model.  Previously, it was shown in Frankel and 
Lee (1998) that intrinsic value-to-market equity ratios are a good measure of mispricing.  
Using, intrinsic value-to-market equity ratios, I find that the short leg is generally fairly 
valued relative to the long leg.  
 Overall, the results indicate that the average security in the short leg of these 
strategies is not hard-to-short and does not become overvalued following high sentiment.  
Given that each strategy only invests a small amount in hard-to-short securities, I directly 
assess whether there is a relation between investor sentiment and hard-to-short securities.  
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However, the results indicate that there is still only a weak relation between investor 
sentiment and hard-to-short securities. 
   These results contribute to the literature by showing that profitable trading 
strategies do not conform to Miller’s (1977) hypothesis, and thus, the relation between 
investor sentiment and profitable trading strategies are likely not due to short sale 
constraints.  Further, these results suggest that hard-to-short securities are not greatly 
affected by investor sentiment.  Therefore, any relation found between investor sentiment 
and profitable trading strategies is likely not due to short sale constraints.  Additionally, 
my results indicate that the relation between investor sentiment and some profitable trading 
strategies may be related to illiquidity and institutional ownership. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.1 reviews the literature, 
Section 2.2 describes the data and methodology, Section 2.3 presents the results, and 
Section 2.4 concludes. 
2.1 Literature Review 
 This work is most closely related to the literature showing that stock returns are 
affected by investor sentiment.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct a composite sentiment 
index and show that certain firms are influenced by investor sentiment.  A similar finding 
was found in Livnat and Petrovits (2009) who find that investor sentiment affects the 
returns to strategies that trade on earnings and accruals. This evidence is extended in Baker, 
Wurgler, and Yuan (2012) who show that investor sentiment affects stock returns outside 
the United States.  Based on the theory developed by Miller (1977), Stambaugh et al. 
(2012b) argue that firms in the short leg could be hard-to-short and as a result these firms 
could become overvalued (relative to the average valuation in the market) following high 
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sentiment. They present compelling evidence that this is indeed the case; firms in the short 
leg have lower returns following high sentiment and the trading strategies are more 
profitable following high sentiment. Their results are supported by results presented in 
Stambaugh et al. (2014).  However, Bulsiewicz (2013) finds much weaker support for this 
argument after expanding the number of strategies tested.  He finds that there is a weak 
relation between investor sentiment and 34 additional common strategies and a weak 
relation between investor sentiment and simulated profitable strategies.  
 There has been additional scholarly work on investor sentiment and stock market 
returns.  Tetlock (2007) found that the sentiment of the media affects stock market returns 
while Kumar and Lee (2006) found that retail investors trade in the same direction as one 
another; when one retail investor buys other retail investors buy and vice versa.  Other 
papers have focused on investor sentiment and the tradeoff between risk and return, how 
to measure investor sentiment, interaction between investor sentiment and analysts’ 
forecasts, and investor sentiment and market irregularities (see for example Ben-Rephael 
et al. (2012), Hribar and McInnis (2012), Lee et al. (1991), and Yu and Yuan (2011)). 
My work is also related to the literature that argues that the returns to profitable 
trading strategies are due to mispricing.  Originally, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1994) argued that certain trading strategies, i.e., the strategy that trades on book-to-market 
ratios, are profitable because they purchase securities that are undervalued and sell 
securities that are overvalued.  Cooper et al. (2004) found evidence consistent with this 
explanation when they investigated price momentum and whether the prior market had 
high or low returns. Some financial scholars argued that mispricing in the market could 
exist if arbitrageurs are not able to trade on the mispricing, i.e., there are limits to arbitrage. 
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(De Long et al. (1990), Pontiff (1996), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) Later work has 
aimed at testing whether this explanation can at least partially explain the returns to 
profitable trading strategies. (Cohen et al. (2007), Lam and Wei (2011), and Mashruwala 
et al. (2006)) Other research in this area includes: Doukas et al. (2010), Li and Zhang 
(2010), Sadka and Scherbina (2007), and Stambaugh et al. (2012a). 
One trading friction that could prevent securities from accurately reflecting 
fundamentals is short sale loan fees.  As discussed in Miller (1977), securities that are hard-
to-short may become mispriced.  The topic of short selling and stock market returns has 
been the focus of a number of studies.  Using institutional ownership as a proxy for short 
sale constraints, Nagel (2005) finds that certain trading strategies are more profitable for 
firms that are thought to be hard-to-short.  Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) sort firms on 
institutional ownership and short interest and find that firms with low institutional 
ownership or high short interest have lower returns than other firms and find that firms 
thought to be hard-to-short underperform other securities.  Consistent with D’Avolio 
(2002), they also find that the majority of firms are not hard-to-short.  Ali and Trombley 
(2006) investigate the relation between short sale constraints and momentum profits and 
find that momentum profits are positively related to short sale constraints.  Boehme et al. 
(2006) find evidence consistent with Miller’s (1977) argument that if a security is hard-to-
short than it may become overvalued; they find securities with high dispersion in investor’s 
valuations and high short sale constraints underperform other securities.  In other work, 
Diether et al. (2009) investigate the trading practices of short sellers and Israel and 
Moskowitz (2013) present evidence that a large portion of the size, value, and momentum 
profits come from the long leg of each strategy.  Further, they find that the returns to these 
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strategies are not greatly affected by trading costs and institutional ownership.  Unlike 
Israel and Moskowitz (2013), I find that there is a relation between institutional holdings 
and profitable trading strategies.  I find that financial institutions hold a higher percentage 
of the shares outstanding of short leg firms during periods when these portfolios earn a 
higher return, namely following low sentiment.    
 One strand of the asset pricing literature investigates whether these trading 
strategies are still profitable after controlling for trading costs.  For example, Korajczyk 
and Sadka (2004) and Lesmond et al. (2004) investigated the profitability of the momentum 
trading strategy originally documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and found mixed 
results on whether this trading strategy is still profitable after controlling for trading costs.  
Earlier work by Stoll and Whaley (1983) provided evidence that the small firm effect 
originally documented by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) is at least partially explained 
by trading costs.  In more recent work, Ng et al. (2008) found that firms with high trading 
costs respond less to earnings announcements and the returns to the post-earnings 
announcement drift trading strategy is reduced by trading costs.  I add to this literature by 
showing for a collection of trading strategies, trading costs reduce the high returns 
following low sentiment. 
 The work presented here is also related to the literature on stock market liquidity 
and asset pricing.  Acharya and Pedersen (2005) present a theoretical model where liquidity 
risk is a priced risk factor.  They find that periods of illiquidity should be followed by 
higher returns.  Likewise, Hasbrouck (2009) finds that returns are increasing in trading 
costs and Baker and Stein (2004) present a theoretical model that explains why returns are 
increasing in liquidity and trading costs. Bekaert et al. (2007) expand these results to 
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emerging markets and find a similar relation between liquidity and returns in these markets.  
In a related study, Chordia et al. (2008) find that liquidity helps to improve markets by 
increasing arbitrage activity and making prices move closer to a random walk.  Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) find that firms whose returns are highly sensitive to changes in liquidity 
earn higher returns than firms that are less sensitive.  In a later study, Sadka (2010) found 
that hedge funds that are more sensitive to liquidity risk outperform other funds that are 
less sensitive to liquidity risk.   Additional work in this literature, such as Avramov et al. 
(2013), Chordia et al. (2009), and Sadka (2006), has looked for a link between profitable 
trading strategies and liquidity.  Generally, these studies have found that liquidity helps to 
explain the returns to these strategies.  I add to this literature by showing that the short leg 
of certain trading strategies is more illiquid than the long leg of these trading strategies and 
that the short leg is more illiquid following low sentiment. 
 There is also a body of literature investigating how financial institutions trade.  
Jiang (2010) investigates the book-to-market effect and institutional investors and finds 
that financial institutions trade on the intangible information measure presented in Daniel 
and Titman (2006) and that financial institutions are trading on book-to-market ratios.  
Campbell et al. (2009) look at how financial institutions trade on a daily basis and present 
evidence that institutions are trading on momentum and earnings announcements.  I 
contribute to this literature by showing that financial institutions are trading on profitable 
trading strategies and are adjusting their holdings based on the level of investor sentiment. 
There is body of literature that looks at investor sentiment and liquidity.  Baker and 
Stein (2004) propose that irrational investors will only participate in the market when they 
are optimistic and these irrational investors increase market liquidity.  Their proposal 
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suggests that the market should be more liquid following high sentiment than low 
sentiment.  Consistent with this proposal, the existing literature has found a negative 
relation between investor sentiment and liquidity (see for example Chen et al. (2009), 
Deuskar (2008), and Lin (2011)). I find supporting evidence of a negative relation between 
investor sentiment and liquidity. However, unlike the existing literature which focuses on 
the market as whole, my results show that the liquidity of profitable trading strategies is 
affected by investor sentiment. Additionally, to my knowledge I am the first to test whether 
the higher returns experienced by some trading strategies following different sentiment 
states are due to trading frictions.   For a collection of 16 trading strategies, I generally find 
that these strategies are more illiquid following low sentiment than high sentiment.  
Further, I also find that the majority of the short leg portfolios of each trading strategy to 
be more illiquid than the long leg portfolios.  These results are robust even when I expand 
the number trading strategies to an additional 34 trading strategies.   
My work is related to 3 recent papers in the finance literature.  Chordia et al. (2014) 
look at whether the profits to 12 trading strategies have decreased over time.  They suggest 
that since liquidity in the market has improved over time, arbitrageurs should be able to 
reduce the profits to the 12 trading strategies.  They find evidence consistent with their 
suggestion.  The profits to these strategies in recent times are lower than they were in prior 
periods.  My work is also related Hwang and Liu (2014).  Hwang and Liu investigate 
whether short sellers trade on 10 profitable trading strategies that were previously reported 
in the literature.  They find that the short interest of securities in the short leg increases 
after those securities are classified as being in the short leg, so they conclude that short 
sellers must be trading on those strategies.  Finally, my work is related to Wu and Zhang 
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(2014).  Wu and Zhang calculate the average illiquidity, institutional ownership, and short 
interest for a strategy that combines 19 different trading strategies into 1 strategy.  They 
find for this 1 strategy institutional ownership is higher for the long leg than the short leg, 
short interest is higher for the short leg portfolio, and illiquidity is higher for the long leg 
than the short leg. 
While my work shares some similarities with Chordia et al. (2014), Hwang and Liu 
(2014), and Wu and Zhang (2014) there are some differences.  First, none of those papers 
investigated how liquidity and trading frictions change following different sentiment states.  
I present evidence that differences in trading frictions may be driving the return differences 
between high and low sentiment states.  Furthermore, our results imply that financial 
institutions are altering their portfolios based on the level of sentiment and that the trades 
of financial institutions could be contributing to the higher return of the short leg portfolio 
following low sentiment.  Unlike Wu and Zhang (2014), I find that illiquidity is generally 
higher for the short leg portfolio than the long leg portfolio.  The reason that Wu and Zhang 
(2014) present a different result than us is most likely due to their methodology.  They 
calculate illiquidity for a single composite strategy whereas I look at illiquidity for each 
strategy separately. 
2.2 Data and Methodology 
 I consider a total of 50 long-short trading strategies.  These trading strategies were 
used in Bulsiewicz (2013) to assess whether the returns to profitable trading strategies are 
due to short sale constraints.  The full list of trading strategies considered in this paper is 
given in Appendix A.  The data needed to allocate securities into the long leg and short leg 
of each trading strategy come from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and I/B/E/S.  The main investor 
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sentiment index used in this paper is the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor 
sentiment index.  Data for this index are obtained directly from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website.  
The University of Michigan consumer confidence index and additional data needed to 
construct the University of Michigan residual consumer confidence indices are obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website. 
 In this paper I am interested in testing whether the average security in these 
strategies conforms to Miller’s (1977) hypothesis, that is, is the average security in these 
strategies hard-to-short, and does it become overvalued following high sentiment?  In order 
to test whether Miller’s hypothesis holds, additional financial variables that measure 
liquidity, short sale constraints, and equity valuation are constructed.  In order to construct 
these variables, data from CRSP, COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S are augmented with short 
interest data from the COMPUSTAT Supplemental file and institutional ownership data 
from the Thompson Reuters 13F database. 
2.2.1 Overview of Short Sale Constraint Measures 
In the first part of this paper, I am interested in determining what fraction of the 50 
trading strategies is invested in hard-to-short securities.  To be able to assess whether or 
not each trading strategy is heavily invested in hard-to-short securities, I need to be able to 
determine whether or not a security is hard-to-short.  I consider a security as having high 
short sale constraints if it has a low share price, is relatively illiquid, has low analyst 
coverage, has high transaction costs, etc.  Initially, I consider a total of 32 different proxies 
for whether or not a security has high short sale constraints.  The first 29 short sale 
constraint proxies cover such variables as share price, firm size, liquidity, profitability, 
analyst coverage and forecast dispersion, volatility, idiosyncratic risk, short interest, 
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transaction costs, and relative valuation.  Similar in methodology to Stambaugh et al. 
(2012a), I also construct 3 composite measures that combine the information in the 29 
unique short sale constraint proxies.  The 29 measures of whether a security has high short 
sale constraints have either been shown to be correlated with short sale loan fees or proxy 
for securities that are likely costly to arbitrage (see for example D’Avolio (2002), Diether 
and Werner (2011), Mashruwala et al. (2006), Kumar and Lee (2006), Lam and Wei 
(2011), and Boehmer et al. (2010)). A more detailed description of all 32 trading friction 
measures is given in Appendix B. 
Following the methodology previously used in Bulsiewicz (2013), I sort firms in 
June of year t on 1 of the short sale constraint measures and allocate securities to 10 decile 
portfolios.  I then calculate equally-weighted and value-weighted returns for the decile 
portfolio that is hardest-to-short, easiest-to-short, and easiest-minus-hardest to short 
portfolios from July of year t until June of year t+1.  I also calculate a combination strategy 
that invests equally in all 32 different short sale constraints strategies.  Next, I calculate the 
correlation matrix between the value-weighted lowest minus highest trading friction 
portfolios and remove strategies that have a correlation greater than or equal to 0.80.   
After removing highly correlated strategies, I am left with 16 trading strategies 
constructed using 1 of the 16 short sale constraint measures.  I use these 16 strategies and 
their underlying variable values in order to determine whether or not profitable trading 
strategies are heavily invested in hard-to-short securities and to assess whether there is a 
relation between investor sentiment and hard-to-short securities.  The 16 remaining 
variables used as proxies for short sale constraints are: analyst coverage, average rank 
across all 32 hard-to-short proxies, book-to-market ratio, cash flow-to-average assets, 
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Corwin-Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread, days-to-cover ratio, dollar short interest, forecast 
dispersion, institutional ownership, liquidity beta, momentum, share turnover, short 
interest, short-term reversal (current 1-month return and lagged 1-month return), and 
volatility. 
I also supplement the 16 hard-to-short proxies with some additional financial 
proxies.  D’Avolio (2002) suggests that illiquid securities have higher short sale constraints 
than other securities.  To fully test whether the average security in the 50 strategies is 
illiquid, a total of 7 illiquidity measures are considered in this paper.  These measures are 
Amihud’s (2002) average 1-month daily illiquidity, 1-month percentage of zero trading 
days, Corwin-Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread, 1-month average daily dollar volume, share 
turnover, and trading volume, and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta.  Lesmond, 
Ogden, and Trczinka (1999) argue that investors will only trade a security if the expected 
return is greater than the trading costs.  Thus, if a security is not traded on a given day then 
this could indicate that the security has high transaction costs.  The Corwin-Schultz bid-
ask spread measure is used because Corwin and Schultz (2012) provide evidence that their 
measure is just as good if not better than other low-frequency estimators.   
Miller (1977) hypothesizes that heterogeneity in beliefs can lead to overvaluation.  
I directly test whether there is higher dispersion in beliefs following high sentiment using 
2 measures: 1-month average return variance, and analysts’ forecast dispersion.  I also 
assess whether the average security in these strategies is hard-to-short using 3 additional 
measures: idiosyncratic risk, institutional ownership, and short interest.  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Pontiff (2006) present an argument that securities with high 
idiosyncratic risk are harder-to-arbitrage than securities with low idiosyncratic risk since 
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arbitrageurs are typically specialized investors who do not hold diversified portfolios.  
Therefore, securities with high idiosyncratic risk should be harder-to-short than securities 
with low idiosyncratic risk.  Institutional ownership is used to measure short sale 
constraints since D’Avolio (2002) shows that securities with low institutional ownership 
or high short interest typically have higher short sale constraints, i.e., higher short sale loan 
fees.        
2.2.2 Overview of Valuation Measures 
I am also interested in finding out whether or not the average security in these 
trading strategies becomes overvalued (relative to the average valuation in the market) 
following high sentiment.  To assess the overvaluation hypothesis, 7 measures of potential 
overvaluation are used: analysts’ expected return, average recommendation, book-to-
market ratio, and 4 measures of intrinsic value to market equity ratios.  Analysts’ expected 
1-year return are used because if securities become overvalued following high sentiment 
then the average analyst should expect for these securities to earn a low return.  Analysts’ 
expected returns are constructed using their 1-year ahead price targets and the current value 
of equity in the market.  If securities are more overvalued following high sentiment than 
low sentiment, then we would expect for analysts to be more likely to make a sell 
recommendation following high sentiment than following low sentiment.  Additionally, if 
the average security in these strategies becomes overvalued then these securities should 
trade on a lower book-to-market ratio following high sentiment.  Previously, Brav and 
Lehavy (2003) showed that analysts’ target prices contain value-relevant information, i.e., 
the market reacts to price target revisions. 
The final valuation measures are constructed using the ratio of intrinsic value to 
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market value of equity.  Frankel and Lee (1998) provide evidence that the ratio of intrinsic 
value to market value of equity is a good predictor of the cross-section of returns.  Intrinsic 
value is calculated using Ohlson’s (1995) residual income model.  A total of 4 different 
measures of intrinsic value are used in this paper. For each of these measures intrinsic value 
is calculated using 7 different estimates of cost of capital: firm-level and industry-level cost 
of capitals estimated using the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor and Carhart (1997) 4-
factor models, and constant costs of capital of 8%, 10%, and 12%. After calculating 
intrinsic value using each of these costs of capital, I then use the median intrinsic value 
from these formulas.  If the intrinsic value is negative, then I set these values to missing.  
The first intrinsic value is calculated assuming that the firm’s current return-on-equity 
remains constant in perpetuity.  The other intrinsic values are calculated using analysts’ 
mean annual earnings forecasts.  The first measure calculates intrinsic value using 1-year 
ahead forecasts and assumes that the firm’s expected 1-year ahead profitability will 
continue in perpetuity.  The second measure uses 1-year and 2-year ahead mean earnings 
forecasts and assumes that the firm’s profitability in year 2 will continue in perpetuity.  The 
final measure of intrinsic value takes the median intrinsic value using the 14 estimates of 
intrinsic value calculated using I/B/E/S 1-year and 2-year forecasts.  More details on the 
construction of each short sale constraints and valuation measures are presented in 
Appendix B.     
2.2.3 Portfolio Formation Methodology 
Following Bulsiewicz (2013), at the time of portfolio formation I use only common 
shares (share codes equal to 10 or 11), and exclude financials (SIC codes 6000-6999), 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), and securities with share prices less than $5 or greater than 
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$1,000.  Each trading strategy is formed in June of year t by sorting firms on a financial 
variable into decile portfolios.  Then, from July of year t until June of year t+1 equally-
weighted and value-weighted portfolio values are calculated for each of the short sale 
constraint and valuation variables.  I then estimate the average value of each short sale 
constraint and valuation variable following high and low sentiment by regressing trading 
strategy portfolio values on dummy variables indicating whether the prior period had high 
or low sentiment.  Following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012b), I define high investor as 
a month where the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment index is 
above its median value for the entire sample period, 1965-2010.  I also test for a predictive 
relation between the trading strategy short sale constraints and investor sentiment by 
regressing each time series on lagged investor sentiment.   These steps are repeated for the 
remaining 49 trading strategies.  After completing these steps, I then calculate the cross-
section average long leg, short leg, and long-short variable values for each trading strategy 
in order to assess whether the average security in these strategies is hard-to-short and if 
these securities become overvalued following high sentiment. 
2.3 Results 
First, I investigate to what extent each trading strategy invests in securities with 
high short sale constraints.  For each trading strategy, firms are sorted on 1 of the financial 
variables and assigned to a decile portfolio, with 1 extreme decile portfolio defined as the 
long leg and the other as the short leg.  Independent of the trading strategy portfolio 
assignment, I allocate firms to 10 trading friction portfolios using 1 of the 16 trading 
friction measures.  Next, each June, I calculate how much of the long leg and short leg 
portfolios are invested in securities assigned to the highest short sale constraints decile. For 
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the combination trading strategy that was constructed by equally-weighting the first 11 
trading strategies, each month I calculate the average weight invested in the highest short 
sale constraint decile across all 11 single-sort strategies.  For each of the long-short 
portfolios, I calculate the weight invested in high short sale constraint securities as the 
difference in weights between the long leg and short leg portfolios.  For the long leg, short 
leg, and long-short portfolios I calculate the equally-weighted and value-weighted time-
series average weight invested in firms assigned to the highest short sale constraint decile.  
Then, I regress the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolio time series of weights on 
the lagged high and low sentiment indicator variables constructed using the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index.  I repeat these steps for each trading strategy.  
Finally, I take the cross-sectional average weight invested in high short sale constraint 
securities across the 50 trading strategies. These steps are repeated for the 15 other hard-
to-short measures and for the 5 other sentiment measures.  For brevity, I only report the 
results using Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment, but I obtain 
similar results using the other sentiment measures. 
2.3.1 Average Weight Invested in Hard-to-Short Securities 
The average weight invested in hard-to-short securities across the 16 short sale 
constraint proxies is reported in Panel A of Table 2.1.  This table also reports, in Panels B 
and C, the average weight invested in hard-to-short securities across high and low 
sentiment states for each of the shorts sale constraint measures. Finally, Panel D reports 
the average weight that the 50 strategies invest in the smallest market capitalization decile.  
Looking at the equally-weighted portfolio results presented in Panel A, we see that on 
average around 16–17% of the long leg portfolios is invested in highly constrained 
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securities while around 20–22% of the short leg portfolios is invested in hard-to-short 
securities, thus in net the long-short portfolios sell around 4–5% more hard-to-short 
securities than is purchased.  Similar results are found when I look at value-weighted 
portfolios, although the average weights are now lower, approximately 10% of the long leg 
portfolios and 14% of the short leg portfolios is invested in highly constrained securities.  
So it does not appear that profitable trading strategies commonly reported in the literature 
take large positions in hard-to-short securities, and in particular, the short leg does not take 
a much larger position in hard-to-short securities than the long leg.   
I also calculate the cross-sectional average weight invested in constrained securities 
following high and low sentiment for each of the 16 measures.  These results are presented 
in Panels B and C of Table 2.1.  Typically, the weight invested in constrained securities 
decreases when I switch from equally-weighted portfolios to value-weighted portfolios.  
This is consistent with small firms having higher trading frictions than large firms.7 
This effect is particularly strong using the average rank measure.  Using this measure, the 
weight invested in constrained securities decreases from 20% to 6% for the long leg 
portfolios and from 30% to 10% for the short leg portfolios. However, looking at dollar 
short interest we see that the average amount invested in highly constrained securities 
increases from around 4% of the long and short leg portfolios to around 33% and 25% for 
the long and short leg portfolios, respectively, when I switch from equally-weighted 
portfolios to value-weighted portfolios.  This could be due to larger firms having relatively 
higher share prices than small firms and more shares outstanding than small firms (i.e., a 
                                                 
7 Papers documenting that small firms have higher trading frictions than large firms include 
D’Avolio (2002), Lesmond et al. (1999), and Stoll and Whaley (1983) among others. 
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large firm and a small firm could have the same short interest ratio but since the large firm 
has more shares outstanding the dollar value of shares shorted is higher).  In general, we 
once again see that the short leg invests only slightly more in highly constrained securities 
than the long leg and overall these positions are not large. 
Previously Stambaugh et al. (2012b) found that there is a strong relation between 
the returns to a collection of 16 anomalies, but Bulsiewicz (2013) found that while some 
strategies are affected by investor sentiment, the returns to the majority of strategies have 
only a weak relation with investor sentiment.  I investigate whether or not the reason that 
Bulsiewicz (2013) finds a different result than Stambaugh et al. (2012b) could be due to 
Bulsiewicz (2013) selecting trading strategies that take much smaller positions in hard-to-
short securities.  In unreported results, I find that the difference in average weights between 
the original strategies used in Stambaugh et al. (2012b) and the additional strategies used 
in Bulsiewicz (2013) is not statistically significant, suggesting that the weak relation 
between investor sentiment and profitable trading strategies reported in Bulsiewicz (2013) 
is not due to 1 group of strategies taking larger positions in hard-to-short securities. 
Overall, the previous results show that profitable trading strategies are not heavily 
invested in hard-to short securities.  Still, it could be argued that while these measures 
capture certain aspects of whether a security is hard-to-short it might be better to use a 
measure that combines all of these measures into 1 composite measure.  To address this 
concern, I use firm size as a proxy for the extent to which a security is hard-to-short.  In 
general, smaller firms are thought to be harder-to-arbitrage than larger firms.  For example, 
Lesmond et al. (1999) show that smaller firms have higher transaction costs than larger 
firms and D’Avolio (2002) provides evidence that the securities of small firms have higher 
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short sale constraints than those of larger firms. 
I test to what extent the 50 strategies invest in the smallest size decile.  Panel D of 
Table 2.1 presents the average weight invested in small firms for the cross-sectional 
average across all 50 strategies. The results are somewhat surprising if we assume that the 
short leg of these strategies is hard-to-short.  Overall, using equally-weighted portfolios, 
both the long leg and the short leg invest around 40% in the securities of small firms.  
Further, the difference in weights between the long leg and the short leg is not statistically 
different from 0.  If I use value-weighted portfolios, the long leg invests on average 5% in 
small firms and the short leg invests on average 6% in small firms.  If the securities in the 
long leg are supposed to be easy-to-short, while the securities in the short leg are supposed 
to be hard-to-short, then it is not clear why the short leg portfolios only invests around 1% 
more in small firms than the long leg portfolios. Thus, even using firm size as the proxy 
for short sale constraints, we still reach the conclusion that these strategies are not heavily 
invested in hard-to-short securities.  
2.3.2 Cross-Sectional Average Liquidity 
The following section presents the results on whether the average security in the 50 
strategies is hard-to-short and if these securities become overvalued following high 
sentiment.  To be brief, I only present the cross-sectional results for all 50 strategies in the 
forthcoming tables.  Generally, similar results are found within subsamples of the trading 
strategies, but I will also highlight interesting results for individual trading strategies, as 
necessary.     
 First, I assess whether the short leg of each trading strategy is more illiquid than the 
long leg and if the short leg is more illiquid following low sentiment.  Amihud and 
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Mendelson (1986) and Amihud (2002) present theory and empirical evidence that suggests 
that returns increase with illiquidity.  If the average security in the short leg is more illiquid 
than the long leg this would support the view that the returns to these strategies are due to 
short sale constraints.  However, if the average security is not illiquid an alternative 
explanation would be needed to explain why certain short leg portfolios earn a higher return 
following low sentiment.  Table 2.2 shows the average high and low coefficient estimates 
for the 7 liquidity measures.  The results for equally-weighted portfolios are presented in 
Panel A.1 while the value-weighted results are presented in Panel B.1.   
2.3.2.1 Amihud Illiquidity Results 
 Turning first to the results for Amihud illiquidity, the average security in both the 
long leg and short leg portfolios is more illiquid following low sentiment.  This result is 
found for both equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, although illiquidity 
decreases quite a bit when value-weighted portfolios are used.  However, the results 
indicate that the average illiquidity of the short leg is not statistically different from the 
average illiquidity of the long leg.  Thus, the evidence so far indicates that the short leg is 
not harder-to-short than the long leg.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, out of the 50 trading 
strategies, the securities with the highest illiquidity is found to be small firms and firms 
with low analyst coverage, while the most liquid firms are large firms and firms with high 
analyst coverage. 
2.3.2.2 Trading Volume, Dollar Volume, and Share Turnover Results 
 The prior results indicate that based on Amihud’s (2002) measure, these trading 
strategies are more illiquid following low sentiment.  Since the Amihud measure is 
constructed using the ratio of absolute daily returns and dollar volume, this result could be 
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due to higher dollar trading volume following high investor sentiment. To test this 
hypothesis, I calculate the cross-sectional average daily dollar volume, trading volume, and 
share turnover.  The results for these 3 variables are reported in Table 2.2, with dollar 
trading volume in thousands and dollar volume in millions of dollars.  For equally-
weighted portfolios, there is approximately $3 million more in trading volume following 
high sentiment than following low sentiment and slightly higher trading volume and share 
turnover.  However, the difference between the long leg and short leg is not statistically 
different from one another.  On the other hand, for value-weighted portfolios, there is 
between $45 million more in trading volume following high sentiment than low sentiment 
and higher share turnover and trading volume.  The long leg portfolios have on average 1 
million more shares traded following high sentiment than low sentiment and the short leg 
portfolios have on average 837,000 more shares traded following high sentiment than low 
sentiment.  This time, share turnover is statistically higher for the short leg than for the 
long leg, implying that under this measure the short leg is more liquid than the long leg. 
 I also investigate which trading strategies have the highest dollar volume and which 
trading strategies have the lowest dollar volume.  Consistent with the earlier results using 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity, I find that large firms and firms with high analyst coverage have 
more than $100 million in trading volume than small firms and firms with no analyst 
coverage.  Interestingly, for the trading strategy using Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, the long 
leg is significantly more liquid than the short leg.  Using equally-weighted portfolios, the 
difference in daily volume is approximately 1 million shares higher, irrespective of 
sentiment state, and the average dollar volume is $42 million higher following high 
sentiment and $27 million higher follower low sentiment.  Using value-weighted 
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portfolios, the difference in trading volume between the long leg and short leg is 
approximately 10 million shares higher following high sentiment and 6.6 million shares 
higher following low sentiment and trading volume is $332 million higher following high 
sentiment and $205 million higher following low sentiment.  While the results for the 
strategy trading on Ohlson’s (1980) O-score indicate that the long leg is more liquid than 
the short leg, overall the results indicate that the average security in the short leg is not less 
liquid than the long leg.  Thus, the short leg does not appear to be harder-to-short than the 
long leg.   
2.3.2.3 Corwin-Schultz (2012) Bid-Ask Spread Results 
I investigate whether the short leg has higher transaction costs using the Corwin-
Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread measure.  Previously, Corwin and Schultz (2012) showed 
that their measure is just as good, if not better, than other estimators, and their measure is 
highly correlated with effective bid-ask spreads.  Turning to the results presented in Table 
2.2, the long leg has approximately 0.12% lower transaction costs for equally-weighted 
strategies and about 0.06-0.07% lower transaction costs for value-weighted strategies.  For 
a $10 security, this equates to the average security in the short leg having transaction costs 
that are 1.2 cents higher using equally-weighted portfolios and 0.6 cents higher using value-
weighted portfolios than the average security in the long leg.  Additionally, transaction 
costs for these strategies are at least halved using value-weighted portfolios instead of 
equally-weighted portfolios.   These results indicate that an investor would have slightly 





2.3.2.4 Percentage of Zero Trading Days Results 
As a robustness check, I also measure illiquidity using the percentage of trading 
days within a month with no trades, as indicated by zero trading volume on those days.  A 
less frequently traded security should be harder-to-short than an otherwise identical 
security.  The results presented in Table 2.2, Panel A.1 indicate that the average security in 
the long leg portfolios has a slightly higher chance of not being traded: there is a 4.55% 
chance of the long leg security not being traded following high sentiment and a 5.17% 
chance of the long leg security not being traded following low sentiment, while for the 
short leg these percentages are 3.52% and 4.35%, respectively.  Based on this result, the 
short leg securities are easier-to-short than the long leg securities.  The percentage of zero 
trading days drops significantly for both the long leg and short leg portfolios after value-
weighting each security.  Now both the long leg and the short leg have less than a 1% 
chance of not being traded.  Additionally, the difference between the long leg and short leg 
is not statistically significant indicating that the short leg is not harder-to-short than the 
long leg based on these measures. 
2.3.3 Cross-Sectional Average Short Sale Constraints 
I further assess whether the average security in these strategies is hard-to-short 
using 5 measures: average daily return variance, forecast dispersion, idiosyncratic risk, 
institutional ownership, and short interest.  Based on Miller’s (1977) argument, if the 
securities in the short leg have wider dispersion in beliefs following high sentiment then 
this could result in lower returns following high sentiment.  Thus, Miller’s argument would 
be able to explain the result found in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012b), who found that 
the short leg portfolios of a set of 16 strategies have lower returns following high sentiment. 
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2.3.3.1 Average Daily Return Variance and Forecast  
Dispersion Results 
I directly assess whether the 50 strategies have wider dispersion in beliefs following 
high sentiment using average daily return variance and analysts forecast dispersion.  The 
cross-sectional average return variance and forecast dispersion for the 50 strategies are 
presented in Table 2.2, Panels A.2 and B.2.  Both measures of dispersion in beliefs provide 
the same conclusion: the long leg and short leg have wider dispersion in beliefs following 
high sentiment, with the larger dispersion of beliefs residing in the short side of each 
strategy.  Thus, this result provides some evidence that the short leg may have slightly 
higher short sale constraints than the long leg.  Additionally, using value-weighted 
portfolios there is not a statistical or economic difference in forecast dispersion between 
high and low sentiment for the long leg portfolios but there is a statistical and economic 
difference for the short leg portfolios.  In unreported results, I also find that there is not a 
statistical difference in beliefs dispersion for the 16 strategies used in Stambaugh, Yu, and 
Yuan (2012) and the 34 additional strategies used in Bulsiewicz (2013), which provides 
supporting evidence that the results presented in Bulsiewicz (2013) are not due to selecting 
strategies with homogeneous beliefs. 
2.3.3.2 Idiosyncratic Risk Results 
 I also test if the short leg securities have high short sale constraints using 
idiosyncratic risk.  If the short leg is harder-to-short than the long leg, then the short leg 
should have higher idiosyncratic risk. The average security in these strategies has higher 
idiosyncratic risk following high sentiment than low sentiment.  Furthermore, using either 
equally-weighted or value-weighted portfolios, the average securities in the short leg has 
slightly higher idiosyncratic risk than the average security in the long leg.  This difference 
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in idiosyncratic risk is 0.35% following high sentiment and 0.22% following low 
sentiment, indicating that the short leg is marginally harder-to-short than the long leg.   
2.3.3.3 Institutional Ownership Results 
 If the securities in the short leg of each strategy are hard-to-short, then they should 
have low institutional ownership.  However, I find that the average security in the 50 
strategies does not have low institutional ownership.  Panel A.2 of Table 2.2 shows the 
cross-sectional average institutional ownership using equally-weighted portfolios and 
Panel B.2 of Table 2.2 shows the cross-sectional average institutional ownership using 
value-weighted portfolios.  Regardless of the weighting scheme, the average security in 
these strategies does not appear to be hard-to-short.  The average security in the long leg 
has institutional ownership above 38% and the average security in the short leg has 
institutional ownership above 35%.     
 Surprisingly, there is a large difference in institutional ownership between 
sentiment states.  Using equally-weighted portfolios, both the long leg and short leg 
portfolios have institutional ownership that is more than 9 percentage points higher 
following low sentiment than following high sentiment.  Furthermore, this effect remains 
using value-weighted portfolios.  Using value-weighted portfolios, the average security in 
the long leg portfolios has institutional ownership that is close to 6.8 percentage points 
higher following low sentiment, while the average security in the short leg portfolios has 
institutional ownership that is more than 7.5 percentage points higher following low 
sentiment.  These results suggest that these strategies are harder-to-short following high 
sentiment, but the average security in the long and short leg portfolios is not hard-to-short.  
Further, there is not a large difference in institutional ownership between the average 
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security in the long leg and short leg portfolios. 
2.3.3.4 Short Interest Results 
 D’Avolio (2002) presents evidence that securities with high short interest are 
harder-to-short than securities with low short interest.  As a further robustness check, I use 
short interest as the proxy for short sale constraints.  The average cross-sectional level of 
short interest across the 50 trading strategies is reported in Table 2.2.  For both the long leg 
and short leg portfolios, I find that the average security has less than 2% of its shares 
outstanding that are sold short.  This result is obtained using equally-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios.  Additionally, this evidence again shows that the average security in 
these strategies is not hard-to-short. 
2.3.4 Institutional Ownership by Institution Type 
Previously, evidence was presented indicating that financial institutions hold a 
larger portion of shares outstanding following low sentiment.  The question then arises, are 
all financial institutions increasing their ownership stakes following low sentiment or are 
only a subsample of financial institutions increasing their ownership stakes?  To investigate 
this issue, I calculate the percentage of shares outstanding held by 3 different types of 
financial institutions: banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions.  
Financial institutions are classified using the classification codes provided by Thomson 
Reuters.  Following the methodology of Lewellen (2011), financial institutions classified 
by Thomson Reuters as investment companies, investment advisors, or other are merged 
together into a single group.  The Thomson Reuters’ institution type code at the end of 
1997 is used for any institution that is in the database after that date instead of updating it 
if the classification changes.  Table 2.3 presents the cross-sectional average ownership for 
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each of the 5 financial institution types.   
2.3.4.1 Banks 
First, I investigate whether banks increase their holdings following low investor 
sentiment.    Based on the evidence presented in Table 2.3, banks do not drastically change 
their holdings based on the level of investor sentiment.  For both the long leg and short leg 
portfolios, the difference in bank ownership between high and low sentiment states is on 
average less than 1 percentage point.  Additionally, the difference in bank holdings between 
the long leg and short leg portfolios is on average less than 2.5 percentage points.    
2.3.4.2 Insurance Companies 
For insurance companies, the evidence presented in Table 2.3 indicates that these 
institutions maintain similar holdings across high and low sentiment states.  Using equally-
weighted portfolios, insurance ownership is around 2.3–2.90% of shares outstanding, and 
using value-weighted portfolios, insurance ownership is around 4.20–4.40% of shares 
outstanding.  This suggests that insurance companies are passive investors, or at least, their 
net trades do not alter their overall level of ownership. 
2.3.4.3 Other 
 The last category of financial institutions is all other institutions not belonging to 
the previous 2 categories. This category of financial institutions includes hedge funds, 
mutual funds, pension funds, and all other types of institutions except for banks and 
insurance companies.  The results presented in Table 2.3 indicate that these institutions 
have much larger holdings following low sentiment than following high sentiment.  For 
equally-weighted portfolios, their level of ownership is 8 to 9 percentage points higher 
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following low sentiment, and for value-weighted portfolios, their level of ownership is 
around 7 percentage points higher following low sentiment.  Additionally, these 
institutions have the largest amount of ownership relative to banks and insurance 
companies.  
 Overall, these results indicate that mutual funds, hedge funds, and other institutions 
are adjusting their holdings based on investor sentiment, while banks and insurance 
companies are not actively adjusting their holdings based on investor sentiment.   
2.3.5 Overvaluation Results 
Miller (1977) proposes that hard-to-short securities can become overvalued when 
investors are optimistic.  I test whether this is the case for the 50 trading strategies.  
Specifically, I investigate whether the short leg becomes overvalued relative to the average 
valuation in the market.  Using 7 different valuation measures, I present the cross-sectional 
average value of these variables across all trading strategies in Table 2.4.   
2.3.5.1 Analysts’ Expected Return Results 
 First, I assess whether the average security in these strategies becomes overvalued 
using analysts’ expected return.  Analyst expected return is defined as the difference 
between the mean 1 year ahead price target and the current market value of equity scaled 
by the current market value of equity.  If the average security becomes overvalued, then 
analysts should expect a lower return following high sentiment than low sentiment.  
Additionally, if the average security in the short leg is hard-to-short then overvaluation 
should be strongest for the short leg securities.  However, this is not what I find.  Analysts 
have a higher expected return following high sentiment and they expect the short leg to 
earn a higher return than the long leg.  Thus, this evidence is inconsistent with Miller’s 
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(1977) framework.  In unreported results, I find that this result is robust if the sample only 
uses those securities where more than one analyst provides a price target. 
2.3.5.2 Average Recommendation 
 I check the prior results using analysts’ average recommendation.  If these strategies 
become overvalued following high sentiment then analysts should be less optimistic about 
these securities and give a higher recommendation, i.e., a sell recommendation.  Since a 
recommendation of 1 is a strong buy, and a recommendation of 5 is a strong sell, the 
difference between the average recommendation following high sentiment and low 
sentiment should be positive.  Consistent with the prior results, I find that, if anything, 
analysts think that the average security in these strategies is undervalued and not 
overvalued.  The difference between the average recommendation following high 
sentiment and low sentiment is negative and found for both the long leg and the short leg.  
This again suggests that the average security in these strategies does not become 
overvalued following high sentiment. 
2.3.5.3 Book-to-Market Ratio 
 I also test Miller’s (1977) overvaluation hypothesis using the book-to-market ratio.  
If these strategies become overvalued following high sentiment, then the average security 
should have a lower book-to-market ratio following high sentiment than following low 
sentiment. Consistent with this reasoning, I find that both the long leg and the short leg 
have a lower book-to-market ratio following high sentiment than following low sentiment.  
On the other hand, the average security in the short leg does not appear to have a lower 
book-to-market ratio than the average security in the long leg.  This result suggests that 
even though each strategy has a lower book-to-market ratio following high sentiment, the 
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short leg does not become more overvalued relative to the long leg. 
2.3.5.4 Compustat Intrinsic Value-to-Market Equity Ratio 
 Another measure that I use to test Miller’s (1977) hypothesis is the ratio of intrinsic 
value-to-market value of equity.  Intrinsic value is calculated using the residual income 
model.  First, I calculate intrinsic value by assuming that each firm will maintain its current 
return on equity in perpetuity.  I calculate the cost of equity using the Fama and French 
(1993) model, the Carhart (1997) model, or a constant cost of equity of either 8%, 10%, or 
12%.  After calculating the intrinsic value for each cost of equity, I then use the median 
value in calculating the ratio of intrinsic value to market equity.  The median is used to 
control for extreme valuations.  Additionally, this methodology is consistent with Miller 
(1997), who argues that hard-to-short securities should become overvalued relative to the 
average valuation in the market.  Similar to the reasoning for book-to-market ratios, the 
average security in these strategies should have a lower intrinsic value to market equity 
ratio following high sentiment than following low sentiment.  However, this is not what I 
find.  The average security in the long leg and short leg portfolios has a higher intrinsic 
value to market equity ratio following high sentiment.  This again suggests that these 
securities do not become overvalued following high sentiment.   
2.3.5.5 I/B/E/S Intrinsic Value-to-Market Equity Ratio Results 
To test the robustness of the prior results, intrinsic values are also calculated using 
1-year ahead analysts’ earnings forecasts or 1- and 2-year ahead analysts’ earnings 
forecasts.  In Table 2.4, the first measure is calculated using only 1-year ahead forecasts, 
the second measure is calculated using 1-year and 2-year ahead forecasts, and the third 
measure is calculated using the median value from both the first measure and the second 
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measure.  Inconsistent with Miller (1977), I again find little evidence of overvaluation.  
Using only 1-year ahead forecasts, the long and short leg portfolios have only slightly lower 
intrinsic value to equity ratios using equally-weighted portfolios.  On the other hand, using 
value-weighted portfolios, the short leg has a lower intrinsic value to market equity ratio 
than the long leg following high sentiment.  Thus, there is evidence with this measure of 
some overvaluation.   
The previous results using only 1-year ahead forecasts presented some evidence of 
overvaluation for value-weighted portfolios.  I test whether this result holds for the other 
measures calculated using analysts’ 1-year and 2-year ahead annual earnings forecasts. 
Using 1-year and 2-year ahead forecasts, I find that both the average security in the long 
leg and short leg portfolios has a higher intrinsic value to market ratio following high 
sentiment.  Additionally, the average valuation ratio for the short leg is either statistically 
indistinguishable from 0 or positive.  Thus, using this measure the average security in the 
short leg is not overvalued relative to the average security in the long leg.   
The final measure of intrinsic value uses the median value from both the intrinsic 
values calculated using only 1-year ahead forecasts and the intrinsic values calculated using 
1-year and 2-year ahead forecasts.  This measure is IBES intrinsic value-to-market equity 
ratio (3) in Table 2.4.  Consistent with the results using 1-year and 2-year ahead forecasts, 
with this measure I again find that average security in these strategies does not become 
overvalued following high sentiment and the average security in the short leg does not 
become more overvalued than the average security in the long leg. 
Overall, these results indicate that the average security in the short leg does not 
become overvalued relative to the average security in the long leg. 
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2.3.6 Market-Adjusted Short Sale Constraints Results 
I investigate to what extent the average firm in these strategies is harder-to-short 
than the average firm in the market and if the average firm in these strategies becomes 
more overvalued than the average firm in the market.  I calculate market-adjusted variable 
values each month by subtracting the cross-sectional equally-weighted average value of 
that variable from its un-adjusted value.  The cross-sectional average values are calculated 
using all firms with share codes equal to 10 or 11.  I then repeat the steps used in the 
previous section to calculate the cross-sectional average market-adjusted values across the 
50 trading strategies for the short sale constraint variables and valuation variables.   
2.3.6.1 Liquidity Results 
 The average market-adjusted liquidity across the 50 trading strategies is presented 
in Table 2.5, Panels A.1 and B.1.  If the average firm in these strategies is more illiquid 
than the market, then the average market-adjusted Amihud (2002) illiquidity should be 
positive and statistically significant.  Despite this prediction, this is not what is shown in 
Table 2.5.  Both the long leg and short leg are more liquid than the average firm in the 
market following high sentiment and low sentiment.  Additionally, the difference in 
liquidity between the average firm in these strategies and the market is largest following 
low sentiment than high sentiment, although from this test we cannot say whether this is 
due to the market being more illiquid, the average firm in these strategies being more 
illiquid, or a combination of the two. 
 Results similar to those found using Amihud’s illiquidity measure are also found 
using the percentage of zero trading days and Corwin-Schultz’s (2012) bid-ask spread 
measure.  The average firm in the long and short leg portfolios has fewer zero trading days 
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than the average firm in the market, with the average security in the short leg appearing to 
be slightly less liquid than the average security in the long leg.  Using the Corwin-Schultz 
(2012) measure, the average firm in these strategies has lower transaction costs than the 
average firm in the market, with the short leg having marginally higher transaction costs 
than the long leg. 
 I also measure liquidity using market-adjusted daily trading volume, dollar trading 
volume, and share turnover.  Using these measures, if the average firm in these strategies 
is harder-to-short than the market, then after controlling for the market, these measures 
should be negative on average.  The evidence indicates that the average firm in these 
strategies is easier-to-short than the average firm in the market since the average market-
adjusted daily volume, dollar trading volume, and share turnover are all greater than 0.  
Consistent with the results using unadjusted data, using market-adjusted trading volume 
and dollar trading volume, I find that the average security in the short leg is not harder-to-
short than the average security in the long leg.  Furthermore, using value-weighted 
portfolios, the average firm in the short leg has higher market-adjusted share turnover than 
the average firm in the long leg. 
2.3.6.2 Belief Dispersion Results 
 Next, I assess whether the average firm in these strategies has higher belief 
dispersion than the average firm in the market.  The results using market-adjusted average 
daily return variance indicate that the average firm in these strategies is not harder to short 
than the average firm in the market.  Using either equally-weighted or value-weighted 
portfolios, both the long leg and the short leg have lower return variance than the average 
firm in the market.  If belief dispersion is measured using market-adjusted forecast 
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dispersion, a somewhat different result is obtained.  Using equally-weighted portfolios, the 
average firm in these strategies has higher forecasts dispersion than the market, and the 
average security has higher forecast dispersion than the market following high sentiment 
than following low sentiment.  This result changes when value-weighted portfolios are 
used.  Now the average security in the long leg portfolios has lower forecast dispersion 
than the average security in the market while the average security in the short leg has 
forecast dispersion that is not statistically different from the average security in the market.  
This suggests that larger firms have lower forecast dispersion than smaller firms.   
2.3.6.3 Institutional Ownership Results 
 Previously, Gompers and Metrick (2001) showed that institutional ownership has 
been increasing over time while Jiang (2010) controlled for this trend using market-
adjusted institutional ownership.  Thus, the results presented here should control for any 
bias imparted by the general increase in ownership over time.  Consistent with the results 
using unadjusted institutional ownership, I find that the average firm in these strategies has 
institutional ownership that is higher than the average firm in the market.  Additionally, 
once again, institutional ownership is higher following low sentiment than following high 
sentiment, although now the magnitude of this difference is not as large.  Using equally-
weighted portfolios institutional ownership is 3 to 4 percentage points higher following 
low sentiment, while using value-weighted portfolios institutional ownership is between 
0.5 and 1.5 percentage points higher following low sentiment, thus a large portion of the 
difference in institutional ownership between high and low sentiment is due to the general 
increase in ownership over time.  Overall, the results indicate that the average security in 
these strategies has higher institutional ownership than the average security in the market.  
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Therefore, the average security in these strategies is easier to short than the average security 
in the market. 
2.3.6.4 Short Interest Results 
 I also use investigate whether the average security in the 50 strategies is hard-to-
short using market-adjusted short interest.  The results for this measure are presented in 
Table 2.5, Panels A.2 and B.2.  Based on these results, the average security in these 
strategies is harder to short than the average security in the market, since the market-
adjusted short interest is positive for the average securities in the long leg and short leg.  
On the other hand, there is a very small difference between market-adjusted short interest 
for the average security in the long leg and short leg portfolios, so the average security in 
the short leg is a little harder to short than the average security in the long leg.  
2.3.6.5 Market-Adjusted Institutional Ownership by Type 
 Previously, the results indicated that banks and insurance companies are 
maintaining their holdings across sentiment states while other financial institutions are 
increasing their holdings following low sentiment.  I test if this result remains after 
controlling for the average holdings of each institution type.  Starting with banks, I 
calculated market-adjusted bank ownership each month by subtracting their cross-sectional 
average ownership from their raw ownership amount.  Market-adjusted insurance 
ownership and market-adjusted other institutional ownership are calculated in a similar 
way.  The results are presented in Table 2.6.  Consistent with the results using unadjusted 
ownership, banks and insurance companies have similar ownership levels across sentiment 
states.  Additionally, insurance companies have about the same holdings of securities in 
the long leg and short leg portfolios, while banks hold slightly higher ownership of the long 
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leg portfolio than of the short leg portfolio.  Even after controlling for the average level of 
ownership in the market, other financial institutions still hold a larger percentage of shares 
outstanding following low sentiment.  For equally-weighted portfolios, the average market-
adjusted ownership for other institutions is about 3 percentage points higher following low 
sentiment; for value-weighted portfolios, the average market-adjusted ownership is about 
1.5–2.0 percentage points higher following low sentiment.  This evidence again indicates 
that banks and insurance companies are passively managing their portfolios while other 
financial institutions are actively managing their portfolios.    
2.3.7 Market-Adjusted Valuation Variable Results 
  Next, I investigate whether the average security in the 50 strategies becomes more 
overvalued than the average security in the market and if average security in the short leg 
becomes more overvalued than the average security in the long leg.  The results for the 7 
valuation measures are reported in Table 2.7.   
2.3.7.1 Market-Adjusted Analysts’ Expected Returns 
 The first measure of overvaluation is market-adjusted analysts’ expected returns.  
If the average security in the 50 trading strategies becomes overvalued then the average 
market-adjusted expected return should be negative, and if the short leg becomes more 
overvalued than the long leg then the average security in the short leg should have a lower 
market-adjusted expected return than the average security in the long leg.  I find some 
evidence that these strategies become overvalued.  Using equally-weighted returns, the 
average market-adjusted expected return for the long leg is negative, although the 
difference between the expected return following high and low sentiment is not statistically 
different from 0.  This suggests that the long leg does not become more overvalued 
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following high sentiment.  For the short leg portfolios, the average security has a higher 
expected return following high sentiment and the difference in expected returns between 
high and low sentiment is statistically positive (t=9.16).  Contrary to Miller’s (1977) 
hypothesis of overvaluation following optimistic periods, if anything, the short leg is 
undervalued following high sentiment.   
 Turning to the results for value-weighted portfolios, the long leg has lower market-
adjusted return following high sentiment than following low sentiment suggesting that the 
long leg may become overvalued following high sentiment.  On the other hand, the 
evidence once again indicates that the short leg if anything is undervalued following high 
sentiment.  
2.3.7.2 Market-Adjusted Average Recommendations 
 I investigate Miller’s (1977) overvaluation hypothesis using market-adjusted 
analysts’ average recommendations.  Since a strong buy is given a value of 1 and a strong 
sell is given a value of 5, if the average security in these strategies is overvalued relative to 
the market then the average market-adjusted analysts’ recommendation should be positive.  
This is not what I find.  For both the long leg and short leg portfolios, the average security 
has an average market-adjusted recommendation that is statistically greater than or equal 
to 0.  Additionally, if the short leg becomes overvalued following high sentiment then the 
difference between the average market-adjusted recommendations between high and low 
sentiment should be positive. However, here the difference is statistically less than 0.  This 





2.3.7.3 Market-Adjusted Book-to-Market Ratio 
 If these trading strategies become more overvalued than the market, then the 
average security in these strategies should have a lower book-to-market ratio than the 
average security in the market.  Thus, the average market-adjusted book-to-market ratio 
should be negative.  Here, I do find evidence in favor of Miller’s (1977) hypothesis.  The 
average security in the long leg and short leg portfolio has a negative market-adjusted 
book-to-market ratio.  This indicates that the average security in these strategies could be 
overvalued.  However, upon closer inspection, the average security in these strategies 
appears to be more overvalued following low sentiment than following high sentiment, 
since the difference between market-adjusted book-to-market ratios between high and low 
sentiment is positive.  This suggests that these strategies are undervalued following high 
sentiment.  Additionally, all of the long-short coefficients are not statistically significant, 
implying that the short leg is not more overvalued than the long leg. 
2.3.7.4 Market-Adjusted Compustat Intrinsic Value-to-Market  
Equity Ratio 
 Miller’s (1977) overvaluation hypothesis is tested using market-adjusted intrinsic 
value to market equity ratios constructed assuming each firm’s current profitability persists 
in perpetuity.  The evidence here indicates that the average security in the long leg and 
short leg portfolios becomes more overvalued following high sentiment.  The average 
market-adjusted intrinsic value-to-market equity ratio is negative and highly significant.  
Furthermore, the difference between high and low sentiment is negative and statistically 
significant.   
While there is evidence that these strategies become overvalued, there is weak 
evidence that the short leg becomes more overvalued than the long leg.  If the short leg is 
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more overvalued than the long leg, then the coefficients for the long-short portfolio should 
be statistically positive.  This is not what I find.  All of the long-short coefficients are 
statistically less than or equal to 0.  Thus, if these strategies do become overvalued, the 
short leg does not become more overvalued than the long leg.   
2.3.7.5 Market-Adjusted I/B/E/S Intrinsic Value-to-Market  
Equity Ratio  
To further test the overvaluation hypothesis, I use intrinsic values constructed using 
I/B/E/S analysts’ annual earnings forecasts.  The first measure that I use is constructed 
using only analysts’ 1-year ahead earnings forecasts.  From Table 2.7, Panel A, there is 
some evidence that the average security in these strategies is overvalued. However, the 
difference between the long leg and the short leg is not statistically different from 0.  For 
value-weighted portfolios, there is again evidence of overvaluation, and the long-short 
portfolio has a positive and significant high sentiment and high-low sentiment coefficients.  
This suggests that the short leg is overvalued relative to the long leg.  
Consistent with the results found using only 1-year ahead forecasts, the results 
found using intrinsic values constructed using 1- and 2-year ahead forecasts indicate that 
the average security in these strategies is more overvalued than the average security in the 
market.  However, now the difference between these ratios between the long leg and short 
leg portfolios is not statistically different from 0.  Thus, the short leg is not more overvalued 
than the long leg.  Very similar results are found using ratios constructed using the median 
intrinsic value calculated using only 1-year ahead forecasts and intrinsic values calculated 
using both 1-year and 2-year ahead forecasts. 
Overall, the majority of the evidence indicates that while these strategies invest in 
securities that appear to become overvalued, the short leg does not become more 
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overvalued than the long leg.  Therefore, Miller’s (1977) framework does not hold for these 
strategies. 
2.3.8 Size-Adjusted Results 
 As a final robustness check, I calculate the cross-average values of the short sale 
constraint and valuation variables using size-adjusted variable values.  Size-adjusted 
variable values are calculated each month by subtracting the equally-weighted cross-
sectional average value from the raw variable value.  The equally-weighted cross-sectional 
average value is calculated using only those firms that are in the same size decile.  Size 
deciles are determined using all securities with share codes equal to 10 or 11.  Table 2.8 
shows the cross-sectional average results across the 50 trading strategies using size-
adjusted variables.   
2.3.8.1 Liquidity Results 
 Consistent with the results found using market-adjusted results, I find that the 
average security in these strategies is more liquid than securities of firms with similar size.  
First, using equally-weighted portfolios, the average security in the long leg and short leg 
securities is more liquid than firms of similar size, as measured using Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity measure or the percentage of zero volume trading days.  Additionally, the 
average security has lower trading costs and higher trading volume, dollar volume, and 
share turnover.  Further, there is not a statistical difference in trading volume and dollar 
volume for the long-short portfolio.  This implies that the short leg is not more illiquid than 
the long leg.  However, I do find that the average security in the long leg has a higher Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta, while the short leg has a lower Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity beta.  Thus, it seems that these strategies are taking a hedge position against 
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changes in liquidity.  
 Turning to the value-weighted portfolio results, these strategies are only slightly 
more liquid than the market.  The magnitude of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity, percentage 
of zero volume trading days, and Corwin-Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread measures are 
smaller in magnitude using value-weighted portfolios than when using equally-weighted 
portfolios.  Alternatively, daily trading volume and dollar volume are larger in magnitude 
using value-weighted portfolios, while share turnover is of similar magnitude.  Again, the 
average security in the long leg has a larger Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta 
than firms of similar size, whereas the average security in the short leg has a smaller Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta than firms of similar size.  These results imply that 
the average firm in these strategies is more liquid than firms of similar size.  Therefore, so 
far these strategies are easier to short than firms of similar size. 
2.3.8.2 Additional Short Sale Constraint Measures 
 I also assess whether the average security in these strategies have wider dispersion 
in beliefs and are hard-to-short relative to those securities of firms with similar market 
capitalization.  The results for average return variance, forecast dispersion, idiosyncratic 
risk, institutional ownership, and short interest are presented in Panels A.2 and B.2 of Table 
2.8.  The results for equally-weighted portfolios are presented in Panel A.2 of Table 2.8.  
Mixed results are found for whether these strategies have wider beliefs dispersion.  
Looking at the results for average return variance, the average security in these strategies 
has lower average return variance than firms of similar size. However, the average security 
has wider forecast dispersion.  Further, here the short leg appears to be harder-to-short than 
the long leg since average return variance and forecast dispersion are more positive.   
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Table 2.8 also shows the results for whether the average security in these strategies 
is harder to short than the securities of firms of similar size.  The long leg and short leg 
have about the same idiosyncratic risk as firms of similar size, given that idiosyncratic risk 
is measured in percentages.  In addition, looking at the results for institutional ownership 
both the long leg and the short leg have institutional ownership that is higher than securities 
of similar size, suggesting that these securities are easier to short than securities of similar 
size.  However, the results using short interest indicate that the average security in these 
strategies has more or less the same short interest as the average security of similar size. 
The results using value-weighted are somewhat different from the results using 
equally-weighted portfolios.  The average security in these strategies has higher dispersion 
in beliefs as measured using average return variance and forecast dispersion.  Further, the 
average security in the short leg has higher dispersion in beliefs than the average security 
in the long leg after controlling for firm size.  Once again, idiosyncratic risk for these 
strategies is only moderately higher than the idiosyncratic risk for securities of similar size.  
Finally, the results for institutional ownership and short interest suggest that the average 
security in these strategies is a little harder to short than the security of similarly sized 
firms.   
2.3.8.3 Size-Adjusted Institutional Ownership by Type 
Next, I investigate if the results found for banks, insurance companies, and other 
institutions holds using size-adjusted ownership.  Size-adjusted bank ownership is 
calculated for each security by subtracting the average level of bank ownership of securities 
in the same size decile from the raw level of bank ownership.  A similar calculation is done 
to calculate size-adjusted insurance ownership and size-adjusted other institutional 
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ownership.  The average level of size-adjusted ownership for equally-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios is presented in Table 2.9. For equally-weighted portfolios, the average 
size-adjusted bank and insurance ownership levels is fairly close to 0 implying that banks 
and insurance companies do not overweight the long leg and short legs of these strategies 
relative to the average security of similar size.  Alternatively, other financial institutions 
hold more of these strategies than of securities of similarly sized firms.  Additionally, there 
is still evidence that other financial institutions increase their holdings following low 
sentiment while the level of bank and insurance ownership is similar between sentiment 
states.  Turning to the value-weighted portfolio results, these results are similar to the 
results found using equally-weighted portfolios.  One difference is that other financial 
institutions have size-adjusted ownership that is closer to their ownership of the average 
security of firms with similar size.    
2.3.8.4 Size-Adjusted Valuation Results 
The results presented in Table 2.10 assess whether the average security in these 
strategies is more overvalued than the average security of similarly sized firms, and if the 
short leg becomes more overvalued than the long leg. The results for equally-weighted 
portfolios are presented in Panel A.    Consistent with the results using raw and market-
adjusted analysts’ expected returns, once again the average security in the short leg has a 
higher expected return than the average security in the long leg.  Further, the average 
security in the short leg has a higher expected return than the average security of similar 
size, while the average security in the long leg has a lower return than the average security 
of similar size.  Even further, the average security in the short leg has a higher size-adjusted 
expected return following high sentiment than following low sentiment.  This suggests that 
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the short leg is undervalued rather than overvalued.   
The results for size-adjusted analysts’ recommendations present a similar result.  If 
the securities in the short leg are more overvalued than the securities of firms of similar 
size, then the average size-adjusted recommendation should be positive.  However, this is 
not what the results in Table 2.10 indicate.  The average security in the short leg has a size-
adjusted recommendation that is statistically negative, there is not a statistical difference 
between high and low sentiment, and there is not a statistical difference between the long 
leg and short leg.  Thus, the average security in the short leg is not viewed to be more 
overvalued than the average security in the long leg. 
For the book-to-market ratios and intrinsic value-to-market equity ratios, if the 
short leg is more overvalued than the long leg then the average security in the short leg 
should have a negative size-adjusted valuation ratio, and the long-short portfolio should 
have a positive average size-adjusted valuation ratio following high sentiment as well as a 
positive high-low average size-adjusted valuation ratio.  The results indicate that the short 
leg has a negative size-adjusted book-to-market ratio, indicating a higher valuation than 
the average firm in the same size decile.  On the other hand, the long-short portfolio does 
not have an average size-adjusted book-to-market that is statistically different from 0. 
Thus, the null of no overvaluation cannot be rejected.  A fairly similar result is found using 
the valuation ratios constructed using intrinsic values.  All of the results for these measures 
indicate that the average security in the short leg is more overvalued than the average 
security of similar size.  For 3 of the measures there is no evidence that the short leg is 
more overvalued than the long leg. However, using intrinsic values constructed using only 
1-year ahead earnings forecasts, the short leg appears to be slightly more overvalued than 
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the long leg; the average intrinsic value-to-market equity ratio is 0.06 following high 
sentiment, 0.0212 following low sentiment, resulting in a high-low sentiment average 
difference of 0.0387.  
Turning to the value-weighted portfolio results, again there is evidence that the 
short leg is undervalued relative to the long leg using analysts’ expected returns and 
analysts’ average recommendation.  The intrinsic value-to-market equity ratio constructed 
using only 1-year ahead forecasts indicate that the short leg may be marginally more 
overvalued than the long leg.  However, there is no evidence that the short leg is more 
overvalued than the long leg using size-adjusted book to market ratios and intrinsic value-
to-market ratios constructed using 1-year and 2-year ahead earnings forecasts or the median 
intrinsic value constructed using 1-year or 1- and 2-year ahead earnings forecasts.    
2.3.9 Difference in Means Test 
The previously reported results used the full sample of 50 trading strategies to test 
if the average security conforms to Miller’s hypothesis.  There could be a concern that 
these results could be driven by the 34 additional trading strategies that were not used in 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012b).  In this section I address this concern.  For each short 
sale constraint, valuation and institutional ownership variable, I calculate the difference in 
cross-sectional means between the original 16 trading strategies used in Stambaugh, Yu, 
and Yuan (2012b) and the 34 additional trading strategies considered in Bulsiewicz (2013).  
The results for each of these variables is reported in Table 2.11.  For brevity, I only report 
the results for unadjusted variables.  The results using market-adjusted and size-adjusted 
measures produce very similar results.  From Table 2.11, we can see that by and large there 
is not a large difference between the average security in the original 16 trading strategies 
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and the additional 34 trading strategies.  Thus, the results reported here are not due to 
selecting 2 samples with different characteristics.    
2.3.10 Investor Sentiment and Short Sale Constraints 
One question that is not fully answered is whether or not there is a statistical relation 
between investor sentiment and the hard-to-short securities in the long, short, and long-
short portfolios and if the easy-to-short minus hard-to-short portion of each of these 
portfolios is more profitable following high sentiment than low sentiment. Previously 
Stambaugh et al. (2012b) presented evidence that the returns to a collection of 16 strategies 
have a relation with investor sentiment but Bulsiewicz (2013) presented evidence of a weak 
relation for a large collection of additional strategies and for simulated trading strategies.  
It could be the case that if we increased the weight that each strategy put on hard-to-short 
securities, we would find a strong relation between these strategies and investor sentiment.  
To address this question I calculate the equally-weighted and value-weighted returns of the 
hardest-to-short and easiest-to-short quintile portions of the long leg, short leg, and long-
short portfolio.  I then test whether the average excess return for each of these portfolios is 
statistically different between high and low sentiment and if there is a predictive relation 
between lagged investor sentiment level and portfolio returns.  
Based on theory provided in Stambaugh et al. (2012b), there should not be a 
statistical relation for easy-to-short firms, so for these portfolios I use a two-tailed t-test 
with a critical t-statistic of 1.96.  There should be a negative relation between hard-to-short 
firms and investor sentiment, so for these portfolios I use a one-tailed t-test with a critical 
t-statistic of 1.65, and there should be a positive relation for the easy-to-short minus hard-
to-short portfolios so for these portfolios I use a one-tailed t-test with a critical t-statistic of 
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1.65.   
Table 2.12 presents the cross-sectional average percentage of statistically 
significant coefficients for the easy-to-short and hard-to-short portions of the long leg and 
short leg quintile portfolios. In Table 2.12, Panel A documents the average percentage of 
statistically significant high-low sentiment average return coefficients and Panel B 
documents the average percentage of statistically significant predictive regression 
coefficients.  Consistent with the evidence presented in Bulsiewicz (2013), on average I 
only find a statistical relation for easy-to-short securities in less than 30% of the strategies 
tested.  Sometimes I find a high number of statistically significant coefficients for the hard-
to-short securities within the long and short leg prior to controlling for the Fama and French 
factors. However, once I control for the Fama and French (1993) factors, the number of 
statistically significant coefficients drops dramatically.  For example, using the University 
of Michigan residual consumer confidence index constructed using economic levels, I find 
approximately 85% of the hard-to-short securities within the short leg have a negative 
relation with investor sentiment, but once I control for the Fama and French (1993) factors 
this percentage drops to 23%.  Another interesting finding in Panels A and B of Table 2.12 
is that I generally find a higher percentage of statistically significant coefficients for the 
short leg portfolios than the long leg portfolios even when I test the easy-to-short firms 
within the short leg of each trading strategy.  These results seem to indicate that the higher 
return of the short leg firms is not due to those securities being hard-to-short. 
The previous literature has argued that there should be a statistical relation between 
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the easy-to-short minus hard-to-short portfolio and investor sentiment.8  I find weak 
support for this assertion. From Panel A of Table 2.12, we can see that across all sentiment 
measures the average percentage of statistically significant easy-to-short minus hard-to-
short portions of the long leg and short portfolios is less than 30% without controlling for 
the Fama and French factors, and is less than 20% after controlling for the Fama and French 
factors.  Turning to Panel B, which presents the average percentage of statistically 
significant predictive regression coefficients across all 50 strategies, I find weak support 
for a predictive relation between investor sentiment and the easiest-to-short minus hardest-
to-short portfolios, usually less than 30% without controlling for the Fama and French 
factors, and even weaker support after controlling for the Fama and French factors.  We 
can also see that these results are robust across 6 different sentiment measures. 
The previous results provide supporting evidence that there is not a strong statistical 
relation between investor sentiment and hard-to-short securities.  Before, the results 
reported in Table 2.12 relied on sorting on a particular trading strategy and then testing for 
a relation between investor sentiment and portfolio returns.  Now, following the same 
formation methodology used in Bulsiewicz (2013) and Stambaugh et al. (2012b), I form 
decile portfolios by sorting firms directly on 1 of the 16 hard-to-short proxies and 
calculating equally-weighted and value-weighted returns for the hardest-to-short and 
easiest-to-short decile portfolios as well as the hardest-to-short minus easiest-to-short 
trading strategy. I then test for a relation between these 16 strategies and investor sentiment.  
These results are presented in Table 2.13 with Panels A and B presenting the number and 
                                                 
8 See Stambaugh et al. (2012b) for an outline of this argument. 
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percentage of statistically significant high-low sentiment average return coefficients and 
predictive regression coefficients, respectively.  
Looking at the results in Panel A, I find some support for the hypothesis of a relation 
between investor sentiment and hard-to-short securities prior to controlling for the Fama 
and French (1993) factors, but once again, this relation becomes weaker after controlling 
for these factors. I find similar results when looking at the predictive regression results 
presented in Panel B.  Still, there appears to be a weak relation between the hard-to-short 
minus easy-to-short portfolios and investor sentiment across the 6 sentiment measures used 
in constructing Table 2.13.  The maximum number of statistically significant high-low 
average return coefficients for the hardest-to-short decile portfolio are found using Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment, 10 out of 16 (62.50%) are 
statistically significant after controlling for the Fama and French factors.  On the other 
hand, using the other sentiment measures, on average less than 50% of the coefficients are 
statistically significant.  Additionally, there is only weak support that the returns to each of 
the hard-to-short strategies are higher following high sentiment than low sentiment.  In 
Panel B of Table 2.13 we can see that similar results are found when I test for a predictive 
relation between strategies that trade directly on hard-to-short measures and investor 
sentiment.   
Overall, these results provide further evidence that the relation between investor 
sentiment and portfolio returns is not due to short sale constraints.  The evidence indicates 
that the short legs of each of the 50 strategies do not take huge positions in hard-to-short 
securities.  Additionally, when I directly test securities that are thought to be hard-to-short 
for a relation between their returns and investor sentiment, I only find weak to moderate 
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support for the assertion that these securities have different payoffs in different sentiment 
states.   
The prior analysis showed that while generally profitable trading strategies have a 
weak relation with investor sentiment, there are still some strategies that have a relation 
with investor sentiment.  To further investigate whether this result is due to short sale 
constraints, I test how the prior results would change if hard-to-short securities are 
excluded at the time of formation of the 50 trading strategies.  If the relation between the 
returns of some trading strategies and investor sentiment is due to short sale constraints, 
then we should see a large decrease in the number of statistically significant coefficients 
after excluding securities that are hard-to-short.  For convenience, Table 2.14 shows the 
number of statistically significant high-low sentiment and predictive regression 
coefficients without excluding any firms based on short sale constraints, the results after 
excluding securities with high short sale constraints, and the results after excluding 
securities of small firms.  
As a starting point, I assess how the relation between investor sentiment and trading 
strategy returns changes after excluding hard-to-short securities.  For each of the 50 trading 
strategies, at the time of formation, firms are removed that are thought to be hard-to-short.  
To be conservative, this typically entails removing firms that are in the hardest-to-short 
quintile.  The methodology for the majority of the hard-to-short proxies is as follows: 
1. Sort firms on 1 of the 50 trading strategy variables into long leg and short leg 
portfolios 




3. Based on the sort in step #2, if a security is in the hardest-to-short quintile then 
remove this firm from the long leg or short leg portfolios 
4. Calculate equally-weighted and value-weighted returns for each strategy and 
run sentiment tests 
5. Repeat steps #1–4 for the remaining hard-to-short proxies 
The methodology is slightly different when excluding firms using analyst coverage, 
days-to-cover, dollar short interest, and short interest.  Firms with no analyst coverage are 
excluded from the long leg and short leg portfolios.  For days-to-cover, dollar short interest, 
and short interest securities with no shares sold, short are placed in 1 portfolio and 4 
additional portfolios are formed using 25 percentile breakpoints.  Then for these 3 hard-to-
short proxies, securities above the 75th percentile are excluded from the long leg and short 
leg portfolios.  
The average percentage of statistically significant coefficients after excluding firms 
on each of the 16 hard-to-short proxies are reported in Table 2.14 with Panel A showing 
the average percentage of statistically significant high-low portfolio coefficients and Panel 
B showing the average percentage of statistically significant predictive regression 
coefficients.   Compared to the results with no exclusions, the results after excluding hard-
to-short firms are very similar.  Take for example the equally-weighted portfolio results 
using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment index.  Using this 
measure, prior to excluding firms, 86% of the 50 short leg portfolios had statistically 
significant high-low investor sentiment coefficients.  After excluding firms, 80% of the 
coefficients were still statistically significant.  Similarly, prior to excluding firms, 88% of 
the short leg predictive coefficients were statistically significant, and after excluding firms 
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72% of the coefficients remain statistically significant. Consistent results are found for the 
long leg and long-short portfolios.  Further, this result is robust using the other 5 measures 
of investor sentiment.  Thus far, the relation between investor sentiment and profitable 
trading strategies is fairly independent of whether or not hard-to-short securities are 
included in the portfolios. 
To further test whether the relation between investor sentiment and profitable 
trading strategies is independent of short sale constraints, we repeat the prior analysis 
excluding firms in the lowest market capitalization quintile.  D’Avolio (2002) presented 
evidence that small capitalization stocks are harder-to-short than large capitalization firms.  
However, D’Avolio also points out that most firms are not hard-to-short.  By excluding the 
lowest quintile, this is removing hard-to-short securities as well as potentially some that 
might be easy-to-short.  Therefore, this exclusion criterion is pretty conservative.  The 
percentage of statistically significant high-low and predictive regression coefficients after 
excluding small firms is presented in Table 2.14.  From this table we can once again see 
that even after removing firms that could be hard-to-short, we do not see a large change in 
the number of statistically significant coefficients.  In fact, the percentage of significant 
coefficients only changes for 1 of the 6 sentiment proxies. 
There could be a concern that the prior results are driven by a small subsample of 
the hard-to-short proxies. Therefore, in Table 2.15 I present the percentage of the 50 trading 
strategies with statistically significant coefficients for each of the 16 proxies.  This table 
was constructed using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment 
index as the measure of investor sentiment.  From this table, we see that, for the most part, 
there is not a lot of variation in the percentage of significant coefficients across the 16 short 
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sale constraint proxies.  For the majority of hard-to-short measures, the percentage of 
significant coefficients does not change greatly, even after excluding hard-to-short 
securities. 
As a last robustness check, I vary the excluded percentile from 0% to 20% in 
increments of 1% and calculate the number of statistically significant coefficients after 
each iteration. Note an exclusion criterion of 0% implies that no firms are excluded.    This 
is completed for 4 of the main proxies: average rank, firm size, institutional ownership, and 
short interest.  Then for each proxy, the number of significant coefficients is plotted against 
the percentile cutoff.  The number of significant coefficients using average rank, firm size, 
institutional ownership, and short interest are plotted in Figures 2.1–2.4. In the first column 
of each figure are the results for the long leg while the second and third column has the 
results for the short leg and long-short portfolios, respectively.  In the first row are the 
number of statistically significant high-low coefficients without controlling for the Fama 
and French (1993) factors, the second row contains the high-low results after controlling 
for the Fama and French factors, and finally the third and fourth rows contain the number 
of statistically significant predictive regression coefficients prior to and after controlling 
for the Fama and French factors.   
If the relation between investor sentiment and strategy returns is a result of short 
sale constraints, then we should see a sharp decline in the number of statistically significant 
coefficients as we change the exclusion criteria from 0% to 20%.  This is not what we see 
in the figures.  Instead of seeing a large drop in the number of statistically significant 
coefficients we see a gradual decline.  For example, looking at the results for average rank, 
as the cutoff is increased, the number of significant short leg high-low coefficients in Panels 
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(ii), (v), (vii), and (xi) decreases slowly.  Furthermore, there are some plots where the 
number of statistically significant coefficients does not change at all, even after removing 
firms in the hardest-to-short quintile.  It should be noted that since we are forming 
breakpoints independent of the trading strategy sort variable, often times we are removing 
more than the given percentile cutoff.  Based on this evidence, it appears that the relation 
between investor sentiment and strategy returns is not due to overvaluation related to short 
sale constraints. 
2.4 Conclusion 
 I test whether the average security across 50 trading strategies is hard-to-short and 
if it becomes overvalued following high sentiment.   I find that the average security in these 
strategies is not hard-to-short.  Furthermore, the average security in the short leg is not 
harder-to-short than the average security in the long leg.  The average security in the short 
leg has fairly similar liquidity, institutional ownership, and short interest as the average 
security in the long leg. Additionally, while each trading strategy may be overvalued 
relative to the average valuation in the market, the short leg does not appear to be 
overvalued relative to the long leg.  In fact, some evidence indicates that the short leg may 
be undervalued or, at a minimum, fairly valued.   
 The evidence also indicates that there may be an alternative explanation for why 
there is a relation between investor sentiment and a subsample of profitable trading 
strategies.  I find that each trading strategy is more liquid following high sentiment and that 
institutional ownership is much higher following low sentiment.  This suggests that the 
relation between investor sentiment and a subsample of profitable trading strategies could 
be due to illiquidity and institutional price pressure.  Furthermore, I find that banks and 
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insurance companies maintain their level of ownership across sentiment states, while other 
financial institutions such as mutual funds and hedge funds are increasing their holdings 
following low sentiment.  
Overall, this evidence indicates that in general, profitable trading strategies do not 
conform to Miller’s (1977) hypothesis of hard-to-short securities becoming overvalued 
following periods of optimism.  Thus, more work is needed to disentangle the true cause 














Average weight in hard-to-short and small securities. Each June, I sort firms on each 
trading strategy variable into 10 decile portfolios. Using each short sale constraint measure, 
and independent of the trading strategy sort, I sort firms on 1 of the short sale constraint 
measures and allocate firms to 10 decile portfolios.  Then, for the long leg and short leg 
portfolio of each strategy, I calculate the equally- and value-weighted amount invested in 
the highest short sale constraint decile.  I then calculate the time series average weight 
invested in high short sale constraint securities following high and low investor sentiment 
by regressing these weights on the lagged high and low sentiment indicators (constructed 
using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment index).  Finally, for 
each short sale constraint proxy, I calculate the cross sectional average across all trading 
strategies considered.  There are a total of 50 trading strategies considered.  These strategies 








Weighting Scheme Statistic High Low High-Low High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
Average weight 0.1701 0.1623 0.0079 0.2225 0.2036 0.0188 -0.0523 -0.0413 -0.0111
t-statistic (42.53) (42.17) (9.67) (42.89) (40.76) (17.38) (-8.96) (-7.28) (-9.87)
Average weight 0.1063 0.1028 0.0036 0.1555 0.1392 0.0164 -0.0492 -0.0364 -0.0128
t-statistic (27.62) (26.78) (3.45) (33.19) (30.49) (13.42) (-8.39) (-6.24) (-7.63)
Panel A. Cross-sectional average weight in hard-to-short securities
Long leg Short leg Long-Short
Equally-weighted
Value-weighted
High Low High-Low High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
Average weight 0.2416 0.2152 0.0263 0.2372 0.2058 0.0315 0.0043 0.0095 -0.0052
t-statistic (18.14) (17.14) (9.90) (10.92) (9.83) (10.22) (0.15) (0.34) (-1.12)
Average weight 0.2022 0.2146 -0.0124 0.2932 0.3037 -0.0105 -0.0910 -0.0891 -0.0019
t-statistic (15.60) (15.09) (-4.99) (21.83) (19.97) (-3.75) (-3.92) (-3.47) (-0.44)
Average weight 0.1751 0.1435 0.0316 0.2536 0.1944 0.0592 -0.0785 -0.0510 -0.0274
t-statistic (11.96) (11.54) (7.64) (12.87) (10.02) (13.03) (-2.65) (-1.87) (-3.91)
Average weight 0.1900 0.1756 0.0145 0.3722 0.3279 0.0443 -0.1822 -0.1521 -0.0301
t-statistic (13.09) (13.72) (4.87) (17.46) (14.90) (9.63) (-5.60) (-4.76) (-5.38)
Average weight 0.2963 0.3201 -0.0239 0.3069 0.3276 -0.0207 -0.0106 -0.0070 -0.0036
t-statistic (24.85) (24.92) (-7.98) (24.68) (23.56) (-5.74) (-0.47) (-0.29) (-0.76)
Average weight 0.0579 0.0584 -0.0004 0.0671 0.0682 -0.0012 -0.0091 -0.0098 0.0007
t-statistic (32.76) (37.45) (-0.37) (42.20) (34.90) (-0.86) (-4.09) (-4.42) (0.40)
Average weight 0.0418 0.0412 0.0006 0.0319 0.0337 -0.0017 0.0099 0.0076 0.0023
t-statistic (5.14) (5.33) (0.49) (3.36) (3.79) (-1.40) (0.73) (0.59) (1.34)
Average weight 0.1074 0.0989 0.0085 0.1513 0.1397 0.0116 -0.0439 -0.0408 -0.0031
t-statistic (17.71) (16.57) (7.20) (7.91) (7.28) (8.53) (-1.93) (-1.80) (-1.68)
Average weight 0.3500 0.3157 0.0342 0.3855 0.3450 0.0404 -0.0355 -0.0293 -0.0062
t-statistic (25.13) (24.67) (12.32) (27.59) (26.97) (8.49) (-1.45) (-1.28) (-1.07)
Average weight 0.1565 0.1542 0.0023 0.2442 0.2214 0.0228 -0.0876 -0.0671 -0.0206
t-statistic (20.06) (21.03) (0.82) (12.16) (11.11) (8.73) (-3.38) (-2.64) (-4.41)
Average weight 0.1477 0.1234 0.0243 0.2506 0.2039 0.0467 -0.1029 -0.0805 -0.0225
t-statistic (11.09) (10.37) (9.98) (11.54) (9.60) (14.06) (-3.25) (-2.71) (-4.89)
Average weight 0.1870 0.1870 0.0000 0.2225 0.2123 0.0102 -0.0355 -0.0252 -0.0104
t-statistic (16.73) (16.07) (-0.01) (27.51) (24.56) (4.16) (-2.20) (-1.50) (-2.89)
Average weight 0.0530 0.0562 -0.0031 0.0615 0.0670 -0.0055 -0.0085 -0.0108 0.0024
t-statistic (31.85) (31.37) (-3.54) (26.97) (24.79) (-6.07) (-2.81) (-3.37) (1.78)
Average weight 0.1350 0.1292 0.0059 0.1985 0.1804 0.0181 -0.0635 -0.0511 -0.0123
t-statistic (21.12) (22.48) (3.01) (10.85) (9.93) (7.17) (-2.81) (-2.32) (-3.38)
Average weight 0.1338 0.1331 0.0007 0.1998 0.1796 0.0202 -0.0660 -0.0465 -0.0195
t-statistic (23.88) (22.64) (0.32) (21.73) (18.96) (8.22) (-4.88) (-3.40) (-4.84)
Average weight 0.2470 0.2304 0.0167 0.2838 0.2476 0.0362 -0.0368 -0.0171 -0.0197
t-statistic (15.31) (15.07) (6.03) (29.91) (27.24) (13.85) (-1.91) (-0.93) (-4.44)
Panel B. Equally-weighted portfolios
Hard-to-short 
measure
































High Low High-Low High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
Average weight 0.0352 0.0290 0.0062 0.0728 0.0583 0.0145 -0.0376 -0.0292 -0.0084
t-statistic (5.22) (5.08) (3.81) (3.23) (2.68) (6.10) (-1.53) (-1.25) (-2.89)
Average weight 0.0499 0.0596 -0.0097 0.1010 0.1069 -0.0060 -0.0511 -0.0473 -0.0037
t-statistic (6.64) (6.93) (-4.97) (10.85) (9.87) (-2.16) (-3.51) (-2.83) (-1.07)
Average weight 0.2488 0.2451 0.0037 0.3061 0.2756 0.0305 -0.0572 -0.0307 -0.0266
t-statistic (11.22) (10.04) (0.56) (13.36) (11.77) (4.33) (-1.48) (-0.75) (-2.30)
Average weight 0.0834 0.0836 -0.0002 0.2327 0.2057 0.0269 -0.1493 -0.1220 -0.0273
t-statistic (9.22) (9.81) (-0.07) (10.55) (9.22) (4.87) (-5.29) (-4.30) (-4.07)
Average weight 0.0690 0.0667 0.0023 0.0934 0.0922 0.0012 -0.0244 -0.0255 0.0011
t-statistic (7.71) (6.79) (1.05) (10.47) (9.22) (0.32) (-1.68) (-1.56) (0.23)
Average weight 0.0389 0.0515 -0.0127 0.0525 0.0622 -0.0098 -0.0136 -0.0108 -0.0028
t-statistic (21.78) (18.66) (-5.01) (28.13) (24.62) (-3.63) (-4.43) (-3.04) (-0.72)
Average weight 0.3328 0.3210 0.0117 0.2477 0.2547 -0.0069 0.0850 0.0664 0.0187
t-statistic (15.52) (14.84) (1.16) (14.61) (14.02) (-0.73) (2.47) (1.85) (1.21)
Average weight 0.0840 0.0807 0.0033 0.1437 0.1307 0.0131 -0.0598 -0.0500 -0.0098
t-statistic (11.30) (9.72) (0.93) (6.80) (6.21) (4.86) (-2.39) (-1.97) (-2.15)
Average weight 0.0866 0.0921 -0.0054 0.1302 0.1237 0.0065 -0.0435 -0.0316 -0.0119
t-statistic (8.67) (10.52) (-1.98) (10.01) (11.17) (1.50) (-2.32) (-1.96) (-2.28)
Average weight 0.1035 0.0878 0.0156 0.2007 0.1556 0.0452 -0.0973 -0.0677 -0.0295
t-statistic (14.31) (13.13) (3.90) (9.75) (7.47) (10.61) (-3.84) (-2.73) (-4.29)
Average weight 0.0839 0.0775 0.0064 0.1719 0.1378 0.0341 -0.0880 -0.0603 -0.0277
t-statistic (7.69) (6.72) (2.03) (7.62) (6.40) (8.39) (-3.03) (-2.15) (-5.39)
Average weight 0.1489 0.1445 0.0044 0.2164 0.1878 0.0287 -0.0676 -0.0432 -0.0243
t-statistic (12.24) (11.21) (1.45) (20.71) (18.10) (9.28) (-3.85) (-2.41) (-5.01)
Average weight 0.0459 0.0516 -0.0056 0.0699 0.0666 0.0033 -0.0239 -0.0150 -0.0089
t-statistic (18.00) (14.88) (-3.26) (23.59) (19.51) (1.75) (-5.80) (-3.02) (-3.25)
Average weight 0.0794 0.0696 0.0098 0.1389 0.1228 0.0162 -0.0596 -0.0531 -0.0064
t-statistic (13.68) (12.86) (4.65) (7.22) (6.36) (7.24) (-2.67) (-2.42) (-1.97)
Average weight 0.0856 0.0691 0.0164 0.1447 0.1074 0.0373 -0.0591 -0.0382 -0.0209
t-statistic (16.04) (13.73) (5.95) (15.63) (12.67) (12.96) (-4.67) (-3.22) (-4.56)
Average weight 0.1258 0.1151 0.0107 0.1663 0.1387 0.0276 -0.0405 -0.0236 -0.0169
t-statistic (9.54) (9.37) (3.13) (18.58) (15.37) (9.82) (-2.36) (-1.48) (-3.35)
Days to cover 
Panel C. Value-weighted portfolios
Hard-to-short 
measure
























Weighting Scheme Statistic High Low High-Low High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
Average weight 0.4067 0.3892 0.0175 0.4175 0.3936 0.0238 -0.0108 -0.0041 -0.0067
t-statistic (18.63) (18.26) (5.30) (24.21) (22.13) (7.08) (-0.30) (-0.11) (-1.40)
Average weight 0.0539 0.0533 0.0006 0.0635 0.0571 0.0064 -0.0096 -0.0038 -0.0058
t-statistic (2.75) (2.72) (0.65) (6.60) (6.49) (2.63) (-0.41) (-0.16) (-2.16)
Panel D. Average weight in smallest market capitalization quintile











Cross-sectional average variable values following high and low sentiment.  This table 
reports the cross-sectional average values for a collection of illiquidity and short sale 
constraint measures following high and low investor sentiment.  Each June, I sort firms 
into 10 portfolios using 1 of the 50 trading strategy variables used in Bulsiewicz (2013).  
The extreme portfolio with firms that have the highest expected return is classified as the 
long leg while the other extreme portfolio is classified as the short leg. Starting with 
Amihud’s illiquidity measure, I calculate the equally-weighted and value-weighted 
monthly average illiquidity for these 2 portfolios from July of year t until June of year t+1.  
Using these 2 time-series average portfolio illiquidity, I construct the long-short portfolio 
illiquidity as the difference between the monthly long leg and short leg portfolio illiquidity.  
I then calculate the average illiquidity, in percent form, following high and low investor 
sentiment by regressing the portfolio illiquidity series on the high and low sentiment 
indicator variable constructed using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor 
sentiment measure.  I repeat these steps for the remaining 49 trading strategies.  Using these 
estimates of illiquidity following high and low sentiment, I calculate the cross-sectional 
average illiquidity across all 50 trading strategies following high and low sentiment.  This 
procedure is repeated for the remaining liquidity measures and for the additional short sale 
constraints measures.  The results for Amihud’s illiquidity, average percentage of zero 
trading days, Corwin-Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread, daily average dollar volume, share 
turnover, and trading volume, and Pastor and Stambaugh liquidity beta are presented in 
Panel A.1 and B.1.  The results for the average return variance, forecast dispersion, 
idiosyncratic risk, institutional ownership, and short interest are presented in Panels A.2 
and B.2.  Panel A presents the results for equally-weighted portfolios and Panel B presents 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectional average ownership following high and low sentiment by institution type.  
This table presents the cross-sectional average ownership across 50 trading strategies by 
financial institution type.  Following the methodology outlined in Table 2.2, starting with 
percentage of outstanding shares held by banks, I calculate the time-series equally-
weighted and value-weighted portfolio bank ownership for the long leg, short leg, and long-
short portfolios.  For each trading strategy, I then estimate the average bank ownership 
following high and low sentiment.  After completing this estimation for all 50 trading 
strategies, I then calculate the cross sectional average bank ownership across all 50 trading 
strategies. These steps are repeated for insurance companies and other financial 
institutions.  Ownership coefficients are reported as percentage of shares outstanding held 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectional average valuation following high and low sentiment.  This table presents 
the cross-sectional average valuation across 50 trading strategies for a collection of 
valuation measures.  Following the methodology outlined in Table 2.2, starting with 
analysts’ expected returns, I calculate the time-series equally-weighted and value-weighted 
portfolio values for the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  For each trading 
strategy, I then estimate the average analysts’ expected return following high and low 
sentiment.  After completing this estimation for all 50 trading strategies, I then calculate 
the cross-sectional average analysts’ expected return across all 50 trading strategies. These 
steps are repeated for the remaining valuation measures.  Analysts’ expected return is 
calculated as the difference between analysts’ most recent annual price target minus the 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectional average market-adjusted variable values following high and low sentiment.  
This table reports the cross-sectional average values for a collection of illiquidity and short 
sale constraint measures following high and low investor sentiment.  Each June, I sort firms 
into 10 portfolios using 1 of the 50 trading strategy variables used in Bulsiewicz (2013).  
The extreme portfolio with firms that have the highest expected return is classified as the 
long leg while the other extreme portfolio is classified as the short leg. Starting with 
Amihud’s illiquidity measure, I calculate the equally-weighted and value-weighted 
monthly average illiquidity for these 2 portfolios from July of year t until June of year t+1.  
Using these 2 time-series average portfolio illiquidity, I construct the long-short portfolio 
illiquidity as the difference between the monthly long leg and short leg portfolio illiquidity.  
I then calculate the average illiquidity, in percent form, following high and low investor 
sentiment by regressing the portfolio illiquidity series on the high and low sentiment 
indicator variable constructed using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor 
sentiment measure.  I repeat these steps for the remaining 49 trading strategies.  Using these 
estimates of illiquidity following high and low sentiment, I calculate the cross-sectional 
average illiquidity across all 50 trading strategies following high and low sentiment.  This 
procedure is repeated for the remaining liquidity measures and for the additional short sale 
constraints measures.  The results for Amihud’s illiquidity, average percentage of zero 
trading days, Corwin-Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread, daily average dollar volume, share 
turnover, and trading volume, and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta are 
presented in Panel A.1 and B.1.  The results for the average return variance, forecast 
dispersion, idiosyncratic risk, institutional ownership, and short interest are presented in 
Panels A.2 and B.2.  Panel A presents the results for equally-weighted portfolios and Panel 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectional average market-adjusted ownership following high and low sentiment by 
institution type.  This table presents the cross-sectional average ownership across 50 
trading strategies by financial institution type.  Following the methodology outlined in 
Table 2.5, starting with percentage of outstanding shares held by banks, I calculate the 
time-series equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolio bank ownership for the long 
leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  For each trading strategy, I then estimate the 
average bank ownership following high and low sentiment.  After completing this 
estimation for all 50 trading strategies, I then calculate the cross sectional average bank 
ownership across all 50 trading strategies. These steps are repeated for insurance 
companies and other financial institutions.  Ownership coefficients are reported as 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectional average market-adjusted valuation following high and low sentiment.  This 
table presents the cross-sectional average valuation across 50 trading strategies for a 
collection of valuation measures.  Following the methodology outlined in Table 2.5, 
starting with analysts’ expected returns, I calculate the time-series equally-weighted and 
value-weighted portfolio values for the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  For 
each trading strategy, I then estimate the average analysts’ expected return following high 
and low sentiment.  After completing this estimation for all 50 trading strategies, I then 
calculate the cross-sectional average analysts’ expected return across all 50 trading 
strategies. These steps are repeated for the remaining valuation measures.  Analysts’ 
expected return is calculated as the difference between analysts’ most recent annual price 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectional average size-adjusted variable values following high and low sentiment.  
This table reports the cross-sectional average values for a collection of illiquidity and short 
sale constraint measures following high and low investor sentiment.  Each June, I sort firms 
into 10 portfolios using 1 of the 50 trading strategy variables used in Bulsiewicz (2013).  
The extreme portfolio with firms that have the highest expected return is classified as the 
long leg while the other extreme portfolio is classified as the short leg. Starting with 
Amihud’s illiquidity measure, I calculate the equally-weighted and value-weighted 
monthly average illiquidity for these 2 portfolios from July of year t until June of year t+1.  
Using these 2 time-series average portfolio illiquidity, I construct the long-short portfolio 
illiquidity as the difference between the monthly long leg and short leg portfolio illiquidity.  
I then calculate the average illiquidity, in percent form, following high and low investor 
sentiment by regressing the portfolio illiquidity series on the high and low sentiment 
indicator variable constructed using the Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor 
sentiment measure.  I repeat these steps for the remaining 49 trading strategies.  Using these 
estimates of illiquidity following high and low sentiment, I calculate the cross-sectional 
average illiquidity across all 50 trading strategies following high and low sentiment.  This 
procedure is repeated for the remaining liquidity measures and for the additional short sale 
constraints measures.  The results for Amihud’s illiquidity, average percentage of zero 
trading days, Corwin-Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread, daily average dollar volume, share 
turnover, and trading volume, and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta are 
presented in Panel A.1 and B.1.  The results for the average return variance, forecast 
dispersion, idiosyncratic risk, institutional ownership, and short interest are presented in 
Panels A.2 and B.2.  Panel A presents the results for equally-weighted portfolios and Panel 
B presents the results for value-weighted portfolios. 
148 
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectional average size-adjusted ownership following high and low sentiment by 
institution type.  This table presents the cross-sectional average ownership across 50 
trading strategies by financial institution type.  Following the methodology outlined in 
Table 2.1, starting with percentage of outstanding shares held by banks, I calculate the 
time-series equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolio bank ownership for the long 
leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  For each trading strategy, I then estimate the 
average bank ownership following high and low sentiment.  After completing this 
estimation for all 50 trading strategies, I then calculate the cross-sectional average bank 
ownership across all 50 trading strategies. These steps are repeated for insurance 
companies and other financial institutions.  Ownership coefficients are reported as 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-sectional average size-adjusted valuation following high and low sentiment.  This 
table presents the cross-sectional average valuation across 50 trading strategies for a 
collection of valuation measures.  Following the methodology outlined in Table 2.2, 
starting with analysts’ expected returns, I calculate the time-series equally-weighted and 
value-weighted portfolio values for the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  For 
each trading strategy, I then estimate the average analysts’ expected return following high 
and low sentiment.  After completing this estimation for all 50 trading strategies, I then 
calculate the cross-sectional average analysts’ expected return across all fifty trading 
strategies. These steps are repeated for the remaining valuation measures.  Analysts’ 
expected return is calculated as the difference between analysts’ most recent annual price 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Difference in cross-sectional means between original strategies and additional strategies.  
This table reports the difference in the cross-sectional mean values between the original 
strategies and the additional strategies for the short sale constraint measures, valuation 
measures, and institutional ownership measures.  The original strategies are the 16 
strategies previously used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012b) while the new strategies 
are the 34 additional strategies considered in Bulsiewicz (2013, 2014).  For each group of 
strategies, I calculate the cross-sectional mean value for a number of financial variables.  
Then using a two-sample t-test, I calculate if there is a statistical difference between the 
original strategies and the new strategies.  Below Panel A presents the results for equally-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average percentage of significant coefficients after double sorting on trading strategy and 
hard-to-short measures.  Each June, I sort firms on each trading strategy variable into 5 
quintile portfolios.  I further divide the long leg and short leg portfolios of each trading 
strategy into 5 quintile hard-to-short portfolios using each hard-to-short measure.  Then for 
both the long leg and short portfolios, I calculate value-weighted portfolio returns for the 
easy-to-short, hard-to-short, and the easy-to-short minus hard-to-short portfolios.  Using 
each sentiment measure I test if the average excess return for each of these portfolios is 
significantly different between high and low sentiment and if future excess returns can be 
predicted using lagged investor sentiment.  The 6 sentiment measures are: Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment (BWOIS), Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
investor sentiment (BWIS), the University of Michigan consumer confidence index 
(UMICH), the residual from a regression of the University of Michigan C.C. index on the 
6 sentiment variables used in Baker and Wurgler (2006) (UMICHRESSENT), the residual 
from a regression of University of Michigan C.C. on the 6 economic growth variables 
(UMICHRESGDPGRO), and the residual from a regression of University of Michigan 
C.C. on the 6 economic levels variables (UMICHRESGDPLEV).  For each hard-to-short 
measure, I then calculate the percentage of coefficients that are statistically significant. 
Finally, I calculate the cross-sectional average percentage of coefficients that are 
statistically significant for each sentiment measure.  The 16 trading friction measures are 
analyst coverage, average rank, book-to-market ratio, cash flow-to-average assets ratio, 
Corwin-Schultz bid-ask spread, days to cover ratio, dollar short interest, forecast 
dispersion, institutional ownership, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta, 
momentum, share turnover, short interest, short-term reversal (1), short-term reversal (2), 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of significant average return coefficients for value-weighted portfolios formed by 
sorting firms on hard-to-short measures.  Each June, I sort firms into decile portfolios using 
each of the 16 short sale constraint variables.  Each portfolio is held from July of year t 
until June of year t+1.  Value-weighted returns are calculated for each portfolio.  Using 
each sentiment measure I test if the average excess return for each of these portfolios is 
significantly different between high and low sentiment and if future excess returns can be 
predicted using lagged investor sentiment.  The 6 sentiment measures are: Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment (BWOIS), Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
investor sentiment (BWIS), the University of Michigan consumer confidence index 
(UMICH), the residual from a regression of the University of Michigan C.C. index on the 
6 sentiment variables used in Baker and Wurgler (2006) (UMICHRESSENT), the residual 
from a regression of University of Michigan C.C. on the 6 economic growth variables 
(UMICHRESGDPGRO), and the residual from a regression of University of Michigan 
C.C. on the 6 economic levels variables (UMICHRESGDPLEV).  After testing the long 
leg, short leg, and long-short portfolio for each short sale constraint measure, I then 
calculate the number and percentage of coefficients that are statistically significant. Below, 
Panel A presents the number and percentage of statistically significant high-low sentiment 
coefficients across all 16 strategies while Panel B presents the number and percentage of 
statistically significant predictive regression coefficients. The 16 trading friction measures 
are analyst coverage, average rank, book-to-market ratio, cash flow-to-average assets ratio, 
Corwin-Schultz bid-ask spread, days to cover ratio, dollar short interest, forecast 
dispersion, institutional ownership, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta, 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Percent of statistically significant investor sentiment coefficients.  This table shows the 
average percentage of statistically significant investor sentiment coefficients after 
excluding firms that are hard-to-short.    Starting with the first trading strategy, firms are 
sorted on the trading strategy variable into 10 decile portfolios using NYSE breakpoints.  
Independent of the trading strategy sort, firms are sorted on 1 of the hard-to-short proxies 
and assigned to 1 of 5 quintile portfolios.  Quintile portfolios are formed using 20% NYSE 
breakpoints.  For analyst coverage, the hardest-to-short quintile is defined as firms with no 
analyst coverage.  For the days to cover ratio, dollar short interest, and short interest we 
place all firms with 0 shares sold short into 1 portfolio and then allocate the remaining 
firms into 4 portfolios using 25% breakpoints.    From the long leg and short leg portfolios, 
firms in the hardest-to-short quintile are removed and equally-weighted and value-
weighted portfolio returns are calculated.  This procedure is repeated for the 48 remaining 
trading strategies, excluding the combination strategy.  The combination strategy is 
calculated after calculating returns for the first 11 trading strategies.  Then, portfolio returns 
are regressed on the investor sentiment variables and the percentage of statistically 
significant coefficients is calculated.  This procedure is repeated for the 15 remaining hard-
to-short proxies.  Finally, the average percentage of statistically significant coefficients is 
calculated across all 16 hard-to-short measures.  This methodology is used for each of the 
sentiment measures.  The table reports the percentage of statistically significant 
coefficients without excluding any securities, the cross-sectional average percentage of 
statistically significant coefficients after excluding securities in the hardest-to-short 
quintile, and the percentage of statistically significant coefficients after excluding securities 














Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
No exclusions 14.00% 80.00% 46.00% 46.00% 86.00% 44.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 6.17% 61.20% 43.83% 25.78% 70.51% 37.03%
Exclude small securities 14.00% 80.00% 46.00% 46.00% 86.00% 44.00%
No exclusions 30.00% 86.00% 46.00% 42.00% 80.00% 44.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 24.68% 80.12% 37.90% 21.76% 61.68% 34.38%
Exclude small securities 30.00% 86.00% 46.00% 42.00% 80.00% 44.00%
No exclusions 12.00% 86.00% 54.00% 10.00% 78.00% 44.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 0.25% 17.20% 23.66% 0.88% 18.94% 17.23%
Exclude small securities 12.00% 86.00% 54.00% 10.00% 78.00% 44.00%
No exclusions 0.00% 10.00% 26.00% 0.00% 22.00% 18.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 96.60% 96.22% 35.40% 5.65% 40.38% 14.24%
Exclude small securities 0.00% 10.00% 26.00% 0.00% 22.00% 18.00%
No exclusions 98.00% 96.00% 36.00% 4.00% 50.00% 16.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 21.59% 81.03% 29.08% 0.88% 12.20% 15.62%
Exclude small securities 98.00% 96.00% 36.00% 4.00% 50.00% 16.00%
No exclusions 28.00% 88.00% 36.00% 0.00% 8.00% 18.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 10.29% 71.72% 45.22% 7.17% 57.02% 34.01%
Exclude small securities 28.00% 88.00% 36.00% 0.00% 8.00% 18.00%
Exclusion Criteria
Panel A.1 Equally-weighted portfolios
Panel A. Percentage of statistically significant High- Low Coefficients
Sentiment measure
Baker and Wurgler investor 
sentiment
Baker and Wurgler 
orthogonalized investor 
sentiment
University of Michigan 
consumer confidence
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
economic growth variables
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
economic level variables
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
sentiment variables
Without Fama and French With Fama and French factors
Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
No exclusions 2.00% 34.00% 44.00% 18.00% 62.00% 40.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 1.89% 28.72% 37.55% 14.33% 48.86% 31.50%
Exclude small securities 2.00% 34.00% 44.00% 18.00% 62.00% 40.00%
No exclusions 12.50% 75.00% 62.50% 18.75% 81.25% 56.25%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 12.34% 59.20% 30.50% 14.22% 48.72% 23.80%
Exclude small securities 8.00% 62.00% 38.00% 16.00% 64.00% 30.00%
No exclusions 2.00% 40.00% 34.00% 10.00% 48.00% 28.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 1.39% 14.85% 22.41% 10.83% 33.08% 17.49%
Exclude small securities 2.00% 40.00% 34.00% 10.00% 48.00% 28.00%
No exclusions 0.00% 10.00% 24.00% 12.00% 34.00% 16.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 44.34% 82.74% 27.59% 3.40% 26.16% 12.06%
Exclude small securities 0.00% 10.00% 24.00% 12.00% 34.00% 16.00%
No exclusions 46.00% 86.00% 32.00% 2.00% 38.00% 18.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 23.14% 78.91% 31.59% 7.18% 42.03% 19.76%
Exclude small securities 46.00% 86.00% 32.00% 2.00% 38.00% 18.00%
No exclusions 12.50% 87.50% 56.25% 0.00% 75.00% 50.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 3.14% 29.78% 30.33% 7.55% 38.86% 21.26%
Exclude small securities 30.00% 86.00% 34.00% 8.00% 52.00% 24.00%
Baker and Wurgler investor 
sentiment
Baker and Wurgler 
orthogonalized investor 
sentiment
University of Michigan 
consumer confidence
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
economic growth variables
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
economic level variables
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
sentiment variables
Panel A.2 Value-weighted portfolios











Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
No exclusions 62.00% 88.00% 44.00% 42.00% 76.00% 42.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 36.66% 72.22% 41.07% 26.53% 55.61% 33.76%
Exclude small securities 62.00% 88.00% 44.00% 42.00% 76.00% 42.00%
No exclusions 66.00% 88.00% 44.00% 36.00% 70.00% 40.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 37.42% 72.02% 41.70% 22.13% 48.05% 33.37%
Exclude small securities 66.00% 88.00% 44.00% 36.00% 70.00% 40.00%
No exclusions 10.00% 68.00% 50.00% 16.00% 66.00% 34.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 45.00% 88.78% 37.16% 0.75% 17.45% 21.30%
Exclude small securities 10.00% 68.00% 50.00% 16.00% 66.00% 34.00%
No exclusions 60.00% 94.00% 44.00% 0.00% 26.00% 18.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 93.81% 96.35% 40.29% 27.41% 72.13% 22.41%
Exclude small securities 60.00% 94.00% 44.00% 0.00% 26.00% 18.00%
No exclusions 96.00% 96.00% 46.00% 34.00% 82.00% 26.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 71.79% 91.27% 39.04% 4.53% 37.76% 25.96%
Exclude small securities 96.00% 96.00% 46.00% 34.00% 82.00% 26.00%
No exclusions 93.75% 100.00% 62.50% 0.00% 62.50% 43.75%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 4.90% 55.21% 41.05% 12.58% 55.51% 29.48%
Exclude small securities 88.00% 96.00% 50.00% 4.00% 42.00% 30.00%
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
sentiment variables
With Fama and French factors
Baker and Wurgler investor 
sentiment
Baker and Wurgler 
orthogonalized investor 
sentiment
University of Michigan 
consumer confidence
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
economic growth variables
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
economic level variables
Panel B. Percentage of statistically significant predictive regression coefficients
Panel B.1 Equally-weighted portfolios
Sentiment measure Exclusion Criteria Without Fama and French 
Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
No exclusions 34.00% 68.00% 40.00% 30.00% 62.00% 40.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 17.90% 58.95% 35.02% 17.61% 47.22% 29.34%
Exclude small securities 34.00% 68.00% 40.00% 30.00% 62.00% 40.00%
No exclusions 40.00% 74.00% 44.00% 20.00% 60.00% 38.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 23.32% 66.03% 37.66% 14.35% 44.58% 30.11%
Exclude small securities 40.00% 74.00% 44.00% 20.00% 60.00% 38.00%
No exclusions 2.00% 24.00% 38.00% 12.00% 50.00% 28.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 21.39% 74.67% 32.23% 9.20% 39.28% 21.78%
Exclude small securities 2.00% 24.00% 38.00% 12.00% 50.00% 28.00%
No exclusions 30.00% 84.00% 34.00% 10.00% 48.00% 26.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 44.29% 84.73% 32.99% 15.85% 50.36% 20.13%
Exclude small securities 30.00% 84.00% 34.00% 10.00% 48.00% 26.00%
No exclusions 54.00% 88.00% 36.00% 18.00% 68.00% 28.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 36.59% 82.55% 37.24% 6.04% 49.83% 25.94%
Exclude small securities 54.00% 88.00% 36.00% 18.00% 68.00% 28.00%
No exclusions 46.00% 94.00% 42.00% 8.00% 62.00% 36.00%
Exclude hard-to-short securities 1.25% 15.21% 29.08% 9.82% 43.79% 22.02%
Exclude small securities 46.00% 94.00% 42.00% 8.00% 62.00% 36.00%
Baker and Wurgler investor 
sentiment
Baker and Wurgler 
orthogonalized investor 
sentiment
University of Michigan 
consumer confidence
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
economic growth variables
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
economic level variables
University of Michigan residual 
consumer confidence using 
sentiment variables
Panel B.2 Value-weighted portfolios













Percentage of statistically significant coefficients after excluding hardest-to-short quintile 
using Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized investor sentiment.  This table shows the 
percentage of statistically significant coefficients across all 50 trading strategies for each 
of the 16 hard-to-short measures.  The methodology used in calculating the percentage of 
statistically significant coefficients is described in Table 2.12. The high-low coefficients 
are the average difference between high and low sentiment and are estimated by regressing 
excess returns on a constant and a high sentiment dummy variable.  The high sentiment 
dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the prior period had sentiment above the median level 
of investor sentiment over the full sample. Otherwise the dummy variable takes a value of 
0.  The predictive regression coefficients are the slope coefficient from regressing excess 






Hard-to-short measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
Analyst coverage 32.65% 91.84% 34.69% 8.16% 55.10% 30.61%
Average rank 6.00% 64.00% 34.00% 12.00% 46.00% 34.00%
Book-to-market ratio 8.16% 69.39% 32.65% 18.37% 38.78% 28.57%
Cash flow-to-average assets 12.00% 48.00% 24.00% 18.00% 30.00% 20.00%
Corwin-Schultz bid-ask  spread 30.00% 84.00% 40.00% 36.00% 84.00% 38.00%
Days to cover 48.00% 94.00% 40.00% 30.00% 80.00% 40.00%
Dollar short interest 44.00% 92.00% 44.00% 32.00% 82.00% 40.00%
Forecast dispersion 36.73% 87.76% 38.78% 6.12% 46.94% 26.53%
Institutional ownership 10.00% 84.00% 40.00% 6.00% 40.00% 26.00%
Liquidity beta 26.53% 81.63% 42.86% 26.53% 71.43% 42.86%
Momentum 22.45% 81.63% 30.61% 28.57% 69.39% 30.61%
Share turnover 18.00% 78.00% 36.00% 24.00% 70.00% 34.00%
Short interest 46.00% 92.00% 46.00% 28.00% 82.00% 44.00%
Short-term reversal (1) 16.33% 85.71% 42.86% 22.45% 61.22% 42.86%
Short-term reversal (2) 32.00% 86.00% 38.00% 40.00% 74.00% 32.00%
Volatility 6.00% 62.00% 42.00% 12.00% 56.00% 40.00%
Panel A: Average percentage of high-low sentiment coefficients
Panel A.1: Equally-weighted portfolios
Without controlling for Fama 
and French (1993) factors
After controlling for Fama and 
French (1993) factors
Hard-to-short measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
Analyst coverage 24.49% 87.76% 36.73% 10.20% 55.10% 22.45%
Average rank 4.00% 44.00% 26.00% 14.00% 42.00% 20.00%
Book-to-market ratio 2.04% 48.98% 36.73% 8.16% 44.90% 30.61%
Cash flow-to-average assets 8.00% 34.00% 22.00% 14.00% 36.00% 24.00%
Corwin-Schultz bid-ask  spread 6.00% 64.00% 38.00% 14.00% 64.00% 34.00%
Days to cover 20.00% 78.00% 30.00% 20.00% 66.00% 22.00%
Dollar short interest 28.00% 88.00% 34.00% 28.00% 74.00% 32.00%
Forecast dispersion 26.53% 77.55% 26.53% 10.20% 26.53% 16.33%
Institutional ownership 24.00% 80.00% 32.00% 8.00% 28.00% 16.00%
Liquidity beta 6.12% 53.06% 34.69% 16.33% 55.10% 26.53%
Momentum 6.12% 48.98% 32.65% 12.24% 48.98% 20.41%
Share turnover 6.00% 40.00% 28.00% 8.00% 40.00% 20.00%
Short interest 20.00% 78.00% 34.00% 20.00% 66.00% 30.00%
Short-term reversal (1) 6.12% 42.86% 32.65% 16.33% 46.94% 22.45%
Short-term reversal (2) 4.00% 42.00% 22.00% 14.00% 42.00% 22.00%
Volatility 6.00% 40.00% 22.00% 14.00% 44.00% 22.00%
Panel A.2: Value-weighted portfolios
Without controlling for Fama 
and French (1993) factors




Table 2.15 continued 
 
  
Hard-to-short measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
Analyst coverage 8.16% 55.10% 30.61% 2.04% 2.04% 24.49%
Average rank 12.00% 46.00% 34.00% 16.00% 52.00% 30.00%
Book-to-market ratio 18.37% 38.78% 28.57% 24.49% 55.10% 32.65%
Cash flow-to-average assets 18.00% 30.00% 20.00% 30.00% 42.00% 20.00%
Corwin-Schultz bid-ask  spread 36.00% 84.00% 38.00% 32.00% 62.00% 36.00%
Days to cover 30.00% 80.00% 40.00% 16.00% 60.00% 40.00%
Dollar short interest 32.00% 82.00% 40.00% 24.00% 64.00% 40.00%
Forecast dispersion 6.12% 46.94% 26.53% 2.04% 0.00% 22.45%
Institutional ownership 6.00% 40.00% 26.00% 8.00% 4.00% 24.00%
Liquidity beta 26.53% 71.43% 42.86% 26.53% 57.14% 42.86%
Momentum 28.57% 69.39% 30.61% 30.61% 61.22% 32.65%
Share turnover 24.00% 70.00% 34.00% 28.00% 50.00% 36.00%
Short interest 28.00% 82.00% 44.00% 24.00% 64.00% 40.00%
Short-term reversal (1) 22.45% 61.22% 42.86% 20.41% 61.22% 42.86%
Short-term reversal (2) 40.00% 74.00% 32.00% 44.00% 74.00% 36.00%
Volatility 12.00% 56.00% 40.00% 26.00% 60.00% 34.00%
Panel B: Average percentage of statistically significant predictive regression coefficients
Panel B.1: Equally-weighted portfolios
Without controlling for Fama 
and French (1993) factors






Hard-to-short measure Long leg Short leg Long-Short Long leg Short leg Long-Short
Analyst coverage 10.20% 55.10% 22.45% 8.16% 40.82% 34.69%
Average rank 14.00% 42.00% 20.00% 12.00% 48.00% 28.00%
Book-to-market ratio 8.16% 44.90% 30.61% 14.29% 44.90% 28.57%
Cash flow-to-average assets 14.00% 36.00% 24.00% 18.00% 36.00% 22.00%
Corwin-Schultz bid-ask  spread 14.00% 64.00% 34.00% 20.00% 62.00% 42.00%
Days to cover 20.00% 66.00% 22.00% 20.00% 58.00% 32.00%
Dollar short interest 28.00% 74.00% 32.00% 18.00% 60.00% 34.00%
Forecast dispersion 10.20% 26.53% 16.33% 10.20% 12.24% 26.53%
Institutional ownership 8.00% 28.00% 16.00% 8.00% 8.00% 24.00%
Liquidity beta 16.33% 55.10% 26.53% 16.33% 46.94% 30.61%
Momentum 12.24% 48.98% 20.41% 16.33% 55.10% 28.57%
Share turnover 8.00% 40.00% 20.00% 10.00% 34.00% 28.00%
Short interest 20.00% 66.00% 30.00% 18.00% 58.00% 30.00%
Short-term reversal (1) 16.33% 46.94% 22.45% 12.24% 61.22% 38.78%
Short-term reversal (2) 14.00% 42.00% 22.00% 14.00% 48.00% 32.00%
Volatility 14.00% 44.00% 22.00% 14.00% 40.00% 22.00%
Panel B.2: Value-weighted portfolios
Without controlling for Fama 
and French (1993) factors





Figure 2.1 Number of statistically significant coefficients after excluding hard-to-short 
securities measured using average rank.  This figure plots the number of trading strategies 
that have statistically significant coefficients after excluding firms with high average rank.  
Average rank is calculated by ranking firms on each of the 32 hard-to-short measures and 
then calculating the average rank across all measures.  First, using all 50 trading strategies, 
I determine the number of statistically significant high-low and predictive regression 
coefficients without excluding any firms.  Next, this procedure is repeated for portfolios 
formed after excluding firms in the highest percentile of average rank.  These steps are 
repeated for percentile cutoffs ranging from 2% to 20%, incremented by 1%.  Going across 
the columns, we report results for the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  The 
first 2 rows plot the number of statistically significant high-low coefficients without and 
with controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, respectively. The last 2 rows plot 
the fraction of statistically significant predictive regression coefficients without and with 
controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors.  Trading strategy returns are calculated 




Figure 2.2 Number of statistically significant coefficients after excluding hard-to-short 
securities measured using firm size.  This figure plots the number of trading strategies that 
have statistically significant coefficients after excluding firms with low market 
capitalization (small firms).  First, using all 50 trading strategies, I determine the number 
of statistically significant high-low and predictive regression coefficients without 
excluding any firms.  Next, this procedure is repeated for portfolios formed after excluding 
firms in the lowest percentile of firm size.  These steps are repeated for percentile cutoffs 
ranging from 2% to 20%, incremented by 1%.  Going across the columns, we report results 
for the long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  The first 2 rows plot the number of 
statistically significant high-low coefficients without and with controlling for the Fama and 
French (1993) factors, respectively. The last 2 rows plot the number of statistically 
significant predictive regression coefficients without and with controlling for the Fama and 






Figure 2.3 Number of statistically significant coefficients after excluding hard-to-short 
securities measured using institutional ownership.  This figure plots the number of trading 
strategies that have statistically significant coefficients after excluding firms with low 
institutional ownership.  First, using all 50 trading strategies, I determine the number of 
statistically significant high-low and predictive regression coefficients without excluding 
any firms with low institutional ownership.  Next, this procedure is repeated for portfolios 
formed after excluding firms in the lowest percentile of institutional ownership.  These 
steps are repeated for percentile cutoffs ranging from 2% to 20%, incremented by 1%.  
Going across the columns, we report results for the long leg, short leg, and long-short 
portfolios.  The first 2 rows plot the number of statistically significant high-low coefficients 
without and with controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors, respectively. The last 
2 rows plot the number of statistically significant predictive regression coefficients without 
and with controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors.  Trading strategy returns are 
calculated using value-weighted portfolios. 
  
   
    






Short leg portfolio results:
(ii) High-Low coefficients without controls
  
  
    
  
    







(v) High-Low coefficients with controls
  
    
  
    






(viii) Predictive coefficients without controls
  
    
  
    






(xi) Predictive coefficients with controls
  
    
  
   
    
  
   
    







(iii) High-Low coefficients without controls
  
    
  
    







(vi) High-Low coefficients with controls
  
    
  
    







(ix) Predictive coefficients without controls
  
    
  
    












Figure 2.4 Number of statistically significant coefficients after excluding hard-to-short 
securities measured using short interest.  This figure plots the number of trading strategies 
that have statistically significant coefficients after excluding firms with high short interest.  
First, using all 50 trading strategies, I determine the number of statistically significant high-
low and predictive regression coefficients without excluding any firms with high short 
interest.  Next, this procedure is repeated for portfolios formed after excluding firms in the 
highest percentile of short interest.  These steps are repeated for percentile cutoffs ranging 
from 2% to 20%, incremented by 1%.  Going across the columns, we report results for the 
long leg, short leg, and long-short portfolios.  The first 2 rows plot the number of 
statistically significant high-low coefficients without and with controlling for the Fama and 
French (1993) factors, respectively. The last 2 rows plot the number of statistically 
significant predictive regression coefficients without and with controlling for the Fama and 






INSTITUTIONAL TRADING MOMENTUM AND MISPRICING 
Since the early 1980s, institutional ownership has been increasing over time (see 
Gompers and Metrick (2001)).  Thus, financial institutions may play an important role in 
setting equity prices.  This raises the concern that if financial institutions were to trade in 
the same direction, prices could be pushed away from fundamentals, thereby creating 
mispricing in the market.  However, the general consensus in the literature is that financial 
institutions are beneficial to the market, in that they push prices towards, rather than away 
from, fundamentals.  Wermers (1999) finds a positive relation between mutual fund 
demand and short-term returns.  Using changes in institutional ownership as a proxy for 
institutional demand, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) also find a positive relation between 
institutional demand and short-term returns.  Recently, Dasgupta et al. (2011) suggest that 
the reason prior studies have found a positive relation between institutional demand and 
short-term returns could be that the prior studies condition upon current institutional 
demand and not on institutional demand over multiple quarters.  In contrast, the Dasgupta 
et al. (2011) findings show that firms bought or sold over consecutive quarters eventually 
have a reversal in returns over the long-run. 
Unlike the results of previous studies, by using a novel measure of institutional 
demand, I find that financial institutions not only push prices away from fundamentals, but 
they also create substantial mispricing.  I measure institutional demand using abnormal 
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institutional ownership, the residual ownership that remains after de-trending institutional 
ownership with the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter. 
   First, I investigate how the level of abnormal institutional ownership has changed 
over time and find that abnormal institutional ownership was particularly high prior to the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009.  After testing abnormal institutional ownership against other 
institutional ownership variables, I find that it contains information not captured by these 
other ownership variables.  Next, using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, I regress 
annual returns on abnormal institutional ownership, finding a strong negative relation 
between abnormal institutional ownership and annual returns.  This result remains 
relatively unchanged even after controlling for other financial variables that have been 
shown to predict stock returns.   
Theoretically, based on the argument presented in Lakonishok et al. (1992), if 
financial institutions exert pressure on equity securities and push their valuations away 
from fundamentals, long positions should be taken in securities with low abnormal 
institutional ownership and short positions should be taken in securities with high abnormal 
institutional ownership.  To test this claim, I form portfolios by sorting firms based on 
abnormal institutional ownership.  I find a strong mean-reversion in both abnormal 
institutional ownership and in returns.  Securities in the high abnormal institutional 
ownership portfolio experience a large run-up in both abnormal and raw institutional 
ownership prior to the portfolio formation date, and a correspondingly large decline in 
abnormal and raw institutional ownership after the portfolio formation date.  The opposite 
result is found for securities in the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  Instead, 
these securities experience a large decline in abnormal and raw institutional ownership 
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prior to portfolio formation, followed by a quick increase in abnormal and raw institutional 
ownership after the portfolio formation date.  A similar result is found with the returns of 
the low-high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  This portfolio experiences 
negative returns prior to portfolio formation and positive returns after portfolio formation. 
The evidence indicates that the aggregate trades of financial institutions exert 
considerable price pressure on securities.  Prior to formation, the net order imbalance 
between buys and sells of the low-high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio reaches 
close to -$300 million. Then, following formation this order imbalance quickly reverts back 
to 0 over the following 4 quarters, and eventually reaches +$100 million 8 quarters after 
the formation date.  The large order imbalance appears to be driven by mutual funds and 
other financial institutions that are not banks and insurance companies.  The order 
imbalance of banks and insurance companies is approximately -$60 million, while the 
order imbalance of mutual funds and other financial institutions is approximately -$240 
million.  This suggests that mutual funds and hedge funds are responsible for pushing prices 
away from fundamentals. 
 The trades of financial institutions result in wide fluctuations in the relative 
valuation of the high abnormal institutional ownership.  As financial institutions increase 
their ownership of the high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio, the average book-
to-market ratio of this portfolio drops from 0.73 to 0.52, then as financial institutions 
decrease their holdings of this portfolio, the average book-to-market ratio increases from 
0.52 to 1.15. 
Further evidence indicates that financial institutions push prices away from 
fundamentals.  Prior to the sorting date on abnormal institutional ownership, the high and 
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low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio have similar returns.  However, as the order 
imbalance between these extreme portfolio increases, the high abnormal institutional 
ownership portfolio consistently experiences much larger returns than the low abnormal 
institutional ownership portfolio over the subsequent months up until the formation date.  
Then following the formation date, there is a reversal, and the high abnormal institutional 
ownership portfolio experiences much smaller returns than the low abnormal institutional 
ownership portfolio.  This reversal in returns results in the low and high abnormal 
institutional ownership portfolios having the same cumulative return 15 months after 
formation.  From 36 months to 3 months prior to formation, the low-high abnormal 
institutional ownership portfolio experiences a cumulative return of -35%.  Then, there is 
a reversal, and the low-high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio experiences 
positive returns over the following 18 months, resulting in a net cumulative return of 0% 
15 months after the sorting date.   
I find that a strategy that purchases the extremely low institutional ownership 
portfolio and sells the extremely high institutional ownership portfolio earns a positive and 
statistically significant return. The average monthly return for this strategy using equally-
weighted portfolios is 2.75%, while the average monthly return using value-weighted 
portfolios is 1.17%.  This result seems likely due to mispricing, since after controlling for 
the Fama and French (1993) factors, the average monthly alpha is 2.79% for the strategy 
formed using equally-weighted portfolios and the average monthly alpha is 1.21% using 
value-weighted portfolios. 
The negative relation between abnormal institutional ownership and returns is 
inversely related to firm size.  Using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, the average 
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abnormal institutional ownership coefficient is between -0.15 and -0.20 for small firms, 
but between -0.02 and -0.04 for large firms.  A similar result is found using portfolios 
formed on both abnormal institutional ownership and firm size.  Within the smallest tertile, 
the average equally-weighted return of the low-high abnormal institutional ownership 
portfolio is 3.48% per month, while within the largest tertile, the average equally-weighted 
return is 0.77% per month.  Similar results are found using value-weighted portfolios and 
these estimates remain relatively unchanged after controlling for the Fama and French 
(1993) factors. 
Consistent with Amihud’s (2002) suggestion that illiquid firms should be more 
sensitive to large trades, i.e., institutional demand, I find that illiquid securities are more 
sensitive to institutional demand than liquid securities.  After allocating firms to 3 
illiquidity portfolios and 10 abnormal institutional ownership portfolios, I find that within 
the most illiquid tertile, the low-high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio earns an 
average monthly equally-weighted return of 3.37% and an average monthly value-
weighted return of 2.53%. On the other hand, within the least illiquid portfolio, the low-
high portfolio earns an average equally-weighted return of 1.32% and an average value-
weighted return of 0.66%.   A similar result is obtained after controlling for the Fama and 
French (1993) factors. 
I test to determine whether the negative relation between institutional demand and 
returns was stronger in one subperiod over another.  One would expect that if financial 
institutions exert a greater effect on prices while holding a large fraction of outstanding 
shares, the low-high abnormal institutional ownership strategy would earn a higher return 
in the later part of the sample, when institutional ownership was highest.  This is exactly 
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what I find.  In the 1980s, the average return of the low-high portfolio earned an average 
monthly equally-weighted return of 1.87%.  In contrast, this same portfolio had an average 
equally-weighted return of 3.55% in the 1990s and an average equally-weighted return of 
2.89% in the 2000s.  Thus, the negative relation between institutional demand and returns 
is strongest when financial institutions play a larger role in the market. 
I investigate whether my results can be extended to subgroups of financial 
institutions.  Following the methodology of Lewellen (2011), I classify each financial 
institution as a bank, insurance company, mutual fund, or other financial institution.  I then 
construct abnormal ownership for each type of financial institution calculated using the 
aggregate holdings of each institution type.  Then, portfolio returns are calculated for low-
high abnormal ownership portfolios that are formed using abnormal bank ownership, 
insurance ownership, mutual fund ownership, and other financial institution ownership.  
For each subgroup of financial institutions, I find the same mean-reversion pattern in 
ownership and returns.  The strategy using abnormal mutual fund ownership generates the 
largest average low-high portfolio return, while the strategy using abnormal insurance 
ownership generates the smallest average low-portfolio return.  Further, the largest 
reversion in returns is found using abnormal mutual fund ownership.  Consistent with the 
earlier results found using abnormal institutional ownership, I find that the low-high 
abnormal mutual fund ownership portfolio experiences large negative returns prior to the 
sorting date and large positive returns after the sorting date.  Unlike the case using abnormal 
institutional ownership, I find that the reversion in returns related to abnormal mutual fund 
ownership is almost exclusively due to the trades of mutual funds.  At the point of reversal 
in abnormal mutual fund ownership, the order imbalance of mutual funds is around -$180 
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million, while the order imbalance of all other financial institutions is around +$5 million.  
This suggests that the trades of mutual funds, if not balanced by the trades of other financial 
institutions, can create substantial mispricing in the market place.    
Finally, I test the robustness of my results using residual ownership measures 
constructed by regressing each ownership series on a constant and a linear trend term.  
Using residual ownership, I find virtually the same results as when using abnormal 
ownership constructed using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter.  
The reason I find a negative relation between institutional demand and short-term 
returns is the use of de-trended institutional ownership as the measure of institutional 
demand.  There are a number of advantages to this measure, relative to the measures 
traditionally used in the literature.  First, de-trended institutional ownership captures the 
aggregate effect of the trades of all financial institutions, whereas some of the other 
measures capture only the actions of a subgroup of financial institutions.  Consider the case 
of a single mutual selling a large block of stock to 10 different mutual funds.  Under my 
measure, the level of institutional ownership would not change. However, a measure such 
as the Lakonishok et al. (1992) measure would conclude that mutual funds were net buyers, 
despite the lack of change in the overall level of institutional ownership.  Additionally, our 
measure remains unchanged when the trades of one group of financial institutions, such as 
mutual funds, is offset by another group of financial institutions, such as insurance 
companies. 
Another advantage of this measure is that it captures both the magnitude of changes 
in institutional ownership as well as the direction of those changes.  Measures that count 
only the number of buyers versus sellers do not take into consideration the magnitude of 
182 
 
those transactions.  For example, fixing the number of buyers and sellers, one could 
discover that 1 set of trades moves institutional ownership from 1% to 20% while another 
moves institutional ownership from 1% to only 1.1%.  De-trended institutional ownership 
is able to distinguish between these 2 cases.   
De-trended institutional ownership is most closely related to the Dasgupta et al. 
(2011) institutional persistence measure and the change in institutional ownership measure 
used in Nofsinger and Sias (1999).  The institutional persistence (henceforth referred to as 
either institutional persistence or persistence) measure counts the number of consecutive 
quarters in which a security was purchased or sold in net.  In this regard, Dasgupta et al. 
(2011) capture the trend in institutional ownership over 3-5 quarters. However, they neither 
capture the magnitude of the change in ownership over those quarters nor take into 
consideration trends lasting longer than 5 quarters.  Moreover, the change in institutional 
ownership measures the change in ownership from one quarter to the next but does not take 
into consideration changes in ownership over multiple quarters or trends in ownership.  
Alternatively, abnormal institutional ownership not only measures the net effect on 
ownership over multiple quarters, but it also measures any sudden changes in ownership.    
Thus, this measure is the best of both worlds.   
A further advantage of this measure relative to other measures is its ability to 
control for trends in ownership.  It allows me to select stocks at the exact moment their 
trend switches direction, whereas other measures may select stocks in the middle of a trend.  
Furthermore, this measure controls for different stocks having different average levels of 
ownership.  One would think that a stock whose level of institutional ownership changes 
from 10% to 20% would be different from a stock whose level of institutional ownership 
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changes from 50% to 60%.      
My work is most closely related to the literature studying institutional demand 
(herding) and returns. Generally, this literature finds a positive relation between 
institutional demand and short-term returns.  Lakonishok et al. (1992) create a new measure 
of institutional demand, the number of funds that are net buyers of a security, and then test 
whether these funds push prices away from or towards fundamentals.  Their evidence 
seems to indicate that for the most part, financial institutions do not push prices away from 
fundamentals.  In a related study, Wermers (1999) investigates the effect of mutual fund 
demand on returns, finding that the stocks bought by mutual funds tend to have positive 
subsequent returns, and stocks sold by mutual funds tend to have negative subsequent 
returns.  This evidence indicates that mutual funds push prices towards fundamentals.  
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) investigate the relation between institutional demand and 
returns, using changes in institutional ownership as the measure of institutional demand.  
They present evidence of a continuation in prices in the short-term. Stocks with a large 
decrease in institutional ownership experience a negative return in the following year while 
stocks with a large increase in institutional ownership experience a positive return in the 
following year.  My research contributes to this literature by presenting strong evidence of 
a negative relation between institutional demand and short-term returns. 
In more recent work, Dasgupta et al. (2011) and Gutierrez and Kelley (2009) 
investigate the relation between institutional demand and returns after 1 year.  They 
discover that there is a reversal in returns in the long-term.  Interestingly, Gutierrez and 
Kelley also find a positive relation between institutional demand and short-term returns 
using the Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding measure, and also present some evidence of a 
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negative relation using changes in institutional ownership.  My results expand on these 
prior papers by using abnormal institutional ownership. I present evidence of a strong 
mean-reversion in both ownership and returns when institutional ownership is abnormally 
high or low. 
 My work is also related to the literature using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (1997) to 
remove trends from financial variables.   Typically, the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to 
remove the trend in economic output variables such as Gross Domestic Product and Gross 
National Product (see Braun and Larrain (2005) and Hodrick and Prescott (1997)). Other 
scholars have used the Hodrick-Prescott filter to de-trend other financial variables.  Naes 
et al. (2011) use the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to de-trend market illiquidity measured 
using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and Campello and Graham (2013) used the 
Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to de-trend accounting ratios such as the price-to-earnings 
ratio and the cash flow to assets ratio. My research contributes to this literature by showing 
that the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter can be applied to institutional ownership as well. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 3.1 discusses the data 
and methodology, section 3.2 presents results indicating that financial institutions are 
pushing prices away from fundamentals, and section 3.3 concludes. 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
 Data are obtained from a number of different sources.  I obtain stock returns and 
other stock market data from the CRSP database and accounting data reported by firms 
from the COMPUSTAT database. Data necessary to construct institutional ownership and 
other related variables are obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) 
database.  Each quarter, financial institutions with more than $100 million in assets under 
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management are required to report to the SEC their positions in equity securities as outlined 
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9  In this study I use institutional holdings data from 
March 1980 until December 2010.  Institutional ownership is defined as the percentage of 
a firm’s shares outstanding that is held by financial institutions.  I also obtain mutual fund 
holdings from the Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings database.    
I use shares outstanding from the CRSP database when constructing this variable.  
Delisting returns are controlled for following the methodology used in Bulsiewicz (2013).  
In all of my future analyses, I use only nonfinancial, nonutility firms with share price 
between $5 and $1,000, inclusive, as of the formation date. 
 Previously, Gompers, and Metrick (2001) documented that institutional ownership 
has been increasing over time.  I am able to confirm this result in the sample period (1980-
2010).  From March 1980 until December 2010, the average equally-weighted institutional 
ownership increased from 12.7% to 55.7%, while the average value-weighted institutional 
ownership increased from 33.6% to 71.3%.  The results for equally-weighted portfolios are 
reported in Figure 3.1.10  In constructing these 2 time-series, I use all common shares (share 
codes equal to 10 or 11) that are traded in the United States.   
I also calculate bank ownership, insurance ownership, mutual fund ownership, and 
other financial institutions ownership.  I calculate mutual fund ownership by aggregating 
across all mutual funds in the Thomson Reuters mutual fund database.  Bank ownership, 
insurance ownership, and other financial institutions ownership is calculated using the 
                                                 
9 More information on 13F institutional ownership filings is available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm  




methodology used in Lewellen (2011).  I classify all firms in the Thomson Reuters 
institutional ownership database as a bank, insurance company, or all other institutions.  I 
then aggregate the holdings of each institution type.  Other financial institutions ownership 
is calculated by subtracting mutual fund ownership (from the mutual fund database) from 
the all other financial institutions ownership.   
The time series of bank, insurance, and other ownership is plotted in Figure 3.1. 
From this figure we can see the trend in institutional ownership is due to a large increase 
in mutual fund and other financial institutions’ ownership.  The ownership of banks and 
insurance companies has been fairly flat over time. 
 While previous studies have generally found a positive relation between 
institutional trading and short-term stock returns, none of these studies have explicitly 
controlled for trends in institutional ownership.  One measure used in these studies is the 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding measure which measures the number of mutual funds 
buying a certain security.  Wermers (1999) uses the Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding 
measure to study whether mutual fund herding, mutual funds that all trade in the same 
direction, push prices towards or away from fundamentals and finds evidence that mutual 
funds push prices towards fundamentals.  The Lakonishok measure takes into account 
whether mutual funds are on average buyers or sellers in a given quarter, but it does not 
take into account trends in institutional ownership.  Another institutional demand measure 
used in the literature is the proportion of institutions that increase their holdings in a 
security.  Using the proportion of institutions increasing their demand for a security, Sias 
(2004) finds a positive relation between institutional demand and returns over the following 
year.  While the proportion of institutions increasing their holdings in a security measures 
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institutional demand, it does not take into account trends in institutional ownership.  
Similarly, some studies use the change in institutional ownership to assess whether there 
is a positive relation between institution trading and short-term returns (see for example 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999)).   
The change in institutional ownership controls for the current change in ownership, 
but it does not take into account how ownership changed over multiple quarters.  Recently, 
Dasgupta et al. (2011) measured institutional demand by counting the number of 
consecutive quarters that financial institutions either increased or decreased their holdings 
in a security.  They provide evidence that there is a reversal in returns in the long-term 
following a period where a security is bought or sold over many quarters and also provide 
some evidence that returns may reverse sooner than 1 year in the future.   
 Unlike the prior literature, I explicitly control for trends in institutional ownership.  
For each equity security I de-trend each equity security’s full time-series of institutional 
ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 1600.  After de-trending 
each security’s institutional ownership I define abnormal institutional ownership as the 
residual ownership remaining after removing the trend (slope and level) from institutional 
ownership.   
Figure 3.2 plots the time-series of abnormal institutional ownership for the whole 
market by equally weighting each security.  Looking at Figure 3.3, there appear to be cycles 
in abnormal institutional ownership, i.e., there are periods where institutional ownership is 
increasing and periods where institutional ownership is decreasing.  Interestingly, prior to 
the financial crisis, there was a large increase in abnormal institutional ownership and 
subsequently there was a large decrease in abnormal institutional ownership.  I find similar 
188 
 
results using value-weighted abnormal institutional ownership, except I also find a large 
spike in abnormal institutional ownership during the Tech bubble and 2001 recession.  
3.2 Results 
 After calculating abnormal institutional ownership, the first order of business is to 
determine the relation between abnormal institutional ownership and other institutional 
ownership measures.  For each security, I calculate a total of 7 institutional ownership 
measures: abnormal institutional ownership, change in abnormal institutional ownership, 
change in institutional ownership, institutional ownership, institutional persistence, mutual 
fund herding, and residual institutional ownership.  Change in abnormal institutional 
ownership is defined as the 1 quarter change in abnormal institutional ownership and the 
change in institutional ownership is defined as the 1 quarter change in raw institutional 
ownership.  Mutual fund herding is calculated using the Lakonishok et al. (1992) measure 
following the methodology of Wermers (1999).  The Lakonishok et al. (1992) measure is 
defined as HMi,t= |pi,t –E[pi,t]| - AFi,t  where pi,t is the proportion of buying and selling 
mutual funds that increase their holdings of stock i in quarter t. and AFi,t  is an adjustment 
factor which takes into account that the expected value of |pi,t –E[pi,t]| is greater than 0 
under the null of no herding.  The adjustment factor is defined as AF(i) = E|pi,t – E[pi,t]|.  
Following Dasgupta et al. (2011) I define institutional persistence as the number of quarters 
that institutional ownership was bought over the most recent 3 quarters, inclusive of the 
current quarter.  Nagel residual institutional ownership is as defined in Nagel (2005), who 
defines residual institutional ownership as the residual from the regression equation: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)2+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                     (16) 
 where INST is institutional ownership, logit(INST) = log ( 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
1−𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
),   𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the log of 
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firm size, and (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)2 is the log of firm size squared.  Nagel uses residual institutional 
ownership to control for institutional ownership that is related to firm size.  To test the 
robustness of the use of abnormal institutional ownership, I also calculate residual 
institutional ownership.  Residual institutional ownership is defined as the residual from 
the regression of firm-level institutional ownership on a constant and a time trend term.11 
 As argued in Dasgupta et al. (2011), I standardize each of the 9 institutional 
ownership variables by the quarterly cross-sectional mean and standard deviation in order 
to be able to interpret the coefficients from any future regressions.  Prior to running any 
regressions, I calculate the correlations between these 9 measures.  These correlations are 
reported in Table 3.1.  
Abnormal institutional ownership is moderately correlated with the other 
institutional ownership measures used in prior studies.  Of these measures, abnormal 
institutional ownership has the highest correlation with the 1 quarter change in institutional 
ownership and is negatively correlated with mutual fund herding.  Abnormal institutional 
ownership is also moderately correlated with the 1 quarter change in abnormal institutional 
ownership and highly correlated with residual institutional ownership.  The correlation 
between abnormal institutional ownership and residual institutional ownership is 82%. 
I also calculate abnormal ownership for the 4 subgroups of financial institutions 
using bank ownership, insurance ownership, mutual fund ownership, and other ownership.  
I define abnormal ownership using these 4 series as abnormal bank ownership, abnormal 
                                                 
11 In this paper, I will refer to the residual ownership from Nagel (2005) as Nagel (2005) residual 
ownership and the residual ownership from the regression of ownership on a constant and a time trend term 




insurance ownership, abnormal mutual fund ownership, and abnormal other ownership.   
Table 3.2 presents the correlation matrix between abnormal institutional ownership and the 
4 other abnormal ownership measures.  Abnormal institutional ownership has a relatively 
high correlation of 73% with abnormal other ownership and is not highly correlated with 
abnormal bank, insurance, and mutual fund ownership.  In addition, the correlation 
between the abnormal ownership of each subgroup is low.  
3.2.1 Fama MacBeth Tests 
While abnormal institutional ownership is related to the other measures of 
institutional ownership, it is not yet clear if it contains additional information not captured 
by other institutional ownership variables.  To test whether abnormal institutional 
ownership contains information not contained in the other measures, I run Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) regressions of future 1 year buy and hold returns on each of the 9 institutional 
ownership variables.  Specifically, I regress the buy and hold return from July of year t 
until June of year t+1   on each of the institutional ownership measures in June of year t.  
The coefficient estimates for each of the variables are presented in Table 3.3.  Panel A of 
Table 3.3 shows the results for all firms, while Panels B, C, and D show the results for 
small, medium, and large market capitalization firms. I define small firms as firms with 
market capitalization less than the 30th percentile, medium firms as firms with market 
capitalization between the 30th and 70th percentile, and large firms as firms with market 
capitalization greater than the 70th percentile.  This definition of firm size was previously 
used in Cooper et al. (2008).   
If financial institutions push prices away from fundamentals, then there should be 
a negative relation between abnormal institutional ownership and short-term returns.  This 
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is exactly what I find.  Overall, there is a strong negative relation between abnormal 
institutional ownership and short-term returns and a negative, but weaker, relation between 
the change in abnormal institutional ownership and short-term returns.  On the other hand, 
consistent with the prior literature, I find an insignificant relation between short-term 
returns and change in institutional ownership, institutional ownership, mutual fund 
herding, or persistence.  Furthermore, I find a positive relation between Nagel (2005) 
residual institutional ownership and short-term returns.  I also find that abnormal 
institutional ownership produces a much higher average adjusted r-squared than any of the 
other measures.  These results indicate that abnormal institutional ownership contains new 
information not present in the other measures. 
Comparing the results using abnormal institutional ownership or residual 
institutional ownership, we can see that there is a negative relation between these measures 
and short-term returns.  In unreported results, I find that the results reported in this paper 
are only slightly weaker to the use of residual institutional ownership in the place of 
abnormal institutional ownership, so for brevity I focus only on the results obtained using 
abnormal institutional ownership. 
 Next, I test whether the negative relation between abnormal institutional ownership 
and short-term returns is present in all 3 size groups.  The negative relation between 
institutional ownership and short-term returns increases in strength as we move from large 
firms to small firms.  The estimated coefficients are -0.0264, -0.0783, and -0.1511 for large, 
medium, and small firms, respectively.  Furthermore, the average adjusted r-squared from 
these regressions is highest for small firms and lowest for large firms.  These results are 
consistent with Amihud (2002), which suggests that the securities of small firms are more 
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illiquid and more sensitive to large trades. If small firms are more sensitive to institutional 
demand than large firms, then this would explain why there is a stronger negative relation 
between abnormal institutional ownership and short-term returns.   
Given that abnormal institutional ownership has a fairly high correlation with the 
change in abnormal institutional ownership and change in institutional ownership variables 
but has a larger effect on future returns than these other variables, I do not include these 2 
other institutional ownership variables in future Fama-MacBeth (1973) tests.  I also exclude 
institutional ownership as an explanatory variable since it is highly correlated with Nagel 
(2005) residual institutional ownership.  While the previous results showed that abnormal 
institutional ownership contains information not contained in other institutional ownership 
variables, abnormal institutional ownership could be capturing information in other 
financial variables.  I consider a total of 14 other financial variables: accruals, asset growth, 
book-to-market ratio, Daniel and Titman Composite issuances, firm size, gross 
profitability, idiosyncratic risk, investments-to-assets, momentum, net stock issuances, O-
score, return on assets return on equity, and share turnover.  A more detailed description of 
these variables is given in Appendix C.   
Prior to running any Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, I calculate the correlation 
between abnormal institutional ownership and the 17 other financial variables.  Each 
variable is standardized by its quarterly cross-sectional mean and standard deviation.  I 
exclude firms with low prices (less than $5), high prices (greater than $1,000), financial 
firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), and utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 
4999).  These correlations are given in Table 3.4.  Abnormal institutional ownership has 
the highest correlation with the 2 other institutional ownership variables, persistence and 
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Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership.  Further, the correlations between abnormal 
institutional ownership and the other financial variables have an absolute value less than 
10%. 
I perform Fama MacBeth (1973) regressions of annual July of year t until June of 
year t+1 returns on abnormal institutional ownership and other financial variables from 
June of year t.  The average coefficient estimates and their corresponding t-statistics are 
reported in Table 3.5, with Panel A reporting the results for all firms, and Panels B, C, and 
D reporting the results for different size groups.  I first estimate the relation between future 
returns and abnormal institutional ownership.  From this regression I find a strong and 
highly significant negative relation between abnormal institutional ownership and returns.  
In regression Specification 2, I add the 3 institutional ownership variables: mutual fund 
herding, Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership, and persistence.  Even after adding 
these variables there is still a strong negative relation between abnormal institutional 
ownership and short-term returns.  Further, the mutual fund herding coefficient is not 
statistically different and there is a positive relation between the other 2 institutional 
ownership variables and short-term returns.  Next, I add Daniel and Titman (2006) 
composite issuances and return on assets as control variables.  Again, there is a strong 
negative relation between abnormal institutional ownership and short-term returns.  In 
regression Specification 4 I add gross profitability and share turnover, and in Specification 
5 I include all 17 control variables.  Consistent with the other 3 specifications, the relation 
between abnormal institutional ownership and short-term returns is relatively unchanged 
after including all of these control variables known to predict returns. 
I repeat these 5 specifications for small, medium, and large firms.  Small firms have 
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a much stronger relation between returns and abnormal institutional ownership than the 
other 2 size groups.  The average abnormal institutional ownership coefficient for small 
firms is approximately -0.185 for small firms, -0.097 for medium firms, and -0.028 for 
large firms.  Thus, as firm size increases, the effect of abnormal institutional ownership on 
returns decreases.  This is consistent with Amihud’s (2002) suggestion that small firms are 
more sensitive to large trades.  Furthermore, unlike the general result reported in the 
literature, these results suggest that financial institutions push prices away from rather than 
towards fundamentals.  
3.2.2 Fama MacBeth Tests by Institution Subgroup 
In this section, I investigate whether the results presented in the last section can be 
extended to subgroups of financial institutions. I run the 5 Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
regressions using abnormal bank, insurance, mutual fund, and other ownership.  The 
estimated Fama-MacBeth coefficients are reported in Table 3.6, with Panels A, B, C, and 
D presenting the results using abnormal bank, insurance, mutual fund, and other ownership.  
For all 4 types of institutions there is a significant negative relation between their abnormal 
ownership and short-term returns.  Out of the 4 types of institutions, the strongest results 
are found using abnormal mutual fund ownership and the weakest results are found using 
abnormal insurance ownership.  Thus, all 4 institutions seem to exert an effect on returns, 
with banks and insurance companies exerting the least and mutual funds, hedge funds, and 






3.2.3 Abnormal Institutional Ownership Portfolio Tests 
To further examine the relation between institutional demand and returns, in June 
of each year from 1980 until 2010, I allocate firms into 10 decile portfolios using New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) breakpoints.  I then calculate the average characteristics 
across all years for each of the 10 portfolios.  I report these descriptive statistics in Table 
3.7.  From this table we can see that there is a wide dispersion in abnormal institutional 
ownership.  The average abnormal institutional ownership in portfolio 1 is -0.0890 and in 
portfolio 10 is 0.1064.  We can also see that firms with high abnormal institutional 
ownership have higher institutional ownership as well as Nagel (2005) residual institutional 
ownership.  Firms with high abnormal institutional ownership have around 28% more of 
its shares held by financial institutions.  Interestingly, firms with low abnormal institutional 
ownership have not been persistently sold.  The Dasgupta et al. (2011) persistence measure 
takes a value of -3 if a stock has been sold over the prior 3 quarters, but here I am finding 
the average persistence for portfolio 1 is -0.06, which is close to 0.  This implies that firms 
with low abnormal institutional ownership have been neither persistently bought nor sold, 
which suggests that financial institutions sell a large portion of their holdings in 1 quarter 
rather than selling small portions of their holdings over multiple quarters.  Based on this, 
it does appear that abnormal institutional ownership is capturing institutional demand or 
alternatively institutional price pressure.   
 I find a different result for high abnormal institutional ownership firms.  These 
firms have been persistently bought over at least the prior 2 quarters.  The average 
persistence for high abnormal institutional ownership firms is 1.88.  The average firm with 
low abnormal institutional ownership has a higher book-to-market ratio, smaller market 
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capitalization, and lower return on equity than the average firm with high abnormal 
institutional ownership.  However, these results could be due to financial institutions 
pushing the price of the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio down and pushing 
up the price of the high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  Additionally, firms 
with high abnormal institutional ownership have a higher return over the prior year as 
shown by the momentum variable. 
3.2.3.1 Abnormal Institutional Ownership in Event Time 
 Next I investigate how abnormal institutional ownership changes prior to and after 
the allocation date.  If financial institutions are driving prices away from fundamentals, 
then we would expect for there to be a spike in abnormal institutional ownership centered 
on the allocation quarter.  This is exactly what I find.  For each of the 10 abnormal 
institutional ownership portfolios I calculate the cross-sectional average abnormal 
institutional ownership for the 12 quarters before and after the allocation quarter.  These 
values are plotted for each portfolio in Figure 3.3.  For the high abnormal institutional 
ownership portfolio, we see that leading up to the allocation quarter abnormal institutional 
ownership increases rapidly from -0.028 to 0.130 at the end of the allocation quarter and 
then decreases rapidly to a level around -0.035.  
I find the opposite result for the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  
For the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio, abnormal institutional ownership 
is around 0.02 prior to the allocation quarter, decreases to -0.11 at the end of the allocation 
quarter, and then proceeds to increase back to a level around 0.04.  Thus, there is strong 
mean-reversion in abnormal institutional ownership.  These results provide further support 
that institutions are pushing prices away from fundamentals.  It seems inconsistent to think 
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that financial institutions would be altering their ownership level if they thought these 
investments would yield a high return.   
I also investigate how the level of abnormal institutional ownership changes around 
the sorting date for the low-high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  For each of 
the 12 quarters surrounding the formation date, I calculate the difference in the average 
abnormal institutional ownership for the low-high portfolio.  In Figure 3.4, I plot how 
abnormal institutional ownership changes around the sorting date for the low-high 
portfolio.  From this figure we see that there is strong mean reversion in ownership.  Prior 
to the sorting date, there is a much larger increase in abnormal institutional ownership for 
the high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio than there is a decrease in abnormal 
institutional ownership for the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  This results 
in the net abnormal ownership being negative prior to the sorting date.  However, following 
the sorting date, this pattern reverses and the low ownership portfolio sees a larger increase 
in ownership while the high ownership portfolio sees the opposite change.  This results in 
a large net increase in abnormal institutional ownership following the sorting date.  Further, 
based on Figure 3.4, there appears to be escalation in the trades of financial institutions 
given that abnormal institutional ownership is concave and decreasing prior to the sorting 
date and increasing after the sorting date. 
3.2.3.2 Institutional Ownership in Event Time 
To provide further insight on the prior results, I also calculate the mean amount of 
institutional ownership for the 10 abnormal institutional portfolios for the 12 quarters 
surrounding the allocation date.  The time-series of average institutional ownership for the 
low and high abnormal institutional ownership portfolios are plotted in Figure 3.5.  Even 
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when using raw institutional ownership, I still find strong mean-reversion.  From 12 
quarters prior to the allocation date to the allocation date, the average institutional 
ownership of the high abnormal institutional portfolio increases from average level of 38% 
to 62% on the allocation date.  Then, after the allocation quarter, the average institutional 
ownership decreases to approximately 48%.  The opposite result is found for the low 
abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  Prior to the allocation date, the average 
institutional ownership of the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio decreases 
from around 47% to slightly less than 36%.  After the allocation quarter, the average 
institutional ownership increases to a level close to 57%.  Thus, I find a reversal in 
institutional ownership for both the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio and the 
high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.   
3.2.3.3 Returns to Abnormal Institutional Ownership Strategy in Event Time 
If institutional demand is pushing prices away from fundamentals, then this would 
suggest that a strategy that purchases low abnormal institutional ownership firms and sells 
high abnormal institutional ownership firms would be profitable.  After forming 10 
portfolios in June, for each portfolio I calculate the cross-sectional average return for the 
36 months surrounding the allocation month.  I also calculate the returns to strategies that 
sort stocks on each of the abnormal ownership subgroups.  Figure 3.6 plots the cumulative 
average monthly return surrounding the formation month for the strategy that buys low 
abnormal institutional ownership firms and sells high abnormal institutional ownership 
firms as well as the low-high portfolios formed using abnormal bank, insurance, mutual 
fund, and other ownership.  There is substantial mean-reversion in returns.  Prior to the 
formation month, returns become increasingly negative.  In total, the cumulative return to 
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the low-high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio is -35% up to 3 months prior to 
the sorting date, then there is a large reversal and returns are positive for the next 20 months 
or so.  By the 17th month after formation, the cumulative return is back to 0.  In total, 
financial institutions appear to push prices away from fundamentals for 33 months and to 
push prices back towards fundamentals for 20 months.  A similar pattern is found for each 
group of financial institutions.  Specifically, strategies formed using abnormal bank, 
insurance, mutual fund, and other ownership all produce negative returns prior to the 
sorting date and positive returns following the sorting date. Overall, the strongest effect is 
found using abnormal ownership for all institutions, but each group of institutions appears 
to be creating mispricing.  Out of the 4 types of institutions, the strategy using abnormal 
mutual fund ownership has the largest mean-reversion in returns, followed by the strategies 
using abnormal bank, other, and insurance ownership, in order of decreasing mean-
reversion. 
To further investigate whether institutions are creating mispricing, Figure 3.7 
shows how $1 invested at the end of the 37th month prior to the sort date would change if 
it were invested in the low and high abnormal institutional ownership portfolios.  From this 
figure, there appears to be mispricing, which based on the institutional ownership evidence, 
appears to be driven by the trades of financial institutions.  Up to 27 months before the sort 
date, the value of $1 would have grown to about the same amount in both the low and high 
portfolios.  However, after this date the high abnormal institutional ownership outperforms 
the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio by an ever increasing margin up until 
around the sorting date.  
 At the peak, the $1 invested in the high portfolio would be worth almost 89 cents 
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more than the $1 invested in the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  However, 
around the sorting date, this all changes since the value of $1 in the high portfolio converges 
back towards the value of the $1 invested in the low portfolio, and around the 15th month 
after the sorting date these 2 portfolios would have almost the same value.  Past this date, 
the $1 invested in the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio is always greater than 
the $1 invested in the high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  Thus, these results 
indicate that financial institutions push prices away from fundamentals and then eventually 
they push them back towards fundamentals. 
Consistent with the results found using abnormal ownership for all institutions, 
similar results are found using abnormal ownership for all 4 subgroups with the strongest 
results found for mutual funds.  Figure 3.8 shows the how the value of $1 would change if 
it were invested in the low and high abnormal mutual fund ownership portfolio 37 months 
prior to formation.  From this figure, we see a similar pattern as was found using abnormal 
institutional ownership. 
3.2.3.4 Order Imbalance in Event Time 
Next, I investigate whether the trades of financial institutions create large order 
imbalances between buys and sells.  I define order imbalance as the net dollar change in 
ownership for each stock in the market.  Dollar change in ownership is estimated using the 
average price prevailing over the reporting period.  I calculate each stock’s institutional 
order imbalance for all institutions and for banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and 
other institutions.  Then for the low and high abnormal institutional ownership portfolios I 
calculate the average order imbalance for the 12 quarters surrounding the formation date.   
The cumulative order imbalance for all institutions and for each of the 4 institution types 
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is presented in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, respectively.  From Figure 3.9, we can see that there 
is a large imbalance in institutional trades.  Just prior to the allocation date, the cumulative 
average order imbalance reaches a level of almost -$300 million implying that in net the 
high portfolio has been bought more than the low portfolio.  This result is confirmed when 
I disaggregate the order imbalance of the low and high portfolios and compare their order 
imbalances separately.  From Figure 3.10, we can see that this large order imbalance is 
almost exclusively driven by mutual funds and other institutions and not by banks and 
insurance companies. 
I investigate whether the pattern found using abnormal institutional ownership is 
also found using abnormal mutual fund ownership. However, I find a much different result.  
Whereas before, I was finding that the collective trades of mutual funds and other 
institutions drove the large change in abnormal institutional ownership, now I find that the 
large change in abnormal mutual fund ownership is almost exclusively driven by mutual 
funds.  This result is shown in Figure 3.11.  From this figure we can see the order imbalance 
created by banks, insurance companies, and other institutions is close to 0.  However, there 
is an extremely large order imbalance created by mutual funds.  The cumulative order 
imbalance reaches almost -$184 million at the allocation date, and in unreported results, I 
find that this is driven by mutual funds heavily buying securities in the high abnormal 
mutual fund ownership portfolio.  Then following the allocation date, this order imbalance 
is reversed and I find that this is due to mutual funds selling the high portfolio and buying 
the low portfolio.  This result suggests that the abnormal institutional ownership effect and 




3.2.3.5 Book-to-Market Ratio 
So far, all of the results point towards financial institutions creating mispricing.  To 
further investigate whether the results are due to mispricing, I investigate how the average 
book-to-market ratio of the high and low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio 
evolves over the 36 surrounding the allocation date.  If prices are changing due to changes 
in fundamentals, then the book-to-market of the extreme portfolios should remain 
relatively constant.  However, if institutions are driving prices away from fundamentals 
then for the high abnormal institutional portfolio we should see a large decline in the 
average book-to-market ratio prior to the allocation date and a large increase in the average 
book-to-market ratio following the allocation date.  For the low abnormal institutional 
ownership portfolio, the opposite result should occur: There should be a large increase in 
the average book-to-market ratio prior to the allocation date and a large decline in the 
average book-to-market ratio following the allocation date.  In Figure 3.12, I plot the 
average book-to-market ratio for the high and low abnormal institutional ownership 
portfolios.  Consistent with the predictions for the high abnormal institutional portfolio, I 
find evidence that financial institutions are creating mispricing.  Initially, 36 months before 
the allocation date the high and low abnormal institutional ownership portfolios have 
similar book-to-market ratios.  However, this quickly changes as the book-to-market ratio 
of the high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio declines from an initial value of 0.73 
to a value of 0.52.  Then following formation, the book-to-market ratio of this portfolio 
more than doubles to a maximum value of 1.22, 32 months after formation.  Thus there is 
substantial evidence that financial institutions push the price of the high abnormal 
institutional ownership portfolio away from fundamentals.  For the low abnormal 
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institutional ownership portfolio, there is much less evidence that the trades of financial 
institutions push prices away from fundamentals.  Based on Figure 3.12, it looks like the 
book-to-market ratio of the low abnormal institutional ownership portfolio fluctuates 
without a clear upward or downward trend.  
3.2.3.6 Average Portfolio Returns and Fama French (1993) Alphas 
Next, I investigate how a strategy that purchased the low abnormal institutional 
ownership portfolio and sold the high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio would 
perform in the 1 year following the allocation date. After allocating each firm to an 
abnormal institutional ownership portfolio, following the methodology of Fama and 
French (2008), for each portfolio I calculate equally-weighted and value-weighted returns 
from July of year t until June of year t+1.  Independent of the abnormal institutional 
ownership portfolio assignment, I also assign firms to 1 of 3 size portfolios using 30th and 
70th percentile breakpoints.  I calculate returns for the abnormal institutional ownership 
portfolios within each size group as well.  Table 3.8 shows the average raw returns and the 
Fama and French (1993) alphas for each of the 10 abnormal institutional ownership 
portfolios and for size, abnormal institutional ownership portfolios.  low abnormal 
institutional ownership firms have a much higher average raw return than high abnormal 
institutional ownership firms.  The average equally-weighted raw return of the low 
portfolio is 2.80% while it is 0.05% for the high portfolio. Thus the low-high portfolio has 
a positive return close to 2.75%.  This result is strongly related to firm size.  For small firms 
the average low minus high equally-weighed return is 3.48%, for medium firms 1.70%, 
and for large firms 0.77%.  This result is again consistent with financial institutions pushing 
prices away from fundamentals and is consistent with Amihud’s suggestion that the returns 
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to small firms are more sensitive to large trades.  A similar result is found using value-
weighted returns. However, the overall strategy produces a much lower return since more 
weight is given to large firms, i.e., firms that are less sensitive to institutional demand.  
Turning to the Fama and French (1993) alphas, I find that the return to the low minus high 
strategy is not materially affected after controlling for the 3 Fama and French factors.  This 
suggests that these results are due to mispricing rather than risk.   
I previously documented that institutional ownership was much lower in the early 
part of the sample and that institutional ownership increased from 1980 until 2010.  Given 
this fact, one might wonder if the relation between abnormal institutional ownership and 
returns has strengthened over time.  Table 3.9 shows the average raw returns and Fama and 
French alphas for the full sample, 1980-2011, as well as for the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.  
From 1980 until the end of 1989, the low minus high abnormal institutional ownership 
strategy earned an average raw return of 1.87% per month, then from 1990 until the end of 
1999 this same strategy earned an average raw return of 3.55%, and finally from 2000 until 
the end of 2010 this strategy earned an average return of 2.89%.  Thus, the relation has 
indeed strengthened over time, but it has weakened slightly since its high point in the 
1990s.  A similar result is found using value-weighted portfolios although the average 
returns are lower in magnitude.  If we look at the Fama and French alphas, we can see a 
similar result of similar magnitude which suggests that this effect is likely due to 
mispricing. 
3.2.3.7 Abnormal Institutional Ownership and Illiquidity 
The prior results all seem to indicate that institutional demand pushes prices away 
from fundamentals.  If this is indeed the case, then we would expect that illiquid firms 
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would be more sensitive to institutional demand than liquid firms.  For each firm I calculate 
the average1-month Amihud Illiquidity (ILIQ) measure using daily data.  Independent of 
the abnormal institutional ownership portfolio allocation, I allocate firms to 1 of 3 
illiquidity portfolios: low illiquidity, medium illiquidity, and high illiquidity using 30th and 
70th percentile breakpoints.  I then calculate portfolio returns for each of the 30 illiquidity, 
abnormal institutional ownership portfolios and report the results in Table 3.10.   
Our suspicions are confirmed.  The portfolio with high illiquidity has a much larger 
return compared to the low illiquidity portfolio.  Using equally-weighted portfolios, the 
low illiquidity portfolio has an average raw return of 1.32% and an average Fama French 
alpha of 1.28% while the high illiquidity portfolio has an average raw return of 3.37% and 
an average Fama French alpha of 3.47%.  Thus, institutional demand has a greater effect 
on illiquid securities than liquid securities. 
3.2.3.8 Abnormal Ownership Strategy Returns by Institution Type 
Previously, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression results indicated that there 
was a stronger effect created using abnormal institutional ownership and abnormal mutual 
fund ownership.  In this section I investigate whether this result holds by repeating the prior 
portfolio analysis for portfolios constructed using abnormal bank, insurance, mutual fund, 
and other ownership.  Each June, I sort stocks on abnormal bank, insurance, mutual fund, 
and other ownership and then calculate portfolio returns over the following 12 months.  
The average returns and Fama and French (1993) alphas from each of these strategies are 
reported in Table 3.11.  The evidence indicates that the largest low-high portfolio return is 
earned using all financial institutions, but the strategy using abnormal mutual fund 
ownership earns an almost as large a return.  For strategies formed using abnormal bank, 
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insurance, mutual funds, and other ownership the average returns are, respectively, 1.39%, 
0.96%, 2.40%, and 1.51%.  Thus, the largest return is earned using abnormal mutual fund 
ownership and the smallest return is earned using insurance ownership.  Fairly similar 
returns are found after controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors.  These results 
are consistent with the results found from the Fama-MacBeth regressions.     
3.2.4 Abnormal Institutional Ownership and Other Institutional  
Demand Measures 
The prior results showed that there is a negative relation between institutional 
demand and returns.  The question remains, why do not I find the same result using other 
institutional demand measures.  First, I investigate how institutional ownership and 
abnormal institutional ownership changes in event time for a strategy that trades on the 
change in institutional ownership.  Previously, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) used to changes 
in institutional ownership to proxy for institutional ownership and found a positive relation 
between this variable and stock returns.  Each June I allocate firms to 1 of 10 change in 
institutional ownership portfolios using NYSE breakpoints.  Then, for each portfolio I 
calculate the cross-sectional mean institutional ownership for the 12 quarters surrounding 
the allocation date.  The time series of mean abnormal institutional ownership for the high 
and low change in institutional ownership portfolios are plotted in Figure 3.13.  For the 
high change in institutional ownership portfolio prior to the formation date, abnormal 
institutional ownership trends downward then there is a large increase in abnormal 
institutional ownership followed by a gradual decline in abnormal institutional ownership.  
I find a similar but opposite result for the low change in institutional ownership portfolio.  
Prior to the allocation date abnormal institutional ownership increases, then decreases 
sharply, and proceeds to increase slowly after the allocation date.  Unlike when I formed 
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portfolios using abnormal institutional ownership, here I find slower reversion in abnormal 
institutional ownership.   
Next, I investigate how the average institutional ownership changes relative to the 
allocation date for the change in institutional ownership portfolios.  The time series of mean 
institutional ownership for the high and low change in institutional ownership portfolios 
are plotted in Figure 3.14.  For the high change in institutional ownership portfolio, there 
is a gradual increase in institutional ownership prior to the allocation date, then right before 
the allocation date there is a large positive jump in institutional ownership, followed by 
relatively little change in institutional ownership.  Looking at the low change in 
institutional ownership portfolio’s time series, there is also a gradual increase in 
institutional ownership, followed by a large negative jump in institutional ownership, and 
then a gradual increase in institutional ownership after the allocation date.  These results 
seem to indicate that the reason that there is not a reversal found for portfolios formed on 
the change in institutional ownership is that these stocks do not experience as large a 
change in abnormal and raw institutional ownership as the stocks contained in the extreme 
abnormal institutional ownership portfolios.   
Perhaps the most commonly used measure of institutional demand is the 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding measure.  Each June, I allocate securities to 1 of 10 mutual 
fund herding portfolios: 5 buy herding portfolios and 5 sell herding portfolios.  I then 
calculate how abnormal institutional ownership changes around the 12 quarters 
surrounding the allocation date for the strongest buy and sell herd portfolios.  Figures 3.15 
and 3.16 plot the time series of abnormal institutional ownership and institutional 
ownership for the strongest buy and sell herd portfolios.  Looking at Figure 3.15, we can 
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see that for the sell herd, initially there is a gradual increase in abnormal institutional 
ownership, followed by a fairly large decline in abnormal institutional ownership at the 
allocation quarter, and then a somewhat gradual increase in abnormal ownership in the 
following 12 quarters.  For the strongest buy herd portfolio there is a gradual decline in 
abnormal institutional ownership, followed by an increase, and then a gradual decline.  
Compared to strategies sorted directly on abnormal institutional ownership, for the mutual 
fund herding strategy, the quarter-to-quarter change in abnormal institutional ownership is 
much more gradual.    
In Figure 3.16 we can see that for the buy herd portfolio, institutional ownership is 
fairly flat prior to the allocation quarter and then increases and continues on a gradual 
upward trend following the allocation quarter.  For the sell herd portfolio there is an 
increase in institutional ownership from 0.45 to 0.50 prior to the allocation quarter, then a 
decline in ownership between quarters -2 and +1, and then a gradual increase over the 
following 11 quarters.  Thus, it appears that this measure does not capture the same level 
of price pressure that is found using abnormal institutional ownership. 
Another proxy for institutional demand used in the literature is the Dasgupta et al. 
(2011) persistence measure.  Each June I form 5 persistence portfolios, 1 portfolio for each 
of the values of persistence (persistence only takes the integer values of -3, -2, 0, 2, 3).  I 
then calculate the cross-sectional average institutional ownership and abnormal 
institutional ownership.  Figure 3.17 plots the average abnormal institutional ownership for 
the low and high persistence portfolios.  From this figure, we can see that after the large 
change in abnormal institutional ownership prior to the allocation date, there is a gradual 
reversion in abnormal institutional ownership afterwards.  Whereas the extreme abnormal 
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institutional ownership portfolios had a swift reversion in abnormal institutional 
ownership, the extreme persistence portfolios have a much slower reversion in abnormal 
institutional ownership.   
The time series of mean institutional ownership for the low and high persistence 
portfolios is plotted in Figure 3.18.  For both extreme persistence portfolios there is only a 
small change in institutional ownership prior to the allocation date, then there is a large 
change in ownership around the allocation date, and then a gradual upward trend following 
the allocation date.   This suggests that perhaps the reason that Dasgupta et al. (2011) find 
continuation in the short term is that there is a continuation in institutional ownership in 
the short term for securities in these 2 portfolios. 
3.3 Conclusion 
 After controlling for trends in institutional ownership I find strong evidence that 
financial institutions push prices away from fundamentals.  First, when abnormal 
institutional ownership is extremely high or low, I find that it quickly reverts towards 0.  In 
conjunction with this finding, I also find that there is a reversal in returns and institutional 
trades.  A strategy that purchases low institutional ownership securities and sells high 
institutional ownership securities has large negative returns prior to formation and positive 
returns in the year following formation.    Theoretically, we would expect that institutional 
demand would have the largest effect on small firms and illiquid firms.  This is exactly 
what I find.  Within small firms, the low minus high abnormal institutional ownership 
strategy has an average raw return of 3.48% while within large firms, this same strategy 
averages 0.77%.  Similarly, within highly illiquid securities this strategy earns an average 
return of 3.37%, but within low illiquid securities this strategy only earns an average return 
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of 1.32%.  These large returns remain even after controlling for the Fama and French 
(1993) factors which suggests that these results are due to mispricing rather than risk.  
Based on all of these results it seems that policies that increase liquidity would mitigate 













Correlation between abnormal institutional ownership and other institutional ownership 
variables.  This table shows the correlations between abnormal institutional ownership and 
other institutional ownership variables.  Abnormal institutional ownership is calculated by 
de-trending institutional ownership for each security using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) 
filter with λ equal to 1600. Change in abnormal institutional ownership is the quarterly 
change in abnormal institutional ownership.  Change in institutional ownership is the 
quarterly change in institutional ownership.  Institutional ownership is the fraction of shares 
outstanding that are held by financial institutions.  Persistence is the Dasgupta et al. (2011) 
institutional persistence measure which counts the number of consecutive quarters over the 
prior 3 quarters that financial institutions have bought or sold a security.  Nagel (2005) 
residual institutional ownership is as defined in Nagel (2005).  Nagel calculates residual 
institutional ownership as the residual from the regression of logit institutional ownership 
on log firm size and squared log firm size.  Mutual fund herding is the Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) herding measure as used in Wermers (1999).  Mutual fund herding is defined as the 
buy herding measure if the stock is bought in net or as the sell herding measure if the stock 
is sold in net.  Residual institutional ownership is the residual from the regression of 
institutional ownership on a constant and a time trend term.  Change in residual institutional 
ownership is the 1 quarter change in residual institutional ownership.  All variables are 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Abnormal institutional ownership 1
(2) Change in abnormal institutional ownership 0.52 1
(3) Change in institutional ownership 0.50 0.98 1
(4) Change in residual institutional ownership 0.51 0.99 0.99 1
(5) Institutional ownership 0.35 0.18 0.18 0.17 1
(6) Mutual fund herding -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 1
(7) Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership 0.33 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.59 -0.10 1
(8) Persistence 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.07 0.03 0.08 1





Correlations between abnormal ownership variables.  This 
table presents the correlations between 5 abnormal ownership 
measures: Abnormal institutional ownership, bank ownership, 
insurance ownership, mutual fund ownership, and other 
ownership.  I classify the ownership of each institution in 
Thomson Reuters as a bank, insurance company, or nonbank 
and noninsurance company following the methodology of 
Lewellen (2011).  I then calculate other ownership as the total 
nonbank and noninsurance institutional ownership minus 
mutual fund ownership.  Mutual fund ownership is calculated 
from the Thomson Reuters mutual fund holdings database.  I 
then calculate abnormal ownership for each institution 
subgroup using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter with λ 
equal to 1600. 
 
   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Abnormal institutional ownership 1
(2) Abnormal bank ownership 0.43 1
(3) Abnormal insurance ownership 0.33 0.06 1
(4) Abnormal mutual fund ownership 0.49 0.13 0.12 1




Fama-MacBeth regressions of annual stock returns on abnormal institutional ownership 
and other institutional ownership variables.  The table reports Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
coefficient estimates from predictive regressions of annual returns on lagged abnormal 
institutional ownership and other institutional ownership variables.  Returns are the annual 
return from July of year t until June of year t+1.  Abnormal institutional ownership is 
calculated by detrending institutional ownership for each security using the Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 1600. Change in abnormal institutional ownership is 
the quarterly change in abnormal institutional ownership.  Change in institutional 
ownership is the quarterly change in institutional ownership.  Institutional ownership is the 
fraction of shares outstanding that are held by financial institutions.  Persistence is the 
Dasgupta et al. (2011) institutional persistence measure which counts the number of 
consecutive quarters over the prior 3 quarters that financial institutions have bought or sold 
a security.  Residual institutional is as defined in Nagel (2005).  Nagel calculates residual 
institutional ownership as the residual from the regression of logit institutional ownership 
on log firm size and squared log firm size. Mutual fund herding is the Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) herding measure calculated using mutual fund data. All variables are standardized 
by their cross-sectional mean and standard deviation. I exclude financials (SIC codes 6000-
6999), utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999), and stocks with price less than $5 or greater than 
$1,000.  I only use common shares with share codes equal to 10 or 11.   Reported t-statistics 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.1440 0.1441 0.1441 0.1441 0.1439 0.1348 0.1382 0.1331 0.1440
(4.47) (4.49) (4.49) (4.49) (4.46) (4.98) (4.47) (4.90) (4.46)
Abnormal institutional ownership -0.0958 . . . . . . . .
(-6.03) . . . . . . . .
Change in abnormal institutional ownership . -0.0154 . . . . . . .
. (-8.05) . . . . . . .
Change in institutional ownership . . 0.0017 . . . . . .
. . (0.63) . . . . . .
Change in residual trend ownership . . . -0.0052 . . . . .
. . . (-2.20) . . . . .
Institutional ownership . . . . 0.0052 . . . .
. . . . (0.66) . . . .
Mutual fund herding . . . . . -0.0033 . . .
. . . . . (-0.90) . . .
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . . . . . . 0.0169 . .
. . . . . . (3.10) . .
Persistence . . . . . . . -0.0028 .
. . . . . . . (-0.53) .
Residual institutional ownership . . . . . . . . -0.0897
. . . . . . . . (-7.23)
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0308 0.0010 0.0004 0.0005 0.0051 0.0014 0.0044 0.0022 0.0264
Panel A. All firms
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.1441 0.1538 0.1546 0.1543 0.1607 0.1428 0.1444 0.1430 0.1399
(3.99) (4.26) (4.27) (4.26) (4.49) (4.15) (4.18) (4.66) (3.89)
Abnormal institutional ownership -0.1511 . . . . . . . .
(-4.97) . . . . . . . .
Change in abnormal institutional ownership . -0.0260 . . . . . . .
. (-7.78) . . . . . . .
Change in institutional ownership . . 0.0043 . . . . . .
. . (1.08) . . . . . .
Change in residual trend ownership . . . -0.0092 . . . . .
. . . (-3.08) . . . . .
Institutional ownership . . . . 0.0150 . . . .
. . . . (1.53) . . . .
Mutual fund herding . . . . . -0.0064 . . .
. . . . . (-1.26) . . .
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . . . . . . 0.0270 . .
. . . . . . (3.94) . .
Persistence . . . . . . . 0.0008 .
. . . . . . . (0.15) .
Residual institutional ownership . . . . . . . . -0.1428
. . . . . . . . (-5.76)
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0468 0.0015 0.0003 0.0005 0.0048 -0.0024 0.0063 0.0013 0.0423
Panel B. Small firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.1417 0.1373 0.1366 0.1369 0.1325 0.1387 0.1350 0.1248 0.1430
(4.78) (4.57) (4.57) (4.58) (4.35) (4.23) (4.48) (4.86) (4.81)
Abnormal institutional ownership -0.0783 . . . . . . . .
(-5.41) . . . . . . . .
Change in abnormal institutional ownership . -0.0058 . . . . . . .
. (-1.81) . . . . . . .
Change in institutional ownership . . 0.0078 . . . . . .
. . (2.08) . . . . . .
Change in residual trend ownership . . . 0.0028 . . . . .
. . . (0.79) . . . . .
Institutional ownership . . . . 0.0167 . . . .
. . . . (2.30) . . . .
Mutual fund herding . . . . . -0.0041 . . .
. . . . . (-0.93) . . .
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . . . . . . 0.0145 . .
. . . . . . (2.15) . .
Persistence . . . . . . . -0.0010 .
. . . . . . . (-0.15) .
Residual institutional ownership . . . . . . . . -0.0696
. . . . . . . . (-6.47)
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0316 0.0014 0.0020 0.0016 0.0064 0.0018 0.0047 0.0041 0.0245
Panel C. Medium firms
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Table 3.3 continued 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.1413 0.1417 0.1417 0.1417 0.1343 0.1390 0.1394 0.1347 0.1418
(5.05) (5.14) (5.13) (5.13) (5.02) (4.97) (4.92) (4.86) (5.09)
Abnormal institutional ownership -0.0264 . . . . . . . .
(-2.61) . . . . . . . .
Change in abnormal institutional ownership . -0.0006 . . . . . . .
. (-0.15) . . . . . . .
Change in institutional ownership . . 0.0026 . . . . . .
. . (0.53) . . . . . .
Change in residual trend ownership . . . 0.0027 . . . . .
. . . (0.55) . . . . .
Institutional ownership . . . . 0.0053 . . . .
. . . . (1.03) . . . .
Mutual fund herding . . . . . -0.0020 . . .
. . . . . (-0.28) . . .
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . . . . . . 0.0065 . .
. . . . . . (0.87) . .
Persistence . . . . . . . -0.0038 .
. . . . . . . (-0.72) .
Residual institutional ownership . . . . . . . . -0.0078
. . . . . . . . (-1.16)
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0100 0.0025 0.0021 0.0029 0.0037 0.0029 0.0032 0.0053 0.0039




Correlations between abnormal institutional ownership and other variables.  This table presents 
correlations between abnormal institutional ownership and other variables.  Abnormal institutional 
ownership is calculated by de-trending institutional ownership for each security using the Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 1600. Change in abnormal institutional ownership is the 
quarterly change in abnormal institutional ownership.   Following Sloan (1996), I define accruals 
as: Accruals = (ΔCA – ΔCash) - (ΔCL – ΔSTD –ΔTP) – Dep, where ΔCA is the change in current 
assets, ΔCash is the change in cash and equivalents, ΔCL is the change in current liabilities, ΔSTD 
is the change in debt included in current liabilities, ΔTP is the change in income taxes payable, 
and Dep is the depreciation and amortization expense.  Asset growth is defined as the year over 
year change in total assets divided by lagged total assets.  This definition of asset growth was used 
in Cooper et al. (2008).  Book-to-market ratio is calculated as book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity and is constructed following the methodology used in Fama and French 
(2008).  Following Daniel and Titman (2006), I define composite share issuances as 
𝜄𝜄(𝑙𝑙 − 5, 𝑙𝑙) = log � 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−5
� − 𝑟𝑟(𝑙𝑙 − 5, 𝑙𝑙) ,                                        (17) 
where MEt  is the firm’s market equity today, MEt-5 is the firm’s market equity 5 years ago, and 
r(t-5,t) is this firm’s 5-year log return.  Firm size is defined as share price multiplied by common 
shares outstanding.  Gross profitability is defined as total revenue less cost of goods sold divided 
by total assets.  This definition was used in Novy-Marx (2012).  I follow the methodology of Ang, 
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) and calculate idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the 
residuals from a monthly regression of daily excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3- 
factor model.  Excess returns are calculated as the difference between firm returns and the risk-
free rate, the 1-month Treasury bill rate.   I use the definition of investments-to-assets given in 
Stambaugh et al. (2012).  They define investments to assets as the annual change in gross property, 
plant and equipment plus the annual change in inventories scaled by the lagged book value of 
assets.  I define momentum as the compound return between month’s t-12 and t-2.  A similar 
definition was used in Fama and French (2008).  Net stock issuances is defined as the log ratio of 
split adjusted shares to lagged split adjusted shares following Fama and French (2008).  I use the 
definition of Ohlson’s (1980) O-score that was used in Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011).  
Ohlson’s O-score measures the probability of bankruptcy and is calculated using a variety of 
accounting measures including: total assets, book value of debt, working capital, net income, etc. 
Persistence is the Dasgupta et al. (2011) institutional persistence measure which counts the number 
of consecutive quarters over the prior 3 quarters that financial institutions have bought or sold a 
security.  Residual institutional is as defined in Nagel (2005).  Nagel calculates residual 
institutional ownership as the residual from the regression of logit institutional ownership on log 
firm size and squared log firm size. Mutual fund herding is the Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding 
measure as in Wermers (1999).  Mutual fund herding is defined as the buy herding measure if the 
stock was bought in net or the sell herding measure if the stock was sold in net.   All variables are 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) Abnormal institutional ownership 1
(2) Accruals 0.04 1
(3) Asset growth 0.02 0.19 1
(4) Book-to-market ratio -0.05 -0.14 -0.08 1
(5) Daniel Titman (2006) composite 0.03 0.11 0.17 -0.13 1
(6) Firm size -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 1
(7) Gross profitability 0.00 0.04 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 0.01 1
(8) Idiosyncratic risk -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.19 -0.15 -0.04 1
(9) Investments to assets 0.01 -0.05 0.36 -0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.06 0.02 1
(10) Momentum 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.01 1
(11) Mutual fund herding -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.01 0.10 1
(12) Nagel residual institutional ownership 0.33 -0.03 -0.05 0.15 -0.05 0.00 0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 1
(13) Net stock issuances 0.02 0.09 0.20 -0.07 0.39 -0.03 -0.09 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.04 -0.05 1
(14) O-score -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.07 0.17 -0.15 -0.35 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.08 1
(15) Persistence 0.28 0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.10 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.03 1
(16) Return on assets 0.01 0.06 -0.25 -0.03 -0.14 0.03 0.21 -0.09 -0.17 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.09 -0.34 -0.02 1
(17) Return on equity 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.00 0.14 1











Fama-MacBeth regressions of annual stock returns on abnormal institutional ownership 
and other variables.  The table reports Fama-MacBeth (1973) coefficient estimates from 
predictive regressions of annual returns on lagged abnormal institutional ownership and 
other financial variables.  Returns are the annual return from July of year t until June of 
year t+1.  Abnormal institutional ownership is the residual institutional ownership 
remaining after removing the trend from institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott 
(1997) filter with λ equal to 1600.  Persistence is the Dasgupta et al. (2011) institutional 
trade persistence measure and residual institutional ownership is the Nagel (2005) residual 
institutional ownership measure.  All independent variables are standardized each quarter 
using their cross-sectional mean and standard deviation. I exclude financials (SIC codes 
6000-6999), utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999), and stocks with price less than $5 or greater 
than $1,000.  I only use common shares with share codes equal to 10 or 11.  Reported t-
statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors.  There are 3 different controls groups.  Control group 1 is Daniel and 
Titman (2006) composite issuances and return on assets, control group 2 is all of the 
variables in control group 1 plus gross profitability and share turnover, control group 3 is 
all of the variables in control group 2 plus accruals, asset growth, book-to-market ratio, 
firm size, idiosyncratic risk, investments to assets, momentum, net issuances, O-score, and 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1440 0.1348 0.1306 0.1322 0.1041
(4.47) (5.42) (4.99) (4.93) (3.13)
Abnormal institutional ownership -0.0958 -0.1140 -0.1000 -0.0975 -0.1020
(-6.03) (-5.82) (-5.61) (-5.60) (-4.86)
Mutual fund herding . -0.0043 -0.0059 -0.0057 -0.0076
. (-0.96) (-1.37) (-1.35) (-2.06)
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . 0.0622 0.0545 0.0502 0.0568
. (4.60) (3.87) (4.25) (4.05)
Persistence . 0.0286 0.0225 0.0216 0.0172
. (4.86) (5.22) (4.82) (4.14)
Controls group 1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls group 2 No No No Yes Yes
Controls group 3 No No No No Yes
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0308 0.0510 0.0622 0.0754 0.1014
Panel A. All firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1441 0.0983 0.0839 0.0836 0.4848
(3.99) (4.12) (3.03) (2.72) (1.99)
Abnormal institutional ownership -0.1511 -0.2034 -0.1965 -0.2029 -0.1737
(-4.97) (-4.83) (-4.75) (-5.09) (-2.91)
Mutual fund herding . -0.0037 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0004
. (-0.63) (0.28) (0.35) (-0.10)
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . 0.1357 0.1417 0.1274 0.1880
. (6.50) (4.61) (5.39) (3.08)
Persistence . 0.0632 0.0470 0.0506 0.0183
. (6.10) (5.80) (5.54) (0.73)
Controls group 1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls group 2 No No No Yes Yes
Controls group 3 No No No No Yes
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0468 0.0882 0.0835 0.0557 0.1244
Panel B. Small firms
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1417 0.1371 0.1323 0.1318 0.1051
(4.78) (4.94) (4.61) (4.50) (1.70)
Abnormal institutional ownership -0.0783 -0.1127 -0.0996 -0.0969 -0.0965
(-5.41) (-5.15) (-4.67) (-4.82) (-4.18)
Mutual fund herding . -0.0072 -0.0108 -0.0097 -0.0093
. (-1.33) (-1.98) (-1.80) (-1.48)
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . 0.0676 0.0563 0.0555 0.0568
. (4.13) (3.37) (3.50) (3.72)
Persistence . 0.0329 0.0273 0.0261 0.0206
. (4.63) (4.81) (4.41) (3.53)
Controls group 1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls group 2 No No No Yes Yes
Controls group 3 No No No No Yes
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0316 0.0576 0.0680 0.0832 0.1156
Panel C. Medium firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1413 0.1379 0.1341 0.1326 0.1213
(5.05) (4.84) (5.19) (4.54) (2.37)
Abnormal institutional ownership -0.0264 -0.0339 -0.0282 -0.0248 -0.0283
(-2.61) (-2.80) (-2.46) (-2.15) (-2.03)
Mutual fund herding . -0.0030 -0.0070 -0.0080 -0.0037
. (-0.51) (-1.43) (-1.97) (-1.09)
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . 0.0157 0.0172 0.0090 0.0187
. (1.81) (1.88) (1.09) (1.78)
Persistence . 0.0033 0.0035 0.0033 -0.0004
. (0.54) (0.70) (0.64) (-0.09)
Controls group 1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls group 2 No No No Yes Yes
Controls group 3 No No No No Yes
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0100 0.0212 0.0470 0.0800 0.1328




Fama-MacBeth regressions of annual stock returns on abnormal ownership and other 
variables by ownership subgroup.  The table reports Fama-MacBeth (1973) coefficient 
estimates from predictive regressions of annual returns on lagged abnormal ownership and 
other financial variables.  Each model is estimated using abnormal bank ownership, 
insurance, mutual fund, and other financial institutions ownership.  Returns are the annual 
return from July of year t until June of year t+1.  Abnormal ownership is the residual 
ownership remaining after removing the trend from ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott 
(1997) filter with λ equal to 1600.  Persistence is the Dasgupta et al. (2011) institutional 
trade persistence measure and residual institutional ownership is the Nagel (2005) residual 
institutional ownership measure.  All independent variables are standardized each quarter 
using their cross-sectional mean and standard deviation. I exclude financials (SIC codes 
6000-6999), utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999), and stocks with price less than $5 or greater 
than $1,000.  I only use common shares with share codes equal to 10 or 11.  Reported t-
statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors.  There are 3 different controls groups.  Control group 1 is Daniel and 
Titman (2006) composite issuances and return on assets, control group 2 is all of the 
variables in control group 1 plus gross profitability and share turnover, control group 3 is 
all of the variables in control group 2 plus accruals, asset growth, book-to-market ratio, 
firm size, idiosyncratic risk, investments to assets, momentum, net issuances, O-score, and 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1452 0.1309 0.1309 0.1329 0.1020
(4.48) (5.37) (5.04) (4.98) (3.05)
Abnormal bank ownership -0.0428 -0.0419 -0.0336 -0.0317 -0.0304
(-5.54) (-5.46) (-5.69) (-5.65) (-5.76)
Mutual fund herding . -0.0049 -0.0058 -0.0056 -0.0073
. (-1.29) (-1.60) (-1.57) (-2.26)
Nagel residual institutional ownership . 0.0158 0.0157 0.0121 0.0135
. (2.48) (1.98) (2.23) (2.05)
Persistence . 0.0022 0.0022 0.0017 -0.0003
. (0.44) (0.75) (0.61) (-0.15)
Controls group 1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls group 2 No No No Yes Yes
Controls group 3 No No No No Yes









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1514 0.1314 0.1316 0.1336 0.1010
(4.46) (5.35) (5.04) (5.01) (2.98)
Abnormal insurance ownership -0.0298 -0.0323 -0.0256 -0.0248 -0.0238
(-4.64) (-5.13) (-5.32) (-5.17) (-4.90)
Mutual fund herding . -0.0038 -0.0053 -0.0049 -0.0067
. (-1.04) (-1.47) (-1.37) (-2.08)
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . 0.0101 0.0100 0.0071 0.0083
. (1.85) (1.49) (1.54) (1.51)
Persistence . -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0020
. (-0.11) (-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.89)
Controls group 1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls group 2 No No No Yes Yes
Controls group 3 No No No No Yes
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0034 0.0112 0.0311 0.0457 0.0711
Panel B. Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1472 0.1346 0.1320 0.1337 0.1058
(4.45) (5.45) (5.03) (4.96) (3.15)
Abnormal insurance ownership -0.0835 -0.0728 -0.0574 -0.0563 -0.0548
(-5.20) (-4.36) (-4.01) (-4.16) (-4.04)
Mutual fund herding . -0.0068 -0.0078 -0.0076 -0.0094
. (-1.94) (-2.33) (-2.25) (-3.16)
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . 0.0233 0.0197 0.0166 0.0201
. (3.37) (2.56) (2.95) (2.99)
Persistence . 0.0074 0.0047 0.0044 0.0005
. (1.54) (1.47) (1.32) (0.24)
Controls group 1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls group 2 No No No Yes Yes
Controls group 3 No No No No Yes
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0243 0.0336 0.0452 0.0591 0.0835
Panel C. Mutual funds
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Table 3.6 continued 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1494 0.1311 0.1321 0.1339 0.0999
(4.45) (5.33) (5.12) (5.05) (3.04)
Abnormal other institutions ownership -0.0560 -0.0511 -0.0427 -0.0422 -0.0429
(-8.91) (-7.32) (-7.34) (-7.21) (-5.93)
Mutual fund herding . -0.0013 -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0041
. (-0.30) (-0.71) (-0.59) (-1.06)
Nagel (2005) residual institutional ownership . 0.0241 0.0199 0.0178 0.0197
. (2.79) (2.35) (2.58) (2.59)
Persistence . 0.0079 0.0068 0.0066 0.0042
. (1.51) (2.03) (2.03) (1.60)
Controls group 1 No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls group 2 No No No Yes Yes
Controls group 3 No No No No Yes
Average adjusted r-squared 0.0113 0.0192 0.0356 0.0506 0.0760




Abnormal institutional ownership deciles: descriptive statistics.  At the end of June of each 
year from 1980 to 2010 I allocate firms to 10 decile portfolios based on abnormal 
institutional ownership.  Abnormal institutional ownership is calculated by de-trending 
institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with λ equal to 1600.  The table 
reports the time series average of annual medians at the time of portfolio formation for 18 
financial variables.  Abnormal INST is defined as abnormal institutional ownership. INST 
is institutional ownership defined as the fraction of shares outstanding held by financial 
institutions. Mutual fund herding is the Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding measure 
calculated as in Wermers (1999).  NAGEL INST is residual institutional ownership after 
controlling for firm size as in Nagel (2005). Persistence is the institutional trade persistence 
measure from Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011).  Accruals is defined as in Sloan (1996).  
Asset growth is the annual growth in assets as defined in Cooper et al. (2008), BM is the 
book-to-market ratio as defined in Fama and French (1993).  DT Composite is the Daniel 
and Titman (2006) composite issuance measure.  Firm size is market capitalization in 
millions of dollars. Gross Profit is the gross profits-to-assets measure from Novy-Marx 
(2012). Idiosyncratic risk is defined as in Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009).  
Investments to asset is defined as in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) who define 
investments to assets as the annual change in gross property, plant and equipment plus the 
annual change in inventories scaled by the lagged book value of assets. Momentum is the 
lagged compound return from month’s t-12 to t-2.  NS is net stock issuances from Fama 
and French (2008).  Net stock issuances is defined as the log ratio of split adjusted shares 
to lag split adjusted shares. O-Score is the Ohlson (1980) measure. ROA is return on assets 
defined as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets.  This 
definition of return on assets was used in Fama and French (2006).  ROE is return on equity 
defined as in Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) who define Return on Equity as income 
before extraordinary items divided by book equity.  Share turnover is the log of share traded 




1(Low) -0.0890 0.3472 0.0527 -0.1121 -0.0667 -0.0123 0.1103 0.6340 0.0653 269.2746
2 -0.0436 0.3907 0.0279 0.0590 -0.0667 -0.0100 0.1023 0.6040 0.0086 328.8708
3 -0.0246 0.3978 0.0253 0.0924 -0.0667 -0.0151 0.0916 0.5942 -0.0258 311.0929
4 -0.0126 0.3758 0.0261 0.0351 -0.0667 -0.0147 0.0925 0.5746 -0.0468 348.4911
5 -0.0029 0.3443 0.0202 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0171 0.0897 0.5655 -0.0469 323.5517
6 0.0064 0.3823 0.0239 0.1123 0.0000 -0.0165 0.0919 0.5819 -0.0473 322.9651
7 0.0169 0.4295 0.0264 0.2778 0.0667 -0.0127 0.0967 0.5606 -0.0392 335.8681
8 0.0309 0.4722 0.0228 0.4532 0.2000 -0.0114 0.1024 0.5596 -0.0189 338.3390
9 0.0534 0.5210 0.0278 0.6064 0.9000 -0.0065 0.1221 0.5173 0.0136 332.1178
10 (High) 0.1064 0.6265 0.0363 1.1883 1.8833 0.0060 0.1685 0.4728 0.1067 340.0640
Spread (1-10) -0.1953 -0.2793 0.0164 -1.3004 -1.9500 -0.0183 -0.0582 0.1612 -0.0414 -70.7893
t(spread) -32.97 -19.69 4.62 -6.17 -13.49 -7.25 -7.25 6.30 -3.51 -3.01
Firm 
Size















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Abnormal institutional ownership portfolio returns.  At the end of June of year t stocks are 
allocated to 10 decile portfolios based on abnormal institutional ownership.  Abnormal 
institutional ownership is the residual ownership remaining after removing the trend from 
institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 1600.  Each 
portfolio is held from July of year t until June of year t+1.  Equally-weighted and value-
weighted returns are calculated each month.  At the time of formation, I exclude stocks 
with price less than $5 or greater than $1,000 and exclude financial firms and utilities (SIC 
codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999).  I only use common equity securities with share code 
equal to 10 or 11.  I report average monthly returns for all firms and for 3 size-sorted 
groups.  Small firms are defined as firms with market equity less than the 30th percentile, 
medium firms are defined as firms with market equity greater than or equal to the 30th 
percentile and less than or equal to the 70th percentile, and large firms are defined as firms 
with market equity greater than the 70th percentile.  Decile breakpoints are based on 
common shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Panel A.1 shows 
average raw returns for equally-weighted portfolios, Panel A.2 shows average raw returns 
for value-weighted portfolios, Panel B.1 shows Fama and French (1993) alphas for equally-
weighted portfolios, and Panel B.2 shows Fama and French (1993) alphas for value-
weighted portfolios.  The t-statistics are adjusted for auto-correlation using Newey West 


























Abnormal institutional ownership portfolio returns by subperiod.  At the end of June of year t 
stocks are allocated to 10 decile portfolios based on abnormal institutional ownership.  Abnormal 
institutional ownership is the residual ownership remaining after removing the trend from 
institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 1600.  Each 
portfolio is held from July of year t until June of year t+1.  Equally-weighted and value-weighted 
returns are calculated each month.  At the time of formation, I exclude stocks with price less than 
$5 or greater than $1,000 and exclude financial firms and utilities (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-
4999).  I only use common equity securities with share code equal to 10 or 11.  I report average 
monthly returns for all firms and for 3 size-sorted groups.  Decile breakpoints are based on 
common shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  Panels A.1 and A.2 show 
average raw returns by sub period for equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, 
respectively.  Panels B.1 and B.2 show Fama and French (1993) alphas by sub period for equally-
weighted and value-weighted portfolios, respectively.  The t-statistics are adjusted for auto-
























Abnormal institutional ownership portfolio returns by Amihud illiquidity.  At the end of 
June of year t stocks are allocated to 10 decile portfolios based on abnormal institutional 
ownership.  Independent of the abnormal institutional ownership portfolio allocation, 
stocks are also allocated to 3 illiquidity portfolios.  Illiquidity is defined as the 1-month 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure calculated for each firm.  Stocks are assigned to the low 
illiquidity portfolio if they have illiquidity less than the 30th percentile, to the medium 
illiquidity portfolio if they have illiquidity between the 30th and 70th percentile, and to the 
high illiquidity portfolio if they have illiquidity greater than the 70th percentile.  Illiquidity 
breakpoints are determined using all common shares traded on the NYSE that have a share 
price greater than $5 and less than $1,000 and that are not a financial or utility firm.  
Abnormal institutional ownership is the residual ownership remaining after removing the 
trend from institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 
1600.  Each portfolio is held from July of year t until June of year t+1.  Equally-weighted 
and value-weighted returns are calculated each month.  At the time of formation, I exclude 
stocks with price less than $5 or greater than $1,000 and exclude financial firms and utilities 
(SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999).  I only use common equity securities with share 
code equal to 10 or 11.  I report average monthly returns for all firms and for 3 illiquidity-
sorted groups.  Panel A.1 shows average raw returns for equally-weighted portfolios, Panel 
A.2 shows average raw returns for value-weighted portfolios, Panel B.1 shows Fama and 
French (1993) alphas for equally-weighted portfolios, and Panel B.2 shows Fama and 
French (1993) alphas for value-weighted portfolios.  The t-statistics are adjusted for auto-



























Abnormal ownership portfolio returns by institution subgroup.  At the end of June of year 
t stocks are allocated to 10 decile portfolios based on abnormal ownership calculated using 
all institution ownership, bank ownership, insurance ownership, mutual fund ownership, 
or other ownership.  Abnormal ownership breakpoints are determined using all common 
shares traded on the NYSE that have a share price greater than $5 and less than $1,000 and 
that are not a financial or utility firm.  Abnormal ownership is the residual ownership 
remaining after removing the trend from ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter 
with λ equal to 1600.  Each portfolio is held from July of year t until June of year t+1.  
Equally-weighted and value-weighted returns are calculated each month.  At the time of 
formation, I exclude stocks with price less than $5 or greater than $1,000 and exclude 
financial firms and utilities (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999).  I only use common 
equity securities with share code equal to 10 or 11.  I report average monthly returns for 
portfolios formed using abnormal institution ownership for all institutions and for the 4 
institution subgroups.  Panel A.1 shows average raw returns for equally-weighted 
portfolios, Panel A.2 shows average raw returns for value-weighted portfolios, Panel B.1 
shows Fama and French (1993) alphas for equally-weighted portfolios, and Panel B.2 
shows Fama and French (1993) alphas for value-weighted portfolios.  The t-statistics are 























Figure 3.1 Times series of equally-weighted institutional ownership. The figure plots the 
time series of institutional ownership, bank ownership, insurance ownership, mutual fund 
ownership, and other institutions ownership for all common equity securities traded on the 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX exchanges with share codes equal to 10 and 11.  Institutional 
ownership is defined as the fraction of securities held by all financial institutions while 
bank, insurance, mutual fund, and other institutions ownership is the fraction of securities 
held by that type of institution.  Institutions are classified using the methodology used in 
Lewellen (2011).  Mutual fund ownership is from the Thomson Reuters mutual fund 
holdings database.  All other ownership measures are calculated using data from the 
Thomson Reuters institutional holdings database.  Ownership variables are calculated for 























































































































Figure 3.2 Time Series of equally-weighted abnormal institutional ownership. The figure 
plots the time series of abnormal institutional ownership for all common equity securities 
traded in the U.S. (share codes equal to 10 and 11).  I calculate abnormal institutional 
ownership by de-trending institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter 
with λ equal to 1600.  Institutional ownership is defined as the fraction of shares 
outstanding held by financial institutions.  Abnormal institutional ownership for the whole 










































































































































Figure 3.3 Mean abnormal institutional ownership in event time. Each June from 1980 to 
2010, firms are sorted into 10 decile portfolios on abnormal institutional ownership.  
Abnormal institutional ownership is defined as the residual institutional ownership after 
removing the trend from institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter 
with λ equal to 1600.  The table plots the equally-weighted level of abnormal institutional 












































Figure 3.4. Mean difference in abnormal institutional ownership in event time.  Each June 
from 1980 to 2010, firms are sorted into 10 decile portfolios on abnormal institutional 
ownership.  Abnormal institutional ownership is defined as the residual institutional 
ownership after removing the trend from institutional ownership using the Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 1600.  The table plots the equally-weighted difference 
in abnormal institutional ownership for the low minus high abnormal institutional 







































Figure 3.5 Mean institutional ownership in event time. Each June from 1980 to 2010, firms 
are sorted into 10 decile portfolios on abnormal institutional ownership.  Abnormal 
institutional ownership is defined as the residual institutional ownership after removing the 
trend from institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 
1600.  The table plots the equally-weighted level of institutional ownership for the low and 
high abnormal institutional ownership portfolios for the 12 quarters around the formation 


































Figure 3.6 Cumulative return for abnormal ownership strategies in event time. Each June, 
firms are sorted on abnormal ownership and allocated to 1 of 10 decile portfolios using 
NYSE breakpoints.  At the time of formation, I exclude financials (SIC Codes 6000-6999), 
utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999), and stocks with share prices less than $5 or greater than 
$1,000.  This figure plots the cross-sectional cumulative average return of the low-high 
portfolio for strategies formed using abnormal bank ownership, abnormal institutional 
ownership, abnormal insurance ownership, abnormal mutual fund ownership, and 








































Figure 3.7 Value of $1 investment in abnormal institutional ownership portfolios in event 
time.  Each June, firms are sorted on abnormal institutional ownership and allocated to 
decile portfolios using NYSE breakpoints.  At the time of formation, I exclude financials 
(SIC Codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999), and stocks with share prices less 
than $5 or greater than $1,000.  This figure plots the value of a $1 investment in the low 
and high decile portfolios for the 36 months surrounding the formation of the low-high 

























































Figure 3.8 Value of $1 investment in abnormal mutual fund ownership portfolios in event 
time.  Each June, firms are sorted on abnormal institutional ownership and allocated to 
decile portfolios using NYSE breakpoints.  At the time of formation, I exclude financials 
(SIC Codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999), and stocks with share prices less 
than $5 or greater than $1,000.  This figure plots the value of a $1 investment in the low 
and high decile portfolios for the 36 months surrounding the formation of the low-high 

























































Figure 3.9 Cumulative dollar order imbalance in event time.  This figure plots the 
cumulative average dollar net order imbalance for the 12 quarters surrounding the 
formation of the low-high abnormal institutional ownership portfolio.  Each June, firms are 
sorted on abnormal institutional ownership and allocated to decile portfolios using NYSE 
breakpoints.  At the time of formation, I exclude financials (SIC Codes 6000-6999), 
utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999), and stocks with share prices less than $5 or greater than 
$1,000.  For each quarter, I calculate the net dollar change in shares held by financial 
institutions for the low and high abnormal institutional ownership portfolios.  Dollar 
change in shares held is defined as the average price over the quarter multiplied by the 
change in shares held.  Dollar Order imbalance is then defined as the difference in the net 


































Figure 3.10 Cumulative order imbalance by institution type in event time for abnormal 
institutional ownership strategy.  This figure plots the cumulative average net dollar order 
imbalance for the 12 quarters surrounding the formation of the low-high abnormal mutual 
fund ownership portfolio.  Each June, firms are sorted on abnormal mutual fund ownership 
and allocated to decile portfolios using NYSE breakpoints.  At the time of formation, I 
exclude financials (SIC Codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999), and stocks 
with share prices less than $5 or greater than $1,000.  For each quarter, I calculate the net 
dollar change in shares held by financial institution type for the low and high abnormal 
institutional ownership portfolios.  Order imbalance is then defined as the difference in the 


































Figure 3.11. Cumulative dollar order imbalance by institution type in event time for 
abnormal mutual fund ownership strategy.  This figure plots the cumulative average net 
dollar order imbalance for the 12 quarters surrounding the formation of the low-high 
abnormal mutual fund ownership portfolio.  Each June, firms are sorted on abnormal 
mutual fund ownership and allocated to decile portfolios using NYSE breakpoints.  At the 
time of formation, I exclude financials (SIC Codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC Codes 4900-
4999), and stocks with share prices less than $5 or greater than $1,000.  For each quarter, 
I calculate the net dollar change in shares held by financial institution type for the low and 
high abnormal mutual fund ownership portfolios.  Order imbalance is then defined as the 





































Figure 3.12. Mean book-to-market ratio in event time.  Each June from 1980 to 2010, firms 
are sorted into 10 decile portfolios on abnormal institutional ownership.  Abnormal 
institutional ownership is defined as the residual institutional ownership after removing the 
trend from institutional ownership using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with λ equal to 
1600.  The table plots the equally-weighted book-to-market ratio for the low and high 




















































Figure 3.13 Mean abnormal institutional ownership in event time for change in institutional 
ownership portfolios.  Each June from 1980 to 2010, firms are sorted into 10 decile 
portfolios on the quarterly change in institutional ownership.  The table plots the equally-
weighted level of abnormal institutional ownership for the 2 extreme decile portfolios for 
the 12 quarters around the formation date.  Abnormal institutional ownership is defined as 
the residual institutional ownership after removing the trend from institutional ownership 





































Figure 3.14 Mean institutional ownership in event time for change in institutional 
ownership portfolios.  Each June from 1980 to 2010, firms are sorted into 10 decile 
portfolios on the quarterly change in institutional ownership.  The table plots the equally-
weighted level of institutional ownership for the 2 extreme decile portfolios for the 12 




































Figure 3.15 Mean abnormal institutional ownership in event time for herding portfolios.  
Each June from 1980 to 2010, firms are sorted into 10 mutual fund herding portfolios 
following the methodology of Wermers (1999).  There are a total of 5 buy herd portfolios 
and 5 sell herd portfolios.  The table plots the equally-weighted level of abnormal 
institutional ownership for strongest buy and sell herd portfolios for the 12 quarters around 
the formation date.  Abnormal institutional ownership is defined as the residual institutional 
ownership after removing the trend from institutional ownership using the Hodrick-











































Figure 3.16 Mean institutional ownership in event time for herding portfolios.  Each June 
from 1980 to 2010, firms are sorted into 10 mutual fund herding portfolios following the 
methodology of Wermers (1999).  There are a total of 5 buy herd portfolios and 5 sell herd 
portfolios.  The table plots the equally-weighted level of institutional ownership for 



































Figure 3.17 Mean abnormal institutional ownership in event time for persistence portfolios.  
Each June from 1980 to 2010, firms are sorted into 5 portfolios on the quarterly Dasgupta 
et al. (2011) persistence measure.  The table plots the equally-weighted level of abnormal 
institutional ownership for low and high persistence portfolios for the 12 quarters around 
the formation date.  Abnormal institutional ownership is defined as the residual institutional 
ownership after removing the trend from institutional ownership using the Hodrick-












































Figure 3.18 Mean institutional ownership in event time for persistence portfolios.  Each 
June from 1980 to 2010, firms are sorted into 5 portfolios on the quarterly Dasgupta et al. 
(2011) persistence portfolios.  The table plots the equally-weighted level of institutional 
ownership for the low and high persistence portfolios for the 12 quarters around the 
































TRADING STRATEGIES CONSIDERED IN THIS PAPER 
A.1 Trading Strategies Description 
I consider a total of 86 trading strategies. These strategies are constructed using 
data from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and I/B/E/S.  Typically, I construct the accounting-
related strategies using annual data; however, where necessary I use quarterly data. 
A.1.1 Trading Strategies 1–2: Accruals 
I use 2 measures of accruals.  The first measure is defined as in Sloan (1996) and 
the second measure is defined as in Fama and French (2008).  Sloan (1996) finds that firms 
with low accruals have historically outperformed firms with high accruals. 
A.1.2 Trading Strategy 3: Age 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) study investor sentiment and firm age. They find that 
older firms outperform younger firms following years that ended with positive investor 
sentiment and younger firms outperform older firms following years that ended with 
negative investor sentiment.  Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), I define firm age as the 
number of years since a firm first appeared in the CRSP database.  I use the complete CRSP 





A.1.3 Trading Strategy 4: Analyst Coverage 
A body of literature investigates analyst coverage and financial markets.  James and 
Karceski (2006) investigate analyst recommendations and price targets and initial public 
offerings and find that poorly performing recent initial public offerings are given higher 
price targets and are more likely to receive strong buy recommendations.  Yu (2008) 
investigates analyst coverage and earnings management and finds that more heavily 
followed firms manage their earnings less.  Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) finds that 
momentum strategies are stronger for firms with low analyst coverage.  Other papers 
investigating analyst coverage include Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006); Cliff and 
Denis (2004); Irvine (2003); and McNichols and O’Brien (1997).  Based on this evidence 
it seems reasonable to form portfolios on analyst coverage.  I define analyst coverage as 
the number of analysts providing annual earnings forecast for a firm. I place all firms that 
do not have any analyst coverage in the lowest decile portfolio.  The remaining firms that 
have at least 1 analyst providing earnings estimates are placed in 1 of 9 portfolios.  These 
portfolios are formed by grouping firms based on 11.1 percentile breakpoints (100%/9 
portfolios). 
A.1.4 Trading Strategies 5–6: Asset Growth 
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) find that firms with low asset growth rates 
outperform firms with high asset growth rates.  This relation was further examined in Fama 
and French (2008).  In this study, I use 2 definitions for asset growth.  The first definition 
is the year over year change in total assets divided by lagged total assets as in Cooper, 




A.1.5 Trading Strategies 7–9: Book-to-Market 
Fama and French (1992, 1993) present evidence that book-to-market ratios are an 
important determinant of stock market returns.  In this study I use 3 different measures of 
book-to-market ratios.  The first measure follows the methodology of Fama and French 
(1993) and uses book equity for fiscal year t-1 divided by market equity at the end of 
December of year t-1 to form portfolios in year t.  The second measure of book-to-market 
equity uses book equity for fiscal year t-1 divided by market equity at time t.  Thus if I am 
forming portfolios in June of year y, then the value of market equity used to calculate book-
to-market ratios is market equity at the end of June of year y.  The third measure of book-
to-market follows the methodology of Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) and divides 
adjusted book equity for fiscal year t-1 by market equity.  Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang 
(2011) adjust book equity by adding 10% of the difference between market equity and book 
equity to the value of book equity. I exclude firms with negative book-equity.   
A.1.6 Trading Strategy 10: Campbell Distress Risk 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) present evidence that firms with low 
failure probability have historically outperformed firms with high failure probability.  In 
this paper, I calculate the Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) distress measure 
following the methodology outlined in their paper.  
A.1.7 Trading Strategies 11–12: Cash Flow-to-Market Equity 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) present evidence that high cash flow-to-
market equity firms earn a higher return than firms with low cash flow-to-market equity 
firms.  I use 2 definitions of cash flow-to-market equity. The first definition uses annual 
cash flow divided by June market equity.  The second definition uses annual cash flow 
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divided by market equity at the end of the formation month. 
A.1.8 Trading Strategies 13–14: Combination 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) present results for a strategy that buys equal 
amounts in the long legs of 11 different trading strategies and sells equal amounts in the 
short legs of the same 11 trading strategies.  The 11 different trading strategies in 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) are Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi’s (2008) distress 
probability, Ohlson’s (1980) O-Score, Daniel and Titman (2006) composite equity 
issuances, net stock issuances, accruals, net operating assets, momentum, gross 
profitability, asset growth, return on assets, and investment-to-assets.  I construct portfolio 
returns following this strategy as well as another strategy that combines equal amounts of 
the portfolio returns from trading on the 84 different trading strategies, excluding the 11 
variable combination strategy.  
A.1.9 Trading Strategy 15: Credit Rating 
Avramov et al. (2012) investigate credit risk and other financial anomalies.  They 
find that high credit rating firms (i.e., A+ rated firms) have a higher CAPM alpha than low 
credit rating firms (i.e., D rated firms).  I use the firm’s credit ratings from the 
COMPUSTAT database and construct portfolios following the methodology of Avramov 
et al. (2012).  Additionally, Avramov et al. (2007) and Avramov et al. (2009) provide 
evidence that the returns to momentum and forecast dispersion strategies are concentrated 





A.1.10 Trading Strategy 16: Daniel and Titman  
Composite Equity Issuances 
Daniel and Titman (2006) present a new trading strategy, composite equity 
issuances, that measures the amount of equity the firm issues (or retires) in exchange for 
cash or services.  They find that this variable forecasts returns.  They find a negative 
relation between firm returns and their composite share issuances measure.  I construct the 
composite share issuances measure using 5 years of data as in Daniel and Titman (2006).  
A.1.11 Trading Strategy 17: Dividends-to-Book Equity 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) use portfolios formed on dividends-to-book equity when 
investigating investor sentiment and stock market returns.  They find that firms with 
positive dividends outperform firms with dividends less than or equal to 0 following years 
that ended with positive investor sentiment, and find the opposite relation following years 
that ended with negative investor sentiment. I use their definition of dividends-to-book 
equity: dividends per share at the ex-date multiplied by COMPUSTAT shares outstanding 
divided by book equity.  I place all firms with dividends less than or equal to 0 in 1 portfolio 
and place all the dividend payers into decile portfolios. 
A.1.12 Trading Strategies 18 and 19: Dividends-to-Price 
Chung, Hung, and Yeh (2012) investigate the predictive power of investor 
sentiment for profitable trading strategies across different economic states, including a 
strategy that sorts firms on dividend yields.  They find that non-dividend payers have 
historically earned a higher return than the highest decile of dividend payers, and that 
lagged investor sentiment predicts the long-short portfolio returns to a strategy that sorts 
firms on dividend yield.  Dividend yield was also studied by Fama and French (1988), who 
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found that dividend yields forecasts stock market returns.  I use 2 different definitions of 
dividend yield.  The first definition, following Kenneth French’s website, gives dividend-
to-price as the total dividends paid from July of year t-1 to June of year t per dollar of 
equity in June of year t.  The second definition calculates dividend yield as total dividends 
paid over the prior 12 months, inclusive of the current month, divided by the current share 
price. I place all firms with dividends less than or equal to 0 in the lowest decile portfolio. 
A.1.13 Trading Strategy 20: Earnings-to-Book Equity 
In Baker and Wurgler (2006), they argue that unprofitable firms are harder to value 
than profitable firms and should therefore be more influenced by investor sentiment.  They 
find that following years ending with positive investor sentiment, profitable firms 
outperform unprofitable firms, and the opposite relation following years ending with 
negative investor sentiment.  Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), I define earnings as 
income before extraordinary items plus income statement deferred taxes minus preferred 
dividends, and I define book equity as shareholders’ equity plus balance sheet deferred 
taxes.  If earnings are negative, I set earnings-to-book equity equal to 0.  I place firms with 
earnings-to-book equity equal to 0 in 1 portfolio and all other firms with positive earnings-
to-book equity values in 10 decile portfolios. 
A.1.14 Trading Strategies 21–23: Earnings-to-Market Equity 
Basu (1977) and Basu (1983) find that firms with high earnings-to-price ratios earn 
a higher return than firms with low earnings-to-price ratios.  I use 3 definitions of earnings-
to-market equity.  The first definition uses earnings divided by June market equity. This 
variable is not updated for changes in firm size.  The second definition updates the ratio 
each month to reflect each firm’s current market capitalization. The third definition uses 
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earnings as defined in Baker and Wurgler (2006) and is calculated annually in June of each 
year. Baker and Wurgler (2006) define earnings as income before extraordinary items plus 
income statement deferred taxes minus preferred dividends. I place all firms with negative 
earnings in the lowest decile portfolio. 
A.1.15 Trading Strategies 24–25: External Finance 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) investigate investor sentiment and external finance-to-
assets.  They find that decile portfolios formed on external finance usually have higher 
returns following years in which investor sentiment was negative at year end than in years 
in which investor sentiment was positive at year end.  I use the definition of external finance 
given in Baker and Wurgler (2006): change in assets minus change in retained earnings all 
divided by total assets. I calculate this variable using 2 variations.  The first variation 
calculates external finance using 1-year changes in assets and retained earnings and the 
second variation calculates external finance using 5-year changes in assets and retained 
earnings. 
A.1.16 Trading Strategy 26: Firm Size 
Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1992, 1993) find that small capitalization stocks 
have outperformed large capitalization stocks.  I define firm size as share price multiplied 
by common shares outstanding (from CRSP).  Firm size is updated each month to reflect 
the most recent share price and shares outstanding. 
A.1.17 Trading Strategy 27: Forecast Dispersion 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) investigate analysts’ earnings forecast 
dispersion and stock returns.  They find that stocks with low forecast dispersion earn a 
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higher return than stocks with high forecast dispersion.  I calculate forecast dispersion as 
the standard deviation of analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts.  Earnings forecasts are 
adjusted to reflect the number of shares outstanding at the time of the forecast.  The forecast 
dispersion measure is calculated using only the most recent analysts’ forecasts prior to the 
earnings announcement date.   
A.1.18 Trading Strategy 28: Gross Profits 
Novy-Marx (2012b) studies firm profitability using gross profits-to-assets and the 
cross section of returns. He finds that more profitable firms outperform less profitable 
firms.  Novy-Marx (2012b) defines profitability as total revenue less cost of goods sold 
divided by total assets.  I use this definition (also used in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012)) 
as the measure of gross profits.  
A.1.19 Trading Strategies 29–30: Idiosyncratic Risk 
Ang et al. (2006, 2009) investigate idiosyncratic risk and stock returns.  They find 
that stocks with low idiosyncratic risk earn a higher return than stocks with high 
idiosyncratic risk.  I follow the methodology of Ang et al. (2009) and calculate 
idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the residuals from a monthly regression of 
daily excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.  Excess returns are 
calculated as the difference between firm returns and the risk-free rate (the 1-month 
Treasury bill rate).  I also estimate idiosyncratic risk using the standard deviation of the 





A.1.20 Trading Strategies 31–34: Illiquidity 
In Amihud (2002), the author proposes an illiquidity measure called ILLIQ.  This 
measure is calculated as the average daily ratio of absolute stock returns to dollar volume.  
Amihud (2002) finds that there is an illiquidity premium. Thus firms with high illiquidity 
are expected to earn a higher return than firms with low illiquidity.  Asparouhova, 
Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2010) find a positive and statistically significant relation 
between Amihud’s ILLIQ measure and NYSE and Amex returns.  Following the 
methodology given in Amihud (2002), for each firm I calculate the ILLIQ measure using 
a rolling window and 1, 3, 6, or 12 months of data.   
A.1.21 Trading Strategy 35: Intermediate Momentum 
While most papers investigate price momentum using lagged 12-month returns 
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)), Novy-Marx (2012a) argues that it is intermediate 
returns that predict future stock market returns. Novy-Marx (2012a) finds that the firms 
with high lagged 7- to 12-month returns outperform firms with low lagged 7- to 12-month 
returns.  I define the intermediate momentum variable as the lagged 7- to 12-month 
compound return, with time 0 equal to the investment month. 
A.1.22 Trading Strategies 36–40: Investments-to-Assets 
Firms with high past investment have historically underperformed firms with low 
past investment (Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Xing (2008)).  Titman, Wei, and Xie 
(2004) define investment-to-assets as the ratio between capital expenditures scaled by sales 
and the average capital expenditures over the prior 3 years.  Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) 
then subtract 1 from this ratio.  Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) also use portfolios formed 
on investments-to-assets, but they define investments-to-assets as the annual change in 
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gross property, plant and equipment plus the annual change in inventories scaled by the 
lagged book value of assets.  I calculate 5 measures of investments-to-assets following the 
definitions of Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012). 
A.1.23 Trading Strategies 41–43: Liquidity Beta 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) find that firms with high sensitivities to liquidity risk 
outperform firms with low sensitivities to liquidity risk.  Following Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003), I estimate liquidity betas by regressing excess returns on the aggregate liquidity 
factor and on the 3 Fama and French (1993) factors. Liquidity betas are estimated monthly 
using 12 months, 36 months, or 60 months of data.   
A.1.24 Trading Strategies 44–46: Long Term Reversal 
De Bondt and Thaler (1984) find that firms that had poor stock performance over 
the prior 3–5 years have better future performance than firms that had good stock 
performance over the prior 3–5 years.  I investigate 3 different measures of long run firm 
performance: 24-month lagged compound return, 36-month lagged compound return, and 
48-month lagged compound return.  
A.1.25 Trading Strategies 47–49: Market Beta 
Fama and French (1992) present evidence that firms with low market betas have 
historically outperformed firms with high market betas.  I estimate market betas by 
regressing firm returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate on the Fama and French 
(1993) market factor.  Market betas are estimated monthly using 12 months, 36 months, or 




A.1.26 Trading Strategies 50–51:  Momentum 
Firms with high returns over the past year have historically outperformed firms with 
low returns over the past year (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)) over the following 6 
to 12 months.  I calculate momentum using 2 different definitions.  The first definition, 
from Fama and French (2008), uses the compounded return between months t-12 and t-2.  
The second definition, following Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), uses the compound 
return between months t-7 and t-2 (relative to the investment month). One month is skipped 
between formation and investment to control for the negative autocorrelation in firm 
returns documented in Jegadeesh (1990) and Novy-Marx (2012a). The 2 momentum 
variables are only calculated when there are no missing returns between the first formation 
month and the last formation month. 
A.1.27 Trading Strategy 52: Net Operating Assets 
Firms with high net operating assets have historically underperformed firms with 
low net operating assets (Hirshleifer et al. (2004)).  I calculate net operating assets using 
the definition given in Hirshleifer et al. (2004): the difference between operating assets and 
operating liabilities scaled by lagged total assets. 
A.1.28 Trading Strategy 53: Net Stock Issuances 
Issuing firms have historically underperformed non-issuing firms (Ritter (1991), 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995)).  The 
relation between the returns of share issuers and non-issuers was further examined by size 
group in Fama and French (2008).  I use the definition of net stock issuances given in Fama 
and French (2008): the log ratio of split adjusted shares to lagged split adjusted shares.  
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A.1.29 Trading Strategy 54–57: Ohlson’s O-Score 
Ohlson (1980) develops a measure of the likelihood a firm will go bankrupt.  This 
measure is commonly referred to as Ohlson’s O-score and was used by Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002) to study the relation between book-to-market ratios and distress risk.   
Griffin and Lemmon calculate Ohlson’s O-score using the formula given in Ohlson’s 
original paper. However, unlike Ohlson (1980), they do not adjust total assets for inflation. 
Additionally, Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) form portfolios by sorting firms on 
their O-score. However, unlike in Ohlson (1980) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002), they 
calculate Ohlson’s O-score using a slightly different definition than given in those 2 papers. 
Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) calculate Ohlson’s O-score using pretax income as 
the value for Ohlson’s funds from operations variable, but it is not clear whether Ohlson 
calculated his O-score measure using this measure or using the Funds From Operations 
(FOPT) variable available on COMPUSTAT. 
In this paper I calculate the O-score using pretax income because FOPT only has 
limited data availability.  I calculate Ohlson’s O-score using 4 different definitions. The 
first definition calculates the O-score measure following Griffin and Lemmon (2002). I 
calculate another measure of Ohlson’s O-score following the definition given in Chen, 
Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011).  These 2 measures are calculated in June of year t and are 
used until May of year t+1.  Unlike the prior 2 definitions, the last 2 O-score measures are 
calculated monthly to reflect changes in market equity, following the definition used in 
Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011). They adjust total assets by 10% of the difference 
between market equity and book equity because of concerns that total assets might be too 
close to 0. However, sometimes market equity can be less than book equity. In this case 
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the adjusted total assets would be less than the unadjusted total assets.   I use one definition 
that adjusts total assets using 10% of the difference between market equity and book equity, 
and another definition that only makes an adjustment to total assets if market equity is 
greater than book equity.  Generally, our results are weakened by the inclusion of 4 
measures of Ohlson’s (1980) O-score since previously Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) 
showed that there is a relation between investor sentiment and the strategy that trades on 
O-score. 
A.1.30 Trading Strategy 58: PPE-to-Assets 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) study portfolios formed on the ratio of property, plant, 
and equipment-to-assets.  They find that firms with high PPE-to-assets have higher returns 
than firms with low PPE-to-assets following years ending with positive investor sentiment 
and the opposite relation following years ending with negative investor sentiment.  I 
calculate PPE-to-assets following Baker and Wurgler (2006), who define PPE-to-assets as 
total gross property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets.  Firms with PPE-to-assets 
values that are less than or equal to 0 are placed in 1 portfolio and all other firms with 
positive PPE-to-assets values are placed in 10 decile portfolios. 
A.1.31 Trading Strategy 59: Profit Margin 
Haugen and Baker (2008) find that profit margin is an important predictor of future 
returns.  Haugen and Baker (1996) find that firms with high expected returns have a larger 
profit margin than firms with low expected returns.  I define profit margin as earnings 





A.1.32 Trading Strategy 60: Profitability-to-Book 
Fama and French (2008) study firm profitability using profitability-to-book ratios.  
Fama and French (2008) investigate whether a profitability premium can be found in 
different size groups, defining profitability as equity income minus preferred dividends 
plus deferred taxes divided by book equity. I use this definition of firm profitability. 
A.1.33 Trading Strategy 61: R&D-to-Assets 
In Baker and Wurgler (2006), they find that firms generally have higher average 
returns after years that ended with negative investor sentiment than years that ended with 
positive investor sentiment.  Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), I define R&D-to-assets 
as research and development expense divided by total assets and set values of R&D-to-
assets prior to 1972 as missing.  Firms with R&D-to-assets values that are less than or equal 
to 0 are placed in 1 portfolio and all other firms with positive R&D-to-assets values are 
placed in 10 decile portfolios. 
A.1.34 Trading Strategies 62–64: Return on Assets 
Fama and French (2006) find that more profitable firms have higher expected 
returns, while Haugen and Baker (1996) find that firms with higher return on assets have a 
higher expected return. I use 3 different measures of return on assets. The first measure is 
calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets, the second 
measure is calculated as operating income after depreciation divided by lagged total assets, 
and the last measure is calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization divided by lagged total assets.  The first definition was used in Fama and 
French (2006).  The second definition is similar to the definition used in Stambaugh, Yu, 




A.1.35 Trading Strategies 65–66: Return on Equity 
Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) propose a 3-factor model that includes a 
return on equity factor.  Additionally, they find that a strategy that invests in high ROE 
firms and sells low ROE firms earns a positive return and has a positive alpha after 
regressing excess ROE returns on the 3 Fama and French (1993) factors. In Haugen and 
Baker (1996) the authors find that firms with higher return on equity have higher expected 
returns and in Haugen and Baker (2008) the authors find that return on equity is an 
important predictor of stock market returns. I use 2 measures of return on equity. The first 
definition of return on equity is calculated using earnings per share (Basic) excluding 
extraordinary items (EPSPX). The second definition is given in Chen, Novy-Marx, and 
Zhang (2011), except I use annual values for income before extraordinary items and book 
equity.   
A.1.36 Trading Strategies 67–74: Return Variance 
Haugen and Baker (1996) find that firms with high expected returns have lower 
volatility than firms with low expected returns, while Haugen and Baker (2008) find that 
the 24-month return variance is an important predictor of future returns.  Following Haugen 
and Baker (1996, 2008), I calculate the total return variance for each stock as the squared 
log two-year return.  This variance calculation is calculated using compounded monthly 
returns.  I also calculate 7 other return variances measures calculated as the mean of squared 
daily returns over the prior 3, 6, 12, 24, 36, 48, or 60 months (inclusive of the current 
month).  A similar type of definition of return variance was used in Campbell, Hilscher, 
and Szilagyi (2008) and Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011).  More recently, Baker and 
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Wurgler (2006) propose that stocks with high return variance are harder to value and harder 
to arbitrage than stocks with lower return variance.  They find that when sentiment is high, 
high return variance stocks earn lower returns and when sentiment is low, they earn higher 
returns.  
A.1.37 Trading Strategies 75–77: Sales Growth 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) find that firms with low sales growth 
outperform firms with high sales growth.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) use sales growth as a 
proxy for whether a firm is hard-to-value.  After sorting firms on past sales growth, they 
find that returns are generally higher in years that end with negative investor sentiment 
than in years that end with positive investor sentiment.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) define 
sales growth as the 1-year change in net sales divided by prior-year net sales, while 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) calculate annual sales growth rates for each firm 
and then rank firms by sales growth for years t-1, t-2, …, t-5.  They then calculate a 
weighted average rank measure that gives a weight of 5 to the most recent year, a weight 
of 4 to the prior year, and so on.  After calculating the weighted average sales rank for each 
firm, they form decile portfolios on this variable.  I use 3 measures of sales growth.  The 
first measure uses the weighted sales growth rank measure and portfolio formation 
methodology of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994). The other 2 measures use the 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) definition of sales growth and are calculated as either the 1-year 
growth in sales or the 5-year growth in sales. 
A.1.38 Trading Strategies 78-79: Sales-to-Market-Equity 
I use 2 definitions of sales-to-market equity.  Both definitions calculate sales-to-
market equity as total revenues divided by market equity (firm size).  The first definition 
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is calculated using June market equity and the resulting value of sales-to-market equity is 
used from June of year t until May of year t+1.  The second definition of sales-to-market 
equity is calculated monthly using the end of the month market equity.  Haugen and Baker 
(1996) find that firms with high expected returns have a slightly higher sales-to-price ratio 
than firms with low expected returns, while Haugen and Baker (2008) also find a positive 
relation between sales-to-price and expected returns.   
A.1.39 Trading Strategy 80: Share Turnover 
A number of papers have found a statistically significant relation between firm 
returns and share turnover (Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001), Fu (2009), 
and Avramov, Chordia, Goyal (2006)).  Additional evidence provided in Avramov, 
Chordia, and Goyal (2006) shows that for three-way sorted portfolios on prior return, 
illiquidity and turnover, there is generally a positive return difference between high 
turnover firms and low turnover firms.  I define share turnover as the log of monthly share 
volume divided by number of shares outstanding. This definition of share turnover is 
similar to the definition used in Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001). 
A.1.40 Trading Strategies 81–82: Short Run Momentum 
Haugen and Baker (1996) find a positive relation between 3-month returns and 
expected returns.  I use 2 definitions of 3-month returns.  The first definition is the 3-month 
compound firm return inclusive of the formation month.  The second definition lags each 
3-month compound return by 1 month.  This is done to control for the reversal documented 




A.1.41 Trading Strategy 83: Short-term Reversal 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) find reversal in short-term returns: Firms 
that performed poorly over the past week or month perform better in the following week 
or month.  I measure short-term reversal as the 1-month return at the time of portfolio 
formation. 
A.1.42 Trading Strategy 84: Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
It has been well documented in the accounting literature that firms with positive 
earnings announcements outperform firms with negative earnings announcements (Ball 
and Brown (1968) and Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), among others).  This 
phenomenon has been termed post-earnings-announcement drift. Typically, the relation 
between earnings and stock market returns is measured using standardized unexpected 
earnings (SUE).  This measure is used in Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006).  Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) investigate price momentum and 
SUE.  They define SUE as the difference between current earnings and earnings 4 quarters 
ago, divided by the standard deviation of this difference over the prior 8 quarters.  I 
construct the SUE variable using this definition.  The value of SUE is used for months’ t 
to t+2 where t is the earnings announcement month. 
A.1.43 Trading Strategies 85–86: Unexpected Earnings 
Some scholars research post-earnings-announcement drift using analysts’ 
forecasted earnings and actual earnings provided by I/B/E/S (Doyle, Lundholm, and 
Soliman (2006) and Livnat and Mendenhall (2006).  I calculate unexpected earnings using 
2 different definitions using data from I/B/E/S.  The first definition of unexpected earnings 
is calculated as the difference between actual earnings reported in I/B/E/S and the median 
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analysts’ forecasted quarterly earnings, divided by the share price at the end of the month 
prior to the earnings announcement.  The second definition of unexpected earnings is 
calculated with the same numerator as in the first definition. However, the denominator is 
the share price at the end of the month prior to portfolio formation. The value of unexpected 




Table A.1 List of the 86 different trading strategies considered in this paper.
 
  
Variable Number Variable Name Variable Short Name
1 Campbell Distress (from Campbell et al. (2008)) Campbell Distress
2 O-Score (Chen Novy-Marx Zhang (2011) Definition using Pre-tax income) O-Score (1)
3 Net Stock Issues Net Stock Issues
4 Daniel Titman (2006) Composite Daniel Titman Composite
5 Accruals (Sloan (1996) Definition) Accruals (1)
6 Net Operating Assets Net Operating Assets
7 Momentum ( Compound (t-12,t-2) Return) Momentum (1)
8 Gross Profitability (from Novy-Marx (2012b)) Gross Profitability
9 Asset Growth (Cooper et al (2008) definition) Asset Growth (1)
10 Return on Assets (Calculated using Income Before Extraordinary Items) Return on Assets  (1)
11 Investments to Assets (Stambaugh et al (2012) definition) Investments to Assets (1)
12 Combination Strategy (Equally-weight strategies 1-11) Combination Strategy (1)
13 Market Beta (60 month rolling window regression) Market Beta (1)
14 Firm Size Firm Size
15 Book-to-market (Fama French definition) Book-to-market (1)
16 Liquidity Beta (60 month rolling window regression) Liquidity Beta (1)
17 Accruals to Book (from Fama and French (2008)) Accruals (2)
18 Age (Baker and Wurgler (2006) definition in years) Age
19 Analyst Coverage Analyst Coverage
20 Asset Growth (Fama and French (2008) definition) Asset Growth (2)
21 Book-to-market (Calculated annually using June Market equity) Book-to-market (2)
22 Book-to-market (updated monthly) Book-to-market (3)
23 Cash flow-to-market equity (calculated in June using June market equity) Cash flow-to-market equity (1)
24 Cash flow-to-market equity (updated monthly) Cash flow-to-market equity (2)
25 Credit Rating Credit Rating
26 Dividends-to-book equity (Baker Wurgler (2006) definition) Dividends-to-book equity
27 Dividends-to-price (Using Kenneth French online definition) Dividends-to-price (1)
28 Dividends-to-price (updated monthly) Dividends-to-price (2)
29 Positive earnings-to-book equity (Baker Wurgler (2006) definition) Earnings-to-book equity
30 Earnings-to-market equity (Calculated annually in June) Earnings-to-market equity (1)
31 Earnings-to-market equity (updated monthly using annual earnings) Earnings-to-market equity (2)
33 External Finance (1 year change using Baker Wurgler (2006) definition) External Finance (1)
34 External Finance (5 year change using Baker Wurgler (2006) definition) External Finance (2)
35 Forecast Dispersion (Standard deviation of analysts' forecasts) Forecast Dispersion
36 Idiosyncratic Risk (Ang et al. (2009) definition) Idiosyncratic Risk (1)
38 Illiquidity (Amihud (2002) definition calculated using 1 month of daily data) Illiquidity (1)
39 Illiquidity (Amihud (2002) definition calculated using 3 month of daily data) Illiquidity (2)
40 Illiquidity (Amihud (2002) definition calculated using 6 month of daily data) Illiquidity (3)
32
Earnings-to-market equity (calculated annually using Baker Wurgler (2006) 
earnings definition) Earnings-to-market equity (3)
37
Idiosyncratic Risk (Ang et al. (2009) definition calculated using residual from 
Carhart (1997) 4-factor model) Idiosyncratic Risk (2)
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Table A.1 continued 
 
  
Variable Number Variable Name Variable Short Name
41 Illiquidity (Amihud (2002) definition calculated using 12 month of daily data) Illiquidity (4)
42 Intermediate Momentum (Lagged 6 month return used in Novy-Marx (2012a) Intermediate Momentum
47 Liquidity Beta (12 month rolling window regression) Liquidity Beta (2)
48 Liquidity Beta (36 month rolling window regression) Liquidity Beta (3)
49 Long-term Reversal (24 month compound return) Long-term Reversal (1)
50 Long-term Reversal (36 month compound return) Long-term Reversal (2)
51 Long-term Reversal (48 month compound return) Long-term Reversal (3)
52 Market Beta (12 month rolling window regression) Market Beta (2)
53 Market Beta (36 month rolling window regression) Market Beta (3)
54 Momentum (Lag (t-6, t-1) return) Momentum (2)
57 O-Score (Griffin and Lemmon (2002) definition using pre-tax income) O-Score (8)
58 Profitability-to-book (Fama and French (2008) definition) Profitability-to-book
59 Profit Margin Profit Margin
60 PPE-to-Assets (Baker and Wurgler (2006) definition) PPE-to-Assets
61 R & D-to-Assets (Baker and Wurgler (2006) definition R&D-to-Assets
62 Return on Assets (Calculated using EBITDA) Return on Assets  (2)
63 Return on Assets (Calculated using Operating income after depreciation) Return on Assets  (3)
64 Return on Equity (Chen et al (2011) definition) Return on Equity (1)
66 Return Variance (3 month average of daily squared returns) Return Variance (1)
67 Return Variance (6 month average of daily squared returns) Return Variance (2)
68 Return Variance (12 month average of daily squared returns) Return Variance (3)
69 Return Variance (24 month average of daily squared returns) Return Variance (4)
70 Return Variance (36 month average of daily squared returns) Return Variance (5)
71 Return Variance (48 month average of daily squared returns) Return Variance (6)
65 Return on Equity (calculated using Earnings per share (Basic) excluding 
extraordinary items) Return on Equity (2)
55 O-Score (Chen Novy-Marx Zhang Definition using pre-tax income calculated 
monthly using adjusted variables) O-Score (5)
56 O-Score (Chen Novy-Marx Zhang Definition using pre-tax income, calculated 
monthly, do not adjust if book equity is less than market equity) O-Score (6)
45 Investments to Assets (Titman et al. (2004) definition using COMPUSTAT 
CAPEX) Investments to Assets (4)
46 Investments to Assets (Titman et al. (2004) definition using CAPEX 
calculated as Difference between annual change in total assets and annual 
change in total liabilities) Investments to Assets (5)
43 Investments to Assets (Avramov et al. (2012) definition and COMPUSTAT 
CAPEX) Investments to Assets (2)
44 Investments to Assets (Avramov et al. (2012) definition using CAPEX 
calculated as Difference between changes in total assets and total 
liabilities) Investments to Assets (3)
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Table A.1 continued 
 
 
Variable Number Variable Name Variable Short Name
72 Return Variance (60 month average of daily squared returns) Return Variance (7)
73 Return Variance ( 24 Month compound return squared) Return Variance (8)
74 Sales Growth (1 Year sales growth using Baker and Wurgler (2006) definition))Sales Growth (1)
75 Sales Growth (5 Year sales growth using Baker and Wurgler (2006) definition))Sales Growth (2)
76 Sales Growth (5 Year Average rank from Lakonishok et al. (1994)) Sales Growth (3)
77 Sales to market equity (calculated using June market equity) Sales-to-market equity (1)
78 Sales to market equity (updated monthly) Sales-to-market equity (2)
79 Share Turnover (Natural log of monthly share turnover) Share Turnover
80 Short-run Momentum (Compound 3 month return) Short-run momentum (1)
81 Short-run Momentum (Lagged compound 3 month return) Short-run momentum (2)
82 Short-term Reversal Short-term Reversal
86 Combination Strategy (Equally-weight strategies 1-11 and 13-89) Combination Strategy (2)
84 Unexpected Earnings ( Livnat and Mendhall (2006) definition; calculated at 
end of earnings announcement month using  prior month's firm market 
equity in the denominator) Unexpected Earnings (1)
85 Unexpected Earnings ( Livnat and Mendhall (2006) definition; updated 
monthly using prior months market equity in the denominator) Unexpected Earnings (2)







DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES CONSIDERED  
AND VALUATION MEASURES USED 
B.1 Hard-to-Short Variable Descriptions 
I consider a total of 33 different proxies for short sale constraints.  These financial 
variables cover share price, firm size, liquidity, profitability, analyst coverage and forecast 
dispersion, volatility, idiosyncratic risk, short interest, transaction costs, and relative 
valuation. Below I list a detailed description of why each measure was chosen and how I 
define each measure. 
B.1.1 Hard-to-Short Measure 1: Analyst Coverage 
Diether and Werner (2011) find a negative relation between analyst coverage and 
loan fees.  I define analyst coverage as the number of annual earnings forecasts provided 
by analysts from I/B/E/S. I only use each analyst’s most recent forecast when constructing 
this measure. 
B.1.2 Hard-to-Short Measure 2: Annual Mean Days to Cover 
I calculate annual mean days to cover as the average of all observations over the 
prior year of the days to cover ratio that was calculated using the monthly average daily 





B.1.3 Hard-to-Short Measure 3: Annual Mean Dollar Short Interest 
Annual mean dollar short interest is the average over the most recent year of all 
dollar short interest observations. 
B.1.4 Hard-to-Short Measure 4: Annual Mean Short Interest 
Similar to the short interest definition, I calculate annual mean short interest as the 
average value of all short interest observations for each firm over the prior year.   
B.1.5 Hard-to-Short Measure 5: Book-to-Market Ratio 
Diether and Werner (2011) find a negative relation between book-to-market ratios 
and short sale loan fees.  Consistent with this result, D’Avolio (2002) finds that glamour 
stocks have higher loan fees than value stocks.  I define book-to-market ratio as book equity 
divided by market equity using the definition used in Fama and French (1993). 
B.1.6 Hard-to-Short Measure 6: Cash Flow to Assets 
D’Avolio (2002) found that stocks with low cash flows have higher loan fees than 
stocks with high cash flows.  Following D’Avolio (2002) I define cash flows as operating 
income after depreciation less accruals scaled by average total assets.  I calculate average 
total assets as the average of beginning of the year and end of the year total assets.  A 
similar definition was used in Sloan (1996).   
B.1.7 Hard-to-Short Measure 7: Cash Flow to Book Equity 
D’Avolio (2002) found that stocks with low cash flows have higher loan fees than 
stocks with high cash flows.  Following D’Avolio (2002) I define cash flows as operating 
income after depreciation less accruals scaled by average book equity. I calculate average 
book equity as the average of beginning of the year and end of the year book equity, with 
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book equity calculated using the Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) definition.   
B.1.8 Hard-to-Short Measures 8–10: Corwin Schultz (2012)  
Bid-Ask Spread Measure 
If illiquid firms are hard-to-short, then we would expect that firms with high 
transaction costs are hard-to-short.  In this paper I use the Corwin Schultz (2012) bid-ask 
spread estimate as our measure of transaction costs.  Corwin and Schultz (2012) find that 
their measure is highly correlated with effective spreads and generally performs as well as, 
if not better than, other transaction cost measures.  I estimate the Corwin Schultz (2012) 
daily bid-ask spread measure using the SAS program that is kindly provided by Professor 
Corwin on his website.  In this paper, I use 2 different bid-ask spread measures. The first 
measure is the monthly average of the Corwin Schultz (2012) daily bid-ask spread 
estimates and the second and third measures are the annual average of the Corwin Schultz 
(2012) daily bid-ask spread estimates. The first and third measures set negative bid-ask 
spread estimates to 0 prior to calculating the monthly or annual average bid-ask spreads.    
B.1.9 Hard-to-Short Measure 11 and 12: Days to Cover 
The days to cover ratio was previously used in Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan 
(2010).  They say that the days-to-cover ratio measures how long it will take for investors 
to cover their short positions in a security. In their paper, they present evidence that the 
median days to cover ratio and the aggregate amount of shorted shares are positively related 
and these measures have increased from 1988 to 2005 (Figure 1, page 83). I calculate 2 
different days to cover variables.  The first measure is defined as the number of shares sold 
short divided by the average daily volume over the current month and the second measure 
is defined as the number of shares sold short divided by the average daily volume over the 
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prior year (inclusive of the current month).  I expect that stocks with high days to cover 
ratios are harder-to-short than stocks with low days to cover ratios. 
B.1.10 Hard-to-Short Measure 13: Dollar Short Interest 
D’Avolio (2002) provides evidence that firms with high short interest have higher 
short sale loan fees.  In a similar fashion to D’Avolio (2002), I calculate dollar short interest 
as number of shares sold short multiplied by end of month share price.  I use the most 
recent short interest value in our analysis. 
B.1.11 Hard-to-Short Measure 14: Firm Size 
Previous literature has generally found that stocks with high loan fees are usually 
small market capitalization firms (D’Avolio (2002) and Diether and Werner (2011)). Firm 
size is calculated as common shares outstanding multiplied by share price.   
B.1.12 Hard-to-Short Measure 15: Forecast Dispersion 
D’Avolio (2002) found that stocks with higher forecast dispersion have higher loan 
fees than stocks with low analyst coverage.  For the most part, a similar result was found 
in Diether and Werner (2011).  I calculate forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of 
analysts’ annual earnings forecasts.  Earnings forecasts are adjusted to reflect the number 
of shares outstanding at the time of the forecast.  Our forecast dispersion measure is 
calculated using only the most recent analysts’ forecasts prior to the earnings 
announcement date.  
B.1.13 Hard-to-Short Measure 16: Idiosyncratic Risk  
The existing literature has argued that stocks with high idiosyncratic risk are harder 
to arbitrage because this risk cannot be offset by holding other securities (Pontiff (1996) 
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and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002).  Additionally, idiosyncratic risk has been used as a 
measure of costly arbitrage (see for example Mashruwala et al. (2006), Kumar Lee (2006, 
and Lam and Wei (2011)).  I follow the methodology of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 
(2009) and calculate idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the residuals from a 
monthly regression of daily excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model.  
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between firm returns and the risk-free rate, 
the 1-month Treasury bill rate.  I also estimate idiosyncratic risk using the standard 
deviation of the residuals from a monthly regression of daily excess returns on the Carhart 
(1997) 4 factors. 
B.1.14 Hard-to-Short Measures 17 and 18: Illiquidity  
D’Avolio (2002) provides evidence that illiquid firms are hard-to-short.  Our 
measure of illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure.  I use 2 measures of Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity measure.  The first measure is calculated using 1 month of daily data and the 
second measure is calculated using 12 months of daily data.  
B.1.15 Hard-to-Short Measure 19: Institutional Ownership 
D’Avolio (2002) provides evidence that firms with low institutional ownership are 
harder to short than firms with high institutional ownership.  I define institutional 
ownership as the percentage of common shares outstanding held by financial institutions 
(as reported in 13F filings). 
B.1.16 Hard-to-Short Measure 20: Liquidity Beta 
Kumar and Lee (2006) suggest that stocks with high liquidity betas could be harder 
to arbitrage.  Additionally, D’Avolio (2002) finds that less liquid stocks have higher short 
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sale loan fees.  Thus, it seems that stocks with high liquidity betas are harder-to-short.  I 
calculate liquidity betas following the methodology given in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
using 60 months of data.  To be consistent with the trading strategies, I define hard-to-short 
stocks as those with low liquidity beta estimates. 
B.1.17 Hard-to-Short Measure 21: Momentum 
D’Avolio (2002) finds that stocks that have performed poorly in the past have 
slightly higher short sale loan fees than other stocks.  Similarly, Diether and Werner (2011) 
find that there is a negative relation between lagged (12, 2) returns and loan fees. I define 
momentum as each firm’s return over months t-11 to t-1 relative to the formation month. 
B.1.18 Hard-to-Short Measure 22: Return on Assets 
Based on the evidence in D’Avolio (2002), firms with low profitability should be 
harder to short than firms with high profitability.  As an alternative to the cash flow 
measures, I use return on assets as an additional proxy for short sale loan fees.  I calculate 
return on assets as income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets. 
B.1.19 Hard-to-Short Measure 23: Return on Equity 
Following the reasoning in D’Avolio (2002) that firms with low cash flows are 
harder to value and thus are harder to short, it seems reasonable that firms with low return 
on equity would also be harder to short than firms with high return on equity.  Furthermore, 
Chen et al. (2011) show that return on equity is an important firm characteristic.  I define 
return on equity as income before extraordinary items scaled by average book value of 
equity.  I calculate average book equity as the average of beginning of the year and end of 




B.1.20 Hard-to-Short Measure 24: Share Price 
D’Avolio (2002) finds that some hard to borrow stocks have stock prices below $5.  
Meanwhile, Diether and Werner (2011) provide evidence that NYSE and NASDAQ stocks 
below $5 have higher short sale loan fees and loan fees decrease as share price increases 
(see Diether and Werner (2011) Table III). Here, I define share price as the end of the 
month firm share price listed in CRSP. 
B.1.21 Hard-to-Short Measure 25: Share Turnover 
Diether and Werner (2011) found that short sales loan fees increase as share 
turnover increases and D’Avolio (2002) found that high turnover securities have higher 
loan fees than low turnover securities. Share turnover is calculated as monthly share 
volume divided by common shares outstanding. 
B.1.22 Hard-to-Short Measure 26 and 27: Short-Term Reversal 
Diether and Werner (2011) finds a negative relation between prior 1-month return 
and short sales loan fees.  I use 2 different measures of stock price reversal.  The first 
measure is each firm’s return during the most recent month and the second measure is each 
firm’s return from the previous month. 
B.1.23 Hard-to-Short Measure 28: Short Interest 
Diether and Werner (2011) find a positive relation between short interest and short 
sale loan fees.  Similar to Diether and Werner (2011), I define short interest as number of 
shares sold short divided by number of common shares outstanding.  I use the most recent 
short interest value in our analysis. 
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B.1.24 Hard-to-Short Measure 29 and 30: Volatility 
In Diether and Werner (2011), the authors find a positive relation between stock 
volatility and short sale loan fees.  I use 2 different measures of volatility.  The first measure 
is the 3-month average of daily squared returns and the second measure is the 12-month 
average of daily squared returns.   
B.1.25 Hard-to-Short Measure 31–33: Average Hard-to-Short Rank, 
Decile Rank, and Quintile Rank 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012a) provide evidence that combining the 
information across variables can reduce the noise in each individual measure and create a 
more precise measure.  With the goal of creating a less noisy and more precise measure of 
the difficulty to short a particular security I create 3 different aggregate measures of the 
difficulty to short a security.  First I calculate the average hard-to-short variables rank.  
Each month I rank firms on each hard-to-short measure in descending order from hardest-
to-short to easiest-to-short.  I then calculate the average rank for each firm month 
observation.  Next, I calculate the average hard-to-short deciles rank using NYSE 
breakpoints.  Prior to imposing the price and industry filters, I allocate firms to 10 decile 
portfolios in ascending order from hardest-to-short to easiest to short using each of the 29 
hard-to-short measures.  Then for each firm month observation I calculate the average hard-
to-short decile rank. Finally, I calculate the average hard-to-short quintile rank.  Similar to 
the methodology used to calculate the average hard-to-short decile rank, I also calculate 





B.2 Brief Description of Liquidity and Short Sale  
Constraint Measures 
Amihud Illiquidity: Average 1-month Amihud (2002) illiquidity calculated using 
daily data.  Amihud defines illiquidity as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to 
the dollar trading volume on that day. 
Average Percentage of Zero Trading Days: Defined as the percentage of trading 
days within a month with 0 shares traded.  A trading day is defined as any day with a non-
missing daily return. 
Corwin-Schultz Bid-ask Spread: Defined as the 1-month average daily bid-ask 
spread calculated using the Corwin-Schultz (2012) bid-ask spread estimator. 
Daily Dollar Volume: Defined as the 1-month average daily dollar trading volume.  
Daily dollar trading volume is calculated each day by multiplying split-adjusted shares 
traded by the daily closing price. 
Daily Share Turnover: Defined as the 1-month average daily share turnover, with 
daily share turnover defined as shares traded divided by shares outstanding. 
Daily Volume: Defined as the 1-month average number of split-adjusted shares 
traded each day. 
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Beta: Defined as the liquidity beta estimated by 
regressing 60 months of excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors and on the 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) innovations in liquidity factor.   
Average Return Variance: Defined as the 1-month average of squared daily returns, 
in percentages. 
Forecast Dispersion: Defined as the standard deviation of analysts’ annual earnings 
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast.  Earnings forecasts 
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are adjusted to reflect the number of shares outstanding at the time of the forecast. The 
forecast dispersion measure is calculated using only the most recent analysts’ forecasts 
prior to the earnings announcement date.   
Idiosyncratic Risk: Following Ang et al. (2009), idiosyncratic risk is calculated as 
the standard deviation of the residuals from a monthly regression of daily excess returns 
on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model. Excess returns are calculated as the 
difference between firm returns and the risk-free rate, the 1-month Treasury bill rate. 
Institutional Ownership: Defined as the total number of shares held (from 13F 
filings) by financial institutions divided by shares outstanding. 
Short Interest: Total number of shares sold short divided by shares outstanding and 
multiplied by 100 to convert into percent form.   
B.3 Brief Description of Valuation Measures 
Analysts’ Expected Return: Defined as the mean analysts’ expected return.  For 
each analyst providing a 1-year ahead price target, we calculate an expected return as 
(Price-Target*Shares outstanding – Current Firm Size)/Current Firm Size.  Current firm 
size is defined to be current month-end share price multiplied by shares outstanding. 
Average Recommendation: Defined as the mean recommendation provided by 
I/B/E/S analysts.  Note that I/B/E/S uses the convention that 1= Strong Buy, 2= Buy, 3 = 
Hold, 4= Underperform, and 5 = Sell. 
Book-to-Market Ratio: Defined as the book value of equity divided by the market 
value of equity.  Book value of equity is calculated quarterly using the Fama and French 
(1992) definition.  Book values are lagged 4 months to make sure that information was 
known by the market.  Book-to-market ratios are updated monthly to reflect changes in 
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market value of equity. 
Compustat Intrinsic Value to Market Value of Equity Ratio: Defined as the median 
intrinsic value calculated using Compustat data divided by the current end-of-month 
market value of equity.  COMPUSTAT intrinsic value is estimated using the residual 
income model assuming that each firm’s current profitability is maintained in perpetuity.  
Thus, Compustat intrinsic value is defined as: 
Compustat intrinsic value = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸                          (18) 
where BEt-1 is the average book value of equity between times t-1 and t, IBt is annual 
income before extraordinary items at time t, rE is the cost of capital.  Equation (1) is 
estimated using a total of 7 different cost of capitals: cost of capital estimated using 60 
months of firm-level monthly returns and either the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor 
model or the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model, cost of capital estimated using 60 months of 
industry returns and either the Fama and French (1993) model or the Carhart (1997) model, 
or a discount rate of 8%, 10%, or 12%.  Industry returns are calculated for each of the 48 
Fama and French (1997) industries.  Industries are determined using the Compustat 
industry code where available. Otherwise, the CRSP SIC Code is used.  If a firm reports 
earnings before the release of its book value of equity then a synthetic book value of equity 
is constructed using the clean surplus relation, BEt = BEt-1 + IBt – Divt .  Intrinsic values 
less than 0 are set to missing. This methodology is closest to the methodology used in 
Ohlson (1995) and Bradshaw (2004). 
I/B/E/S Intrinsic Value to Market Equity Ratio (1): Defined as the median intrinsic 
value calculated using 1-year ahead I/B/E/S annual earnings forecasts divided by the 
current market value of equity.  Intrinsic value is calculated assuming that the forecasted 
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profitability remains constant in perpetuity.  I/B/E/S Intrinsic value is calculated using the 
following equation: 
Intrinsic Value = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1−𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸                             (19) 
where BEt  is the average book value of equity between periods t-1 and t, Forecasted IBt+1 
is the mean forecasted 1-year ahead expected earnings, and rE is 1 of the 7 cost of capital 
estimates.   
I/B/E/S Intrinsic Value to Market Equity Ratio (2): Defined as the median intrinsic 
value calculated using 1-year and 2-year ahead I/B/E/S annual earnings forecasts divided 
by the current market value of equity.  Intrinsic value is calculated assuming that the current 
dividend payout rate and the forecasted profitability remains constant in perpetuity.  
I/B/E/S Intrinsic value is calculated using the following equation: 
Intrinsic Value =𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1−𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡(1+𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸) +  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+2−𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1(1+𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸)∗𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸         (20) 
where BEt  is the average book value of equity between periods t-1 and t, Forecasted IBt+1 
is the mean forecasted 1-year ahead expected earnings, Forecasted IBt+2 is the mean 
forecasted 2-year ahead expected earnings and rE is 1 of the 7 cost of capital estimates.  
Intrinsic values less than 0 are set to missing. 
I/B/E/S Intrinsic Value to Market Equity Ratio (3): Defined as the median I/B/E/S 




Table B.1 Description of 50 variables used to construct 50 trading strategies. This table 
provides a brief description of the variables used to construct the 50 trading strategies.  A 
more detailed description of these variables is given in Bulsiewicz (2013). The first 16 
variables were used in Stambaugh et al. (2012b) and Bulsiewicz (2013) while the 
remaining 34 new variables were used in Bulsiewicz (2013).  More information, including 




Variable Short Name Definition
(1) Campbell Distress Campbell distress risk calculated following Campbell et al. (2008) definition
(7) Momentum (1)  Cumulative compound return from month t-12 to month t-2
(12) Combination Strategy (1) Combination Strategy from Stambaugh et al. (2012); Equally-weights strategies 1-1
(14) Firm Size share price multiplied by common shares oustanding
(15) Book-to-market (1)   book equity in fiscal year t-1 divided by market equity at the end of December 
of year t-1 (following Fama and French (1993) definition)
(16) Liquidity Beta (1)
regression of firm returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate on the 
Fama and French (1993) factors and aggregate liquidity using 60 months of data 
(following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003))
(11) Investments to Assets (1) annual change in gross property, plant and equipment plus the annual change in 
inventories scaled by the lagged book value of assets (Stambaugh et al (2012) 
(13) Market Beta (1) regress monthly firm returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate on the 
Fama and French (1993) market factor using a 60 month rolling window
(9) Asset Growth (1) annual change in total assets divided by lagged total assets (from Cooper et al. 
(2008))
(10) Return on Assets  (1) Income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets (from Fama and 
French (2006))
(6) Net Operating Assets defined as the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities 
scaled by lagged total assets (as in Hirshleifer et al. (2004))
(8) Gross Profitability total revenue less cost of goods sold divided by total assets (from Novy-Marx 
(2012b))
(4) Daniel Titman Composite 5 year log growth in market equity minus 5 year log return (from Daniel and 
Titman (2006))
(5) Accruals (1)
(change in current assets - change in cash - change in current liabilities - 
depreciation expense + change in short term debt + change in taxes 
payable)/average total assets (from Sloan (1996))
Panel A. Original financial variables
(2) O-Score (1) Ohlson's O-Score measure calculated using Chen Novy-Marx Zhang (2011) 
definition using Pre-tax income
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Variable Short Name Variable Description
(19) Analyst Coverage number of analysts providing annual earnings forecasts on the I/B/E/S database
(32) Liquidity Beta (2)
regression of firm returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate on the 
Fama and French (1993) factors and aggregate liquidity using 12 months of data 
(following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003))
(33) Liquidity Beta (3)
regression of firm returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate on the 
Fama and French (1993) factors and aggregate liquidity using 36 months of data 
(following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003))
(30) Investments to Assets (4)
ratio between capital expenditures scaled by sales and the average  capital 
expenditures over the prior 3 years  minus one. Capital expenditures is defined 
as CAPEX from COMPUSTAT. This definition is from Titman et al. (2004).
(31) Investments to Assets (5)
ratio between capital expenditures scaled by sales and the average  capital 
expenditures over the prior 3 years  minus one. Capital expenditures is defined 
as the difference between total assets and total liabilities. This definition is from 
Titman et al. (2004).
(28) Investments to Assets (2)
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX from COMPUSTAT) divided by lagged property, 
plant, and equipment (Avramov et al. (2012) definition)
(29) Investments to Assets (3)
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX from COMPUSTAT) divided by lagged property, 
plant, and equipment (Avramov et al. (2012) definition). Capital expenditures is 
calculated as the difference in total assets and total liabilities (Avramov et al. 
(2012) definition)
(26) Forecast Dispersion standard deviation of analysts' annual earnings forecasts (from Diether et al. 
(2002))
(27) Intermediate Momentum 6 month cumulative compound return from 6 months prior (Novy-Marx (2012a) 
definition)
(24) External Finance (1)
change in assets minus the change in retained earnings all divided by total 
assets. Changes are calculated using 1 year of data following Baker Wurgler 
(2006) definition
(25) External Finance (2)
change in assets minus the change in retained earnings all divided by total 
assets. Changes are calculated using 5 years of data following Baker Wurgler 
(2006) definition
(22) Earnings-to-market equity (2)
Earnings divided by market equity.  Earnings is defined as annual operating 
income after depreciation.  Market equity is defined as price multiplied by 
common shares outstanding. This variable is updated monthly to reflect changes 
in market equity.
(23) Earnings-to-market equity (3)
Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), earnings is defined as income before 
extraordinary items plus income statement deferred taxes minus preferred 
dividends while market equity is as previously defined. 
(20) Cash flow-to-market equity (2) cash flow-to-market equity (updated monthly). Cash flow is defined as operating 
income after depreciation minus accruals 
(21) Dividends-to-price (1) total dividends paid from July of year t-1 to June of year t per dollar of equity in 
June of year t (Kenneth French online definition)
Panel B. New financial variables
(17) Accruals (2)
change in operating working capital per split-adjusted share from fiscal year t-2 
to t-1 divided by book equity per split-adjusted share at t-1.  Operating working 
capital is defined as current assets minus cash and short term investments minus 
current liabilities plus debt in current liabilities (from Fama and French (2008))
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Panel B. New financial variables (continued)
(34) Long-term Reversal (1) 24 month cumulative compound return
(35) Long-term Reversal (2) 36 month cumulative compound return
(36) Long-term Reversal (3) 48 month cumulative compound return
(37) Market Beta (2) Market beta calculated using 12 months of data
(38) Momentum (2) cumulative compound return from month t-6 to t-1
(42) Return Variance (8) squared log 24 Month compound return 
(43) Sales Growth (1) 1 Year sales growth using Baker and Wurgler (2006) definition
(44) Sales Growth (2) 5 Year sales growth using Baker and Wurgler (2006) definition
(45) Sales-to-market equity (1) total revenues divided by market equity (calculated using  market equity in June)
(46) Short-run momentum (1) cumulative compound 3 month return
(47) Short-run momentum (2) Lagged 1 month cumulative compound 3 month return
(48) Short-term Reversal one month return at the time of formation
(49) SUE
SUE is defined as Standardized Unexpected Earnings, which is defined as the 
difference between current earnings and earnings four quarters ago divided by 
the standard deviation of this difference over the prior eight quarters (Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2006) definition)
(50) Unexpected Earnings (1)
difference between actual earnings reported in IBES and the median analysts’ 
forecasted quarterly earnings divided  by the share price at the end of the month 
prior to the earnings announcement ( Livnat and Mendhall (2006) definition)
(40) PPE-to-Assets total gross property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets (Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) definition)
(41) R&D-to-Assets research and development expense divided by total assets  (Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) definition
(39) Profit Margin earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided 





VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS FROM CHAPTER 3 
Accruals: Sloan (1996) finds that firms with low accruals outperform firms with 
high accruals.  Following Sloan (1996), I define accruals as: Accruals = (ΔCA – ΔCash) - 
(ΔCL – ΔSTD –ΔTP) – Dep, where   ΔCA is the change in current assets, ΔCash is the 
change in cash and equivalents, ΔCL is the change in current liabilities, ΔSTD is the change 
in debt included in current liabilities, ΔTP is the change in income taxes payable, and Dep 
is the depreciation and amortization expense.  I construct the accruals measure using annual 
COMPUSTAT data.   
Asset Growth: Cooper et al. (2008) found that firms with low asset growth 
outperform firms with high asset growth.  Using the definition given in Cooper et al. 
(2008), asset growth is defined as the year over year change in total assets divided by 
lagged total assets. 
Book-to-Market Ratio: Book-to-market ratio is defined as book equity for fiscal 
year t-1 divided by market equity at the end of December of year t-1.  Book equity is 
calculated as total assets minus total liabilities plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
minus preferred stock.  Market equity is calculated as share price multiplied by common 
shares outstanding.  I construct this measure following Fama and French (2008). 
Daniel and Titman Composite: Daniel and Titman (2006) find a negative relation 
between composite share issuances and stock returns.  Following their definition of 
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composite share issuances, I define composite share issuances as  
𝜄𝜄(𝑙𝑙 − 5, 𝑙𝑙) = log � 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−5
� − 𝑟𝑟(𝑙𝑙 − 5, 𝑙𝑙)                                         (21) 
where MEt  is the firm’s market equity today, MEt-5 is the firm’s market equity 5 years ago, 
and r(t-5,t) is this firm’s 5-year log return.  
Firm Size: Firm size is defined as price times shares outstanding, as in Fama and 
French (2008). 
Gross Profitability: Gross profitability is defined as total revenue less cost of goods 
sold divided by total assets.  This definition was used in Novy-Marx (2012). 
Idiosyncratic Risk: I follow the methodology of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 
(2009) and calculate idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the residuals from a 
monthly regression of daily excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model.  
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between firm returns and the risk-free rate, 
the 1-month Treasury bill rate.   
Investments-to-assets: I use the definition of investments-to-assets given in 
Stambaugh et al. (2012).  They define investments to assets as the annual change in gross 
property, plant, and equipment plus the annual change in inventories scaled by the lagged 
book value of assets.   
Momentum: I define momentum as the compound return between months t-12 and 
t-2.  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) provided evidence that firms with positive returns 
in the past continue to have positive returns in the short-term and firms with negative 
returns in the past continue to have negative returns in the short-term. 
Net Stock Issuances: Net stock issuances is defined as the log ratio of split adjusted 
shares to lagged split adjusted shares following Fama and French (2008). 
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O-Score: I use the definition of Ohlson’s (1980) O-score that was used in Chen, 
Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011).  Ohlson’s O-score measures the probability of bankruptcy 
and is calculated using a variety of accounting measures including: total assets, book value 
of debt, working capital, net income, etc.  
Persistence: Persistence is the institutional trade persistence measure from 
Dasgupta et al. (2011).  This variable measures the number of (consecutive) quarters that 
a certain stock has been bought or sold by financial institutions.  I construct this measure 
using 3 quarters of institutional holdings data.   
Residual Institutional Ownership: Residual institutional ownership was previously 
used in Nagel (2005) to study short sales and stock returns.  He defines residual institutional 
ownership as the residual ownership remaining after regressing logit institutional 
ownership on log firm size and squared log firm size. The goal of this measure is to capture 
the amount of institutional ownership that is unrelated to firm size.  I construct residual 
institutional ownership following the methodology given in Nagel (2005).   
Return on Assets: I calculate return on assets as income before extraordinary items 
divided by lagged total assets.  Return on assets was previously used in Fama and French 
(2006) to study the relation between profitable firms and stock market returns. 
Return on Equity: Return on equity is calculated as income before extraordinary 
items divided by lagged book equity.  I calculate this variable following the definition given 
in Chen et al. (2011). 
Share Turnover: Share turnover is calculated as the log of monthly share volume 
divided by common shares outstanding.  This definition is similar to the definition used in 
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